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 This dissertation is composed of three essays on financing decisions by firms. The 
first essay examines the cost of borrowing in the syndicated loan market for recent IPO 
firms. We find evidence of informational rent extraction by IPO underwriters that lend to 
firms after going public. The (informed) lender affiliated to the IPO underwriter on average 
earns a 5% higher abnormal payoff (interest) than an unaffiliated lender. When these loans 
commence trading on the secondary market, loans originated by affiliated lenders increase 
by 97 bps more than loans originated by unaffiliated lenders. Thus, the primary and 
secondary market evidence supports the hypothesis of informed lenders extracting 
informational rents from borrowers.  
The second essay explores the IPO decisions and the pricing of equity.  In a 
difference-in-difference (DD) framework, I provide causal evidence on the role of financial 
constraints on the IPO decision and the associated underpricing. I use the adoption of 
interstate banking laws as an exogenous variation in the availability of bank credit and 
thereby financial constraints. I find that financially constrained (FC) firms are more likely 
to pursue an IPO in response to a credit shock, and these FC issuers incur higher issuance 
costs in the form of higher underpricing. Post-issuance, FC firms exhibit higher investment 
intensity than Non-Financially Constrained (NFC) firms. 
v 
Finally, in the third essay I examine the implication of bundling M&A advisory and 
deal financing. The payoff to M&A advisers is usually contingent on deal completion but 
independent of deal outcome. This contractual arrangement may result in an agency 
problem. I examine whether bundling of M&A advisory and financing mitigates this 
problem. Consistent with contract theory, I find that buy-side advisers are more likely to 
finance deals when the agency problem is the most severe i.e., complex deals. These 
advisers trade off lower advisory fees for higher interest rates. Deal financing by advisers 
reduces the completion time and elicits a positive response from the market. 
vi 
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INFORMATION EFFICIENCY OR HOLD-UP WITH UNIVERSAL BANKS?  
SOME EVIDENCE FROM POST-IPO LOANS 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
The debate on the separation of commercial and investment banking activities of financial 
intermediaries continues unabated. Literature predominantly focuses on the benefits 
borrowers derive when financial intermediaries combine lending with other financial 
services to realize economies of scope (Gande, Puri, Saunders, and Walter (1997); 
(Drucker and Puri 2005); and many others). However, an equally important but less 
understood issue is the adverse outcome of the emergence of these one-stop shop 
intermediaries also known as universal banks on borrowers. The recent financial crisis of 
2008 has brought the issue of combining lending with investment banking back into the 
spotlight. Banks can create relationship specific capital through lending and non-lending 
relationships and can potentially exploit this capital at the expense of their clients. We 
examine the implications of universal banks using private information collected during the 
initial public offering (IPO) underwriting process on the subsequent lending decision.  
The interaction between banks and firms extends beyond lending relationships to 
other financial services such as securities underwriting, financial advisory, securities 
trading, analyst support, and investment management. Financial intermediaries use 
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information collected through lending relationships to trade in equity markets ((Massa and 
Rehman 2008); (Ivashina and Sun 2011)) and derivative markets (Acharya and Johnson 
2007).  
These banks when acting as M&A advisors exploit inside information to make 
favorable bets in the options market (Lowry, Rossi, and Zhu 2018) and in the equity market 
(Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov 2009). This opportunistic behavior of the universal banks 
may have an adverse impact on its clients. Further, creditors can influence the management 
to make decisions that benefit the creditor at the expense of the shareholder. It has been 
found that lenders can utilize their position on the borrower’s board of directors to solicit 
lending business and charge high interest rates on these loans (Ferreira and Matos 2012). 
The objective of this study is to bridge the gap in the literature on the adverse impact on 
borrowers when financial intermediaries cross-sell loans and equity underwriting by 
addressing two questions. First, do IPO firms exhibit a preference for specific lenders when 
borrowing after the IPO? Second, does this preference result in adverse outcomes for the 
borrowers?  
 An IPO is a watershed event in the life of a firm. Universal banks that act as 
underwriters to the IPO collect information on the firm's operations and management to 
price the equity issuance. The underwriter can reuse this inside information in the near 
future while making lending decisions to the issuing firm. In other words, the underwriter 
can create a relationship specific asset by performing due diligence on the issuer. Thus, 
IPO underwriting, and the subsequent lending provides an ideal context to test the 
implications of lenders exploiting private information.  
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 Our hypothesis is motivated by the seminal work of Sharpe 1990 on rent extraction 
by informed lenders. He develops a theoretical model to show that lenders can use 
relationship specific assets to extract economic rents from high quality borrowers.1 On the 
lines of Von Thadden 2004, we show that in a lending game between informed and 
uninformed lenders, the informed lenders can earn informational rents from good 
borrowers. Thus, we hypothesize that lenders affiliated to the IPO underwriters are more 
likely to charge higher spreads than commensurate with the borrower’s risk on post-IPO 
loans. We test our hypotheses using data on syndicated loans from LPC’s Dealscan and 
IPOs from SDC Platinum. Our primary sample includes 630 IPOs and 4,189 loans 
originated within 5 years from the IPO offer date. We find that loans originated by a lender 
affiliated to the IPO underwriter (informed) are 9% more expensive than loans originated 
by a lender that is unrelated to the IPO underwriter (uninformed).  
A firm’s decision to choose a lender may be endogenous, i.e., issuers and 
underwriters may self-select based on preferences and characteristics. In fact, we show that 
affiliated lenders in the theoretical model may prefer lending to good firms in equilibrium. 
Our empirical design accounts for this non-random matching between lenders and 
borrowers by implementing a self-selection model (Fang 2005; Li and Prabhala 2007). The 
first-stage lender-borrower matching regression indicates that large borrowers, borrowers 
with long term credit ratings, and borrowers with concentrated lending relationships are 
more likely to be paired with informed (affiliated) lenders. The second-stage regression 
indicates that loans originated by informed lenders are 5% more expensive than loans 
                                                          
1 These locked-in borrowers can eventually reduce bank's ability to extract rents through implicit contracts 
(Sharpe (1990)) and multiple sources of financing (Rajan (1992)). 
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originated by uninformed (unaffiliated) lenders. Our results are robust after controlling for 
loan purpose, loan type, industry and time fixed effects.  
The non-price features of the loan contract also support the informational rent 
extraction hypothesis. Lenders may be willing to forego control rights (covenants) in 
exchange for rights to surplus and thus, the difference in the pricing of the loan could be 
attributed to a tradeoff. We do not find any significant difference between the covenants 
for loans originated by affiliated and unaffiliated lenders.  
It is possible that the firm private information is correlated with lender 
characteristics and firm risk. We perform additional tests to show that the information 
priced in the loan is distinct from lender characteristics and borrower risk. Commercial and 
investment banks may pursue different lending policies. We account for this difference in 
our analysis. Systematic and idiosyncratic risk affect the price of debt securities (Campbell 
and Taksler 2003). We account for differences in overall borrower risk by controlling for 
the volatility of equity in our analysis. 
We devise a cleaner test to provide more conclusive evidence on informational rent 
extraction by comparing the origination price with the secondary market price for the same 
loan. In an efficient secondary market, when private information is disseminated, the price 
of the loan will converge to its fair value. We find that the price of loans originated by 
informed lenders on average increases by 97 basis points (bps) more than loans originated 
by uninformed lenders. In other words, the yield on loans from affiliated lenders decreases 
more in the secondary market than the yield on loans from unaffiliated lenders. We 
conclude that affiliated lenders originate loans at higher interest rates than commensurate 
with the firm’s risk.  
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Finally, we confirm our findings through a series of robustness tests. The possibility 
of earning abnormal profits would reduce with the passage of time because the value of 
private information collected during the IPO will diminish. It turns out that the economic 
value of rents is the strongest for the first loan after the IPO and is absent in a sample of 
loans originated between the sixth and tenth year after the IPO. Overall, the evidence 
presented here supports the idea that IPO underwriters can create relationship specific 
capital through the IPO underwriting process and may extract informational rents when 
they lend to the IPO firm.  
The initial empirical evidence on lender rent extraction in the literature focuses on 
the intensity of lending relationships and source of funding (Houston and James 1996; 
Farinha and Santos 2002). In more recent studies, one strand of literature evaluates the 
impact of lending relationships on the average cost of loans around a significant event such 
as equity IPO (Schenone 2010) or bond IPO (Hale and Santos 2009). A second strand of 
the literature explores the hold-up problem by comparing the cost of borrowing for firms 
with and without access to alternative sources of financing such as bond markets (Santos 
and Winton 2008) and external equity (Wu, Sercu, and Yao 2009). However, our attempt 
at understanding the rent extraction by lenders differs in at least two aspects from the 
documented findings. First, we identify a new channel for informational rent extraction by 
evaluating the impact of information collected through equity underwriting on the 
subsequent lending decision. Second, we overcome the endogeneity problem associated 
with the aforementioned studies by tracking the price of the same loan in the primary and 
secondary markets to draw conclusions on rent extraction.  
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 The empirical issue addressed in our paper is related to (Drucker and Puri 2005) 
and (Schenone 2010). Drucker and Puri 2005 find evidence of an economies of scope 
wherein concurrent lending and SEO underwriting lowers borrowing costs. Schenone 2010 
exploits the initial public offering (IPO) as an informational shock and finds evidence of 
rent extraction before the IPO and economies of scale after the IPO. We combine the issues 
in these papers by evaluating how IPO underwriters can utilize the private information 
produced in the underwriting process to extend loans to the IPO firm in the near future. 
Contrary to our findings, Chen, Ho, and Weng 2013 find that borrowers benefit by 
borrowing from their IPO underwriters.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We develop the hypotheses in Section 
II and describe the identification strategy in Section III. In section IV, we present the 
summary statistics. The main results are presented in Section V, followed by robustness 
checks in Section VI, and a confirmatory test using secondary market data in Section VII. 
Finally, we conclude in Section VIII. 
1.2. A MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The underwriter collects private information on the firm during the pre-IPO due 
diligence process and thus can create “relationship specific capital” (C. M. James 1992; 
Rajan 1992). An underwriter can exploit this relationship specific asset in multiple ways. 
First, underwriters are more likely to be involved in subsequent equity offerings of the 
issuer. Thus, IPO underwriting results in the creation of valuable relationship capital 
through loyalty (Burch, Nanda, and Warther 2005). Second, the underwriter can utilize the 
information for a quid pro quo arrangement with its institutional investor and retail clients. 
Underwriters allocate “hot” IPOs to its institutional clients in exchange for brokerage 
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commissions (Reuter 2006; Nimalendran, Ritter, and Zhang 2007) and to retail depositors 
in exchange for loans (Puri and Rocholl 2008). Finally, the underwriter can reuse this 
information to lend to the equity issuer and possibly extract informational rents from the 
firm i.e., hold-up (Rajan (1992)). In general, severity of hold-up is greater when the 
duration of the lending relationship is long (Degryse and Van Cayseele 2000), the lender 
is a large bank (Kano et al. 2011), and the lending market is concentrated (Petersen and 
Rajan 1995). 
In this section, we illustrate the theoretical mechanism underpinning our empirical 
analysis. The mechanism was first elucidated in a model by Sharpe 1990 and this model 
was later modified by Von Thadden 2004. On the lines of Von Thadden 2004, we build on 
Sharpe’s model to provide a mathematical intuition for our empirical work. Our model is 
set up as a two-period game between borrowers and lenders. Lenders are of two types – 
informed inside lender and uninformed outside lender. The inside lender collects private 
information on its borrowers’ quality in the first period and uses this information in making 
lending decisions in the subsequent period. The outside lender competes with the inside 
lender to finance the borrower’s project in the second period. 
1.2.1. The Model Setup 
Consider an economy with 2 types of firms – good (H) and bad (L). There are three 
times and two periods. A firm starts a project at t= t0 and needs borrow I to invest in the 
project at t=t1. If the project is successful, it will generate a cash flow of X that is sufficient 
to repay the bank at all reasonable rates at t=t2. If the project is unsuccessful, the payoff is 
zero. The project cash flow at t=t2 is observable and verifiable to all parties.  
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At t=t0, firms establish a relationship through their IPO process with a lender 
(informed). We assume that this inside (informed) lender collects information on the 
borrower till t=t1. For a particular borrowing firm, all the other lenders that are not affiliated 
with its underwriter do not collect information on the firm and remain uninformed. At t=t1, 
an intermediate signal for each firm can be observed by the inside lender and the firm. This 
intermediate signal ϒ is given by: 
ϒ {
   𝑆    𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑒𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1 
𝐹   𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑒𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑏𝑎𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1
           
The probability for ϒ=S for an H firm is pH, and the probability for ϒ=S for an L 
firm is pL. We assume that pH> pL. We also assume that the signal is private and cannot be 
observed by the uninformed (outside) banks. The outside banks know the identity of the 
inside bank for a borrower and the parameters for its private signal. 
At t=t1, firms can choose to borrow either from the inside lender (affiliated to the 
IPO underwriter) or from an outside lender. A borrowing firm will choose a lower rate if 
the inside and outside banks offer different rates and will randomly choose a lender if the 
same rate is offered. Banks are risk neutral, engage in Bertrand competition, and have 
unlimited access to funds at the net interest rate ?̅? . Figure 1 provides a graphical 
representation of the two-period game. 
We assume that the probability of success of the project at t=t2 for an “H” and “L” 
firm is also pH and pL, respectively. There are a fraction of θ high firms in the economy. 
Thus, the unconditional (pooled) probability of success at t=t2, as well as observing good 
performance at t=t1, is 
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𝑝𝑃 = θ𝑝𝐻  + (1-θ) 𝑝𝐿        (1) 
The Bayesian probabilities for success in period 2 after the inside lender observes the signal 
ϒ in period 1 are given by p(ϒ=S) and p(ϒ=F). 
𝑝(ϒ = 𝑆) = 𝑝𝐻 𝑝(𝐻|ϒ = 𝑆) + 𝑝𝐿𝑝(𝐿|ϒ = 𝑆) 
                                   = 𝑝𝐻 𝑝(𝐻|ϒ = 𝑆) + 𝑝𝐿(1 − 𝑝(𝐻|ϒ = 𝑆))  (2) 
 
Note that  
𝑝(𝐻|ϒ = 𝑆) =
𝜃𝑝𝐻
𝑝𝑃
       (3) 
So we can rewrite Eq. (2) and have 





      (4) 
Similarly,  
𝑝(ϒ = 𝐹) =
(1−𝑝𝐻)𝑝𝐻 𝜃+(1−𝑝𝐿)𝑝𝐿(1−𝜃)
1−𝑝𝑃
     (5) 
It is evident from the above expressions that p(ϒ =S) > 𝑝𝑃  > p(ϒ =F). 
At t=t1, a lender can be uninformed and thus cannot offer different rates for different 
borrowers. Denote the break-even rate for an uninformed lender as 𝑟𝑃. Note that a failed 
project offers zero payoffs, so we have: 
(1 + 𝑟𝑃) =  
1+ ?̅?
𝑝𝑃
               (6) 
An informed lender can offer different rates t=t1 based on the signal ϒ. Denote the break-
even rates for ϒ = 𝑆 and ϒ = 𝐹 as 𝑟𝑆 and 𝑟𝐹, respectively. We have  
(1 + 𝑟𝑆) =  
1+ ?̅?
𝑝𝑆
            (7) 
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(1 + 𝑟𝐹) =  
1+ ?̅?
𝑝𝐹
       (8) 
Clearly, 𝑟𝑆 < 𝑟𝑃  < 𝑟𝐹. 
 
If 𝑟𝑆, 𝑟𝑃 , and 𝑟𝐹.are the three rates that any bank can offer, an informed lender will 
𝑟𝑃 when it gets a signal of ϒ = 𝑆 and 𝑟𝐹 when it gets a signal of ϒ = 𝐹. Note that an 
informed bank will not offer 𝑟𝑆 since a signal of ϒ = 𝑆 cannot be observed by an outside 
bank. Also note that an outside bank cannot offer a rate of 𝑟𝑃: If an outside bank offers this 
rate to all firms, it will attract all firms with a signal of ϒ = 𝐹 and a firm with a signal of 
ϒ = 𝑆 will randomly choose between an informed or an uninformed bank. Consequently, 
the outside bank will earn a negative profit. Instead, the outside bank can be better off by 
offering 𝑟𝐹 to all firms. At equilibrium, a firm with a signal of ϒ = 𝑆 always borrows 
from the informed bank, and a firm with a signal of ϒ = 𝐹 will randomly choose between 
an informed and an uninformed lender.  
However, a bank should be able to lend at whatever rate it chooses. If so, the 
aforementioned analysis is incomplete and there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. 
But there exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies (Von Thadden 2004). Following 
Von Thadden (2004), we first prove that no Nash equilibrium exists in our model setup in 
Proposition 1 and identify the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies in Proposition 2.    
Proposition 1: The lending game in period 2 has no Bayesian Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies. 
Proof: See Appendix B 
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The intuition behind Proposition 1 is simple. The inside bank of a borrowing firm 
can potentially earn informational rents by charging a rate above the expected rate. But for 
any pure strategies (i.e., set a particular interest rate for an H firm), if the rate for an H firm 
is high enough for an outside bank to earn at least zero profit, the outside bank would offer 









When the inside bank offers a rate that in at or above 𝑟′, an outside bank has an 
incentive to offer 𝑟′. Call this case the high rate case. For the high rate case, the inside 
bank has an incentive to lower the rate to outbid the outside lender and gain more lending 
business for H firms and collect more informational rents. But for any rates that are below 
𝑟′, an outside will only offer 𝑟𝐹 and hence will only lend to L firms. Call this the low rate 
case. In this case, the inside bank has an incentive to increase the rate to earn more 
informational rents from H firms. Thus, neither the high nor the low rate case can be an 
equilibrium.   
The above game is similar to a non-cooperative first-price, sealed bid auction with 
asymmetric information, where the set-up involves an informed bidder and an uninformed 
bidder. The equilibrium for such a model has been characterized by Wilson 1967 and 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom, and Weber 1983. The optimum bidding strategy for both 
bidders must consider both the private information of a competing bidder and the 
information revealed when a bid wins over competing offers. There exists a mixed strategy 
equilibrium such that the expected profits for uninformed bidders are zero, while informed 
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bidders earn a positive profit. Hendricks and Porter 1988 find empirical support for the 
existence of such an equilibrium. 
The equilibrium with mixed strategies for our model is characterized as follows: 
Proposition 2: There exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for the 
lending game in period 2. The inside bank offers 𝑟𝐹 for firms with an F signal, and offers 




 , where 𝑟 ∈ [𝑟𝑝, 𝑟𝐹) for firms with 
an S signal. An outside bank offers 𝑟𝐹  with a probability of 𝑝(𝐹) and offers r with a 
density function of 𝑔𝑂 = 𝑝(𝑠)𝑔𝑖
𝑆(r), where 𝑟 ∈ [𝑟𝑝, 𝑟𝐹) for all firms. 
Proof: See Appendix B 
Proposition 2 suggests that an outside lender can still put on a limited competition 
for good risk even without inside information. Furthermore, such limited competition 
lowers the borrowing costs on average. Note that an outside bank can just offer 𝑟𝐹, only 
attract firms with an F signal, and still earn a zero profit. This strategy would allow the 
inside bank to charge a higher rate on average for good risk (firms with an S signal).  
Outside lenders on average still earn zero profits, although with limited competition 
they do earn positive profits from firms with an S signal. However, the inside bank can still 
take advantage of its information, put a greater weight on the density function for lending 
to firms with an S signal, and earn a higher profit from lending to firms with an S signal. 
We state the result as Proposition 3. 
Proposition 3: Inside lenders on average earn a higher profit than outside lenders when 
lending to a firm that signals “S”. 
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Proof: See Appendix B 
Proposition 2 also suggests that both good and bad firms can switch lenders from 
their IPO to their post-IPO loans. Bad firms are more likely to borrow from outside banks 
because they sometimes get a rate below their fair rates from an outside bank. Good firms 
are more likely to borrow from the inside bank because the inside bank takes advantage 
of its inside information and puts a greater weight on each rate that it offers to a firm with 
an S signal. We state this result as Proposition 4.  
Proposition 4: Firms that signal “S” are more likely to borrow from inside lender while 
firms that signal “F” are more likely to borrow from outside lender. 
Proof: See Appendix B 
1.2.2. A Numerical Example and Empirical Implications 
We provide a numerical demonstration of the model below. 
Assumptions  
Probability of success for "H" firms (pH) 95.00% 
Probability of success for "L" firms (pL) 80.00% 
Fraction of "H" firms in the economy (θ) 60.00% 
Average cost of raising funds for lender (r̅) 0.50% 
Computation  
Probability of an S signal, 𝑝𝑃, in period 1  
(θpH + (1- θ) pL) 
89.00% 
Probability of an F signal (1 − 𝑝𝑃) in period 1  11.00% 
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(θ(1-pH) + (1- θ)(1-pL)) 
Baysean Probability (pe) of success when lending to the average 
firm in period 2 when signal = “S”, p(S) 
89.61% 
Baysean Probability (pe) of success when lending to the average 
firm in period 2 when signal = “F”, p(F) 
84.09% 
Equilibrium Interest Rates (r𝑆 < r𝑃< r𝐹)  
Full information rate for good firm in period 2 (r𝑆) 12.16% 
Full information rate for bad firm in period 2 (r𝐹) 19.51% 
Uninformed (pooled) interest rate (r𝑃) 12.92% 
 
In our example, the uninformed lender randomizes the rate offered to a firm within 
[12.92 %, 19.51 %) and the informed lender randomizes the rate offered to a firm signaling 
“S” within [12.92 %, 19.51 %]. We discretize the distributions 𝑔𝑜(r) and 𝑔𝑖
𝑆(r) to compute 
the average profit for the informed and uninformed lender. The interest rate and profit for 
the inside and outside lender are presented in Figure 2. 
Figure 2(b) provides an insight into the underlying mechanism. The inside lender 
earns a profit by lending to firms that signal “S”. An outside lender does not observe the 
signal and breaks even by lending to both “S” and “F” firms. The outside lender earns a 
profit by lending to firms that signal “S”, which is offset by a loss on lending to firms that 
signal “F”. Thus, a lender affiliated to the IPO underwriter can have some ex-post 
monopoly power over “S” firms. 
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We can draw conclusions on the bidding strategy of inside and outside lenders by 
evaluating the features of the post-IPO loan contract. Proposition 4 implies that everything 
else being equal, successful (ϒ="S") firms are more likely to borrow from an affiliated 
lender, while unsuccessful (ϒ="F") firms are more likely to borrow from an unaffiliated 
lender. Thus, everything else being equal, firms that borrow from affiliated lenders will 
have a lower default rate than those that borrow from an unaffiliated lender. Proposition 2 
implies that affiliated lenders earn profits while unaffiliated lenders breakeven. The 
affiliated lender observes the signal ϒ, i.e., private information. Proposition 3 suggests that 
such private information enables an affiliated lender to charge on average a higher rate for 
successful firms than what an unaffiliated lender charges. If we compare the spread 
(interest rate) on loans originated by affiliated and unaffiliated lenders, the difference in 
the spread should be positive after controlling for firm and loan characteristics. A key 
assumption in our set-up is that the informed lender has access to relevant private 
information. However, the unexplained difference in the spread after controlling for firm 
and loan characteristics could be attributed to unobservable borrower risk, private 
observable borrower risk or lender preferences. These sources of unexplained variation 
may not be mutually exclusive. Investment banks lend to riskier firms but price risk more 
generously than commercial banks (Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi 2006). Thus, the 
difference in the price may be correlated to lender characteristics. One possible solution to 
disentangling these joint hypotheses would be to observe the change in the price of the loan 
when private observable borrower risk is made public, arguably in the secondary loan 
market. We lay out our approach to relate the pricing of the loan with private observable 
borrower risk in the next section. 
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1.3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
In the U.S., the Glass-Steagall Act (1933) made it mandatory for financial 
institutions to separate their commercial and investment banking businesses into 
independent entities. However, after the sixties, federal regulators made less stringent 
interpretation of the provisions in the Glass-Steagall Act and this permitted commercial 
banks to operate investment banking businesses to varying degrees. The Glass-Steagall Act 
was formally repealed and replaced by the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (1999), which 
permitted commercial banks to operate investment banking businesses. In our main sample, 
we only include loans from universal banks because commercial banks may not offer any 
ancillary services such as underwriting, analyst coverage, and financial advisory. A lender 
that has common ownership with an IPO underwriter is designated as a universal bank.2 
For example, Salomon Smith Barney (underwriter) was affiliated to Citibank (lender) 
because they shared a common owner - Citigroup. In addition, we also account for mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As) between commercial banks. For example, Wells Fargo (lender) 
acquired Wachovia (lender). Finally, we also account for universal banks acquiring pure 
investment banks. For example, Deutsche Bank (universal bank) acquired Alex Brown & 
Sons (underwriter). 
1.3.1. Lender Affiliation and the Cost of Borrowing 
We evaluate the difference in the pricing of loans originated by informed lenders 
and uninformed lenders. This price is the All-in-drawn spread (AISD) of a syndicated loan. 
The lead lender negotiates the terms of the loan on behalf of the syndicate members. Hence, 
                                                          




we only consider the lead lender for the purpose of our analysis. A lead lender that is 
affiliated to the underwriter of the borrower’s IPO is designated as an affiliated lender 
(Aff_Lender). The regression model is specified as an Ordinary Least Squares model with 
the natural logarithm of the AISD as the dependent variable. 
 
 𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝐼𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑗) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1  𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗  + 𝛽2
′  𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖
+ 𝛽3
′ 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑗 + 𝜃𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝜇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒 +  𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
+ 𝛿𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝑖𝑗 
(1) 
where 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟 is a vector for borrower characteristics and 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟 is 
a vector of loan characteristics. Aff_Lender is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
the IPO underwriter and the lead bank of the syndicated loan are the same. The suffix ‘i’ 
designates a borrower and ‘j’ designates a loan. The multiple facilities of a syndicated loan 
(package) are not independent. Hence, the standard errors are clustered at the package 
level.  
Our theoretical framework in Section II suggests that the coefficient on 
𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗, 𝛽1, is positive. Proposition 3 suggests that an inside lender on average earn 
a greater profit from lending to “good” firms because of its private information. The mixed 
strategy equilibrium identified in Proposition 2 implies that some “bad” firms are able to 
borrow at a lower rate from an unaffiliated lender. Putting these together, Propositions 2 
and 3 imply that the loans for both “good” and “bad” firms, respectively, from an affiliated 
lender on average have a greater interest rate. We, as well as the literature, often refer to 
𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 as a proxy for private information. Note that the higher rates for loans from 
affiliated lenders are due to the fact that an affiliated lender can use its private information 
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to earn informational rents by better targeting good firms and avoiding lending below-fair 
rate to bad firms. 𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 as a proxy for private information does not mean better 
firm quality. 
One could argue that Eq. (1) can control for more factors that partly capture the 
inside lender’s private information at 𝑡 = 𝑡1 (when lending decisions are made). If this is 
true, the control variables collectively affect the predicted value of the spread of a loan and 
hence the intercept of the regression, as well as the estimation of the covariance matrix and 
the t-statistics. The coefficient on 𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 captures the advantage of an affiliated 
lender due to its private information. Its point estimate is not affected by how well one’s 
regression model can capture different lenders’ private information.  
Also, although “bad” firms are more likely to borrow from unaffiliated lenders, 
loans from unaffiliated lenders do not overall carry a higher rate, everything else being 
equal. A bad firm would randomly choose between the affiliated and unaffiliated lenders 
if both lenders offer it 𝑟𝐹, the fair rate for firms that signal F. A bad firm switches to an 
unaffiliated lender because it is offered a rate for “good” firms. An increased likelihood for 
bad firms to borrow from an unaffiliated lender due to such switching does not imply an 
overall higer rate, although these bad firms are risker borrowers. 
Furthermore, the coefficient on 𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 can simply capture additional risks 
beyond known firm and loan characteristics, although it is hard to find a theoretical 
foundation for such an argument. The regression model in Eq. (1) cannot rule out this 
possibility. We discuss another empirical strategy to lend more direct support for the hold-
up hypothesis as we outlined in the model.    
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1.3.2. Cost of Borrowing and Private Information  
In Proposition 4, we showed that affiliated lenders are more likely to lend to “good” 
firms than unaffiliated lenders. From an econometric perspective, this preference 
(assortative matching) results in regression estimates that are no longer consistent. This 
self-selection can be corrected by using a modified Heckman two-step procedure ((Li and 
Prabhala 2007); (Fang 2005)). This correction for the non-random matching of borrowers 
and lenders helps us estimate the value of private information and thereby reduce the 
ambiguity on the interpretation of the positive coefficient on 𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗. 
In the first step, we model the decision of a firm to borrow from an affiliated lender 
or an unaffiliated lender. This decision is modeled based on economic theory (relevance 
condition). The relevance condition requires that we include at least one explanatory 
variable that is correlated with the choice of borrower but is not directly correlated to the 
main outcome variable - AISD.  
The issuer-underwriter pairing is positive assortative, i.e., high quality firms match 
with more reputable underwriters in the IPO underwriting market (Fernando, Gatchev, and 
Spindt 2005). Bank dependent firms prefer a reputed underwriter to improve the chances 
of a successful IPO and obtain lower underpricing (R. Carter and Manaster 1990; R. B. 
Carter, Dark, and Singh 1998, Schenone 2004). These borrowers that go public with their 
relationship bank are usually larger (assets) and have higher financial leverage than issuers 
that go public with a non-relationship bank. Further, large firms may prefer reputed (large) 
underwriters because these underwriters are usually affiliated to large universal banks with 
a greater breadth of financial services and depth of fund raising to meet the future financing 
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requirements of the firm. Thus, the reputation of the underwriter is correlated with the 
quality of the firm (relevance condition) .  
Underwriters protect their reputation by acting as credible information producers. 
The underwriter must produce accurate information to gain market share because it is 
involved in a repeated game with investors who subscribe to IPOs. The literature suggests 
that the underwriting market share is positively related to underwriter reputation 
(Megginson and Weiss 1991; Chemmanur and Fulghieri 1994). Thus, in the first step (Eq. 
(2)) we regress the choice of lender on the reputation of the underwriter. It is unlikely that 
the reputation of the underwriter in the IPO market is directly correlated with the spread 
on the loan. Thus, the exclusion condition is satisfied.   
Aff_Lender = {
0,        𝑍𝑖𝛼 +  𝜂𝑖 ≤ 0
1,        𝑍𝑖𝛼 +   𝜂𝑖 > 0
 
 Pr (AffLenderij)  
=  𝛼0 + 𝛼1UW_Rank𝑖𝑗  + 𝛼2BorrowerChar𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛼3LoanChar𝑖𝑗 +  
 𝜃𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝜇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒 +  𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑ustry + 𝛿𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜂𝑖   
(2) 
UW_Rank  in Eq. (2) is the Carter-Manaster ranking (underwriter) of the 
underwriter. The Carter-Manaster (CM) ranking is our main measure of underwriter 
reputation (R. Carter and Manaster 1990). It is constructed by using the number of IPO 
tombstone announcements managed by an underwrite. 3  The lowest reputation 
underwriters are assigned a value of 0 and the highest reputation underwriters are assigned 
                                                          
3 A tombstone is a public formal announcement of an IPO. 
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a value of 9. Using the coefficients from equation Eq (2), we estimate the modified inverse 
Mills ratio -  𝜆 𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 as follows:  
 
 𝜆 𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 =  𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟
𝜙(𝑍?̂?)
𝛷(𝑍?̂?)
 + (1 − 𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟)
𝜙(𝑍?̂?)
1 − 𝛷(𝑍?̂?)
    
where ϕ is the probability distribution function and Φ is the cumulative density 
function, ?̂? is the first-step Probit estimate of the selection model, and 𝑍 is the vector of 
explanatory variables in the Probit regression. The inverse Mills ratio term ( λ 𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟) 
is mathematically equal to E(ηi | Lender Type), which is an updated estimate of the private 
information (Li and Prabhala 2007). On one hand, affiliated lenders can earn abnormal 
profits by lending to “good” firms and so on average  λ 𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 will be positive for 
affiliated lender loans. On the other hand, unaffiliated lenders breakeven by lending at a 
premium to “good” firms and at a discount to “bad” firms, and hence, on average 
 λ 𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 will be zero for unaffiliated lender loans. Thus, by including the modified 
inverse Mills ratio ( λ 𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟), we are testing for the relevance of private information.  
In the second step (Eq (3)), we model the spread on the loan (AISD) as a function 
of private information, borrower characteristics and loan characteristics:  
 𝐿𝑛(𝐴𝐼𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑗) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝜆 𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗
 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝜃𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝜇𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒 + 𝛾𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
+ 𝛿𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝑖 
(3) 
A positive coefficient on  λ 𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟  would suggest that on average affiliated 
lenders earn abnormal profits, while unaffiliated lenders earn zero abnormal profits. We 
provide a more detailed description of the empirical design in Appendix C. 
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1.3.3. The Secondary Loan Market and Hold-Up 
We provide more direct evidence on informational rent extraction by evaluating the 
change in the pricing of the loan in response to dissemination of private information. As 
discussed in the previous section,  𝜆 𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 is an estimate of the private information 
conditional on the firm’s choice. This private information could be attributed to 
unobservable borrower risk, private observable borrower risk or lender preferences. There 
exists some evidence that investment banks are more likely to lend to riskier firms, but they 
price risk more generously than commercial banks (Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi 2006). 
We disentangle these joint hypotheses by observing the change in the pricing of the loan 
when private observable borrower risk is made public. An increase in the price of the loan 
would suggest that informed lenders price private observable borrower risk at origination 
and earn economic rents. 
Syndicated loans are traded in the secondary loan market. A lending syndicate 
consists of a lead lender and multiple participants. Initially, the lead lender determines the 
pricing of the loan and monitors the borrower on behalf of the syndicate. The lead lender 
disseminates private information on the borrower to syndicate members, who use this 
information to facilitate the process of price discovery in the secondary loan market 
(Bushman, Smith, and Wittenberg-Moerman 2010). 
Syndicate participants can trade on private information in the secondary loan 
market because these loans are not considered as securities and thus, are not governed by 
the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934. A Standard & Poor’s report (2001) on the secondary 
market identified significant movement in loan prices without any corresponding news and 
concluded that participants trade on private information. Institutional investors also use 
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private information acquired in the loan market to trade in public securities (Ivashina and 
Sun 2011). 
The principle of market efficiency would imply that the secondary market would 
price the loan fairly, i.e., the price will be commensurate with the risk of the firm. The 
secondary loan market can be informationally more efficient than the secondary bond 
market (E. I. Altman, Gande, and Saunders 2010) and the secondary equity market (Park 
and Wu 2009). Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the principle of market efficiency can 
be applied to the secondary loan market.  
If the hold-up story as we model is true, then the yield of loans for “good” firms in 
the secondary market will be lower than the yield at origination, and these underpriced 
loans are more likely to be from an affiliated lender. In other words, the price of the loan 
from an affiliated lender will on average increase more than a loan from an unaffiliated 
lender. However, if affiliated lenders originate riskier loans and these loans are fairly priced 
(overpriced) as suggested by Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi 2006, the price should remain 
unchanged (decrease). 
We use the following regression model to disentangle the hold-up and the riskier 
loan hypotheses: 
 ΔP𝑖𝑗 =  𝜓0 + 𝜓1Aff_Lender𝑖𝑗  + 𝜓2BorrowerChar𝑖𝑗 + 𝜓3LoanChar𝑖𝑗






Where, ΔP is the change in the price of the loan i.e., (Pt=1 – Pt=0) and Δ𝜗 is the 
change in macro-economic conditions. If the coefficient 𝜓1 is positive and significant, we 
can conclude that loans originated by affiliated lenders on average experience a greater 
decline in expected yield/spread than loans originated by unaffiliated lenders. That is, a 
positive coefficient 𝜓1 is supportive of the hold-up hypothesis. 
1.4. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
We obtain information on IPOs of issuers located in the U.S. from Thomson 
Reuters' SDC Platinum database. We restrict the sample to IPOs with offer dates between 
1995 and 2016 because the syndicated loan data is more reliable after 1995. Our proxy for 
underwriter reputation is the Carter-Manaster (CM) underwriter ranking from Jay Ritter's 
website.4 We also compute two additional measures of underwriter reputation using the 
IPO data from SDC Platinum. 
The information on syndicated loans is from the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) 
Dealscan database. We merge the IPO data with the syndicated loan data for loans 
originated between 1995 and 2012 using the link file provided by (Chava and Roberts 
2008). We manually match IPOs and loans by issuer name for loans originated between 
2013 and 2016. A loan is designated a post-IPO loan if the loan deal activation date is after 
the IPO offer date. We visually inspect each loan and identify loans with lead lenders that 
are affiliated to the IPO underwriter. We designate a lender as an affiliated (informed) 
lender if the lead lender of the loan and the IPO underwriter share a common owner 
(holding company). Issuers may borrow from pure commercial banks or universal banks.  




We only retain loans arranged by universal banks because these banks can utilize 
information collected during the IPO due diligence while lending to firms after the IPO. 
Finally, we augment the sample by adding firm characteristics from COMPUSTAT. We 
exclude firms in highly regulated industries such as financial services (SIC between 6000 
and 6999) and utilities (SIC between 4900 and 4999). The final sample includes 630 IPOs 
with 2,389 loan packages and 4,189 loan facilities with deal activation dates within 5 years 
after the IPO offer date. We winzorize all explanatory variables at the 99% and 1% tail of 
the distribution. 
Our identification strategy also includes a test on loan secondary market data. We 
obtain loan secondary market data from Thomson Reuter and Standard & Poor Leveraged 
Commentary & Data (LCD). The Thomson data consist of daily market quotations for 
syndicated loans and includes the average bid price, average ask price, and the number of 
quotations. The LCD data include the primary market pricing terms when a loan is 
originated and the first trade price of a loan when it breaks into the secondary market. We 
match the primary DealScan data with the Thomson and LCD data using the Loan 
Identification Number (LIN), issuer name, or loan activation date. Our secondary market 
data start in 2000. The secondary market sample includes 630 loan facilities with deal 
active dates within 5 years after the IPO offer date.  
The summary statistics for the sample are provided in Table 1. The theoretical 
framework indicates that the informed lenders are more likely to lend to good firms based 
on private information. From an empirical perspective, a good firm has a lower default risk. 
In Panel A, the borrower characteristics suggest that firms that are large (assets) and more 
tangible assets are more likely to borrow from affiliated lenders. Such firms are less likely 
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to default on a loan. The lending pattern of affiliated and unaffiliated lenders is consistent 
with (Gopalan, Udell, and Yerramilli 2011) who find that large COMPUSTAT firms are 
less likely to switch lenders while small COMPUSTAT firms are more likely to switch 
lenders. Firms can mitigate the hold-up problem by borrowing from multiple lenders 
(Rajan 1992). Although switching lenders lowers interest rates, over time as the borrower 
gets informationally locked-in, the lender will increase the interest rate (Ioannidou and 
Ongena 2010). We follow Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan 2011 in defining the 
intensity of prior lending relationships. It is the fraction of the amount borrowed from a 
given lender in the last 5 years to the total amount borrowed in the last 5 years.5 Affiliated 
lenders are also more likely to lend to firms if they have an existing lending relationship.  
Loan package characteristics and loan facility characteristics are presented in 
Panels B and C. A loan package can comprise of multiple facilities. Each facility is a unique 
loan type (revolvers/term loans) with unique features. Loan packages originated by 
affiliated (informed) lenders are more likely to be larger (amount) and are secured. 
Furthermore, these loan packages are more likely to be originated by a larger syndicate. 
The size of the syndicate is inversely related to the amount of public information available 
on the firm (Ivashina 2009). The facility level characteristics suggest that affiliated lenders 
seek a higher spread on the loan across all loan types.  
Rajan 1992 argues that the optimal maturity of a loan should be proportional to the 
lender’s rights to the surplus. The ability to hold-up the firm will endow the lender with 
property rights to the firm. If the firm opts for short-term debt, the bank has direct control 
                                                          
5 Our results remain unchanged if we use alternative definitions prescribed in (S. T. Bharath et al. 2011) 
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rights, i.e., the possibility of refusing to rollover the loan in bad states. However, if the firm 
opts for long-term debt, the lender gives up some right to the surplus by continuing to lend 
even in bad states. The manager may not have an incentive to exert effort when the bank 
provides a short-term loan. Hence, a firm should borrow long term from a bank when the 
lender has the power to hold-up the firm. In Panel C, loans from affiliated lenders have a 
longer maturity. This supports the theoretical result from Rajan 1992.  
Finally, in Panel D we present the characteristics of the secondary market data. For 
both the first trade price and the 30-day average market price of the loan measured at least 
1 month after origination, the price changes of loans from both affiliated and unaffiliated 
lenders tend to decline. However, the average price decline of loans originated by affiliated 
lenders is significantly less than that of the loans originated by unaffiliated lenders. The 
univariate tests provide suggestive evidence of rent extraction by informed lenders.  
1.5. MAIN RESULTS 
We now test our hypotheses in a multivariate setting. First, we compare the price 
of loans originated by affiliated (informed) and unaffiliated (uninformed) lenders to test 
the informational rent extraction (hold-up) hypothesis. Subsequently, we try to eliminate 
alternative explanations for the difference in the pricing of loans. Finally, we augment the 
evidence on rent extraction by providing additional evidence from the secondary market. 
The results of the multivariate test using Eq. (1) are presented in Table 2. The 
sample includes all loans originated by a universal bank within 5 years after the IPO offer 
date. We include loan type, loan purpose, industry (two-digit SIC), and year fixed effects. 
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The multiple facilities that constitute a syndicated package are not independent and hence, 
we cluster standard errors at the package level.  
In Column (1), the coefficient on 𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 suggests that loans from affiliated 
lenders are 12% more expensive than loans from unaffiliated lenders. Note that we do not 
control for loan characteristics in Column (1) to avoid potential simultaneity bias. After 
controlling for both firm and loan characteristics in Columns (2) and (3), affiliated lenders 
charge 8-9% more in interest than unaffiliated (uninformed) lenders. The average spread 
for loans from unaffiliated lenders is 212 bp. An additional 12% of the loan spread means 
that a firm can potentially pay a 25 bp higher spread due to hold-up.  
The coefficients on the control variables in Table 2 are consistent with the findings 
in the literature. Large firms (assets), firms that are rated, and firms that exhibit superior 
operating performance (profit) pay lower spreads. Firms with existing banking 
relationships also enjoy lower spreads. It appears that loans originated by sole lenders carry 
a lower spread.6 Overall, it appears that firms pay a higher spread if they borrow from an 
informed lender.  
However, it is possible that the choice to borrow from an affiliated lender may not 
be random. In fact, in the theoretical framework we show that good firms are more likely 
to borrow from an affiliated lender while, the bad firms are more likely to borrow from an 
unaffiliated lender. We address this problem by adopting a two-step Heckman procedure 
(Li and Prabhala 2007) using Eqs. (2) and (3). The results are presented in Table 3. In the 
                                                          
6 (Ivashina 2009) finds that asymmetric information between the lead bank and participants will result in 
participants demanding a higher interest rate. In a multivariate test, we do not find any evidence of the lead 
lender’s share influencing the results. 
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first step, we use the reputation (UW_Rank) of the underwriter as an identification variable. 
In Columns (1) and (3), the coefficients on UW_Rank are positive and statistically 
significant. Reputed underwriters are more likely to act as future lenders to IPO firms. This 
could be attributed to the superior ability of reputed underwriters to produce information. 
Further, reputed underwriters (universal banks) have larger lending businesses. Hence, 
these underwriters are more likely to meet the future financing needs of firms that have a 
greater demand for external finance.  
The second step involves regressing the outcome variable (spread on the loan) on 
the inverse Mills ratio from the first step, and the same set of control variables from the 
first step. In Columns (2) and (4), the coefficients on λAff_Lender are positive and remain 
statistically significant. Firms borrowing from affiliated lenders pay 5% more than firms 
that borrow from unaffiliated (uninformed) lenders. In economic terms, the average AISD 
is 220 basis points and the average loan amount is USD 250 million. Thus, an increase in 
5% is equivalent to 11 basis points, or USD 275,000 per year.  
The inverse Mills ratio term (λAff_Lender) that accounts for self-selection is equal to 
E(ηi | Lender Type), which is an updated estimate of firm’s private information held by the 
affiliated lender. Hence, by including λAff_Lender in our regressions, we are actually testing 
for the relevance of private information. A positive coefficient on λAff_Lender would suggest 
that affiliated lenders incorporate private information in the pricing of the loan and earn 
abnormal profits. In other words, it is plausible that when lenders possess private 
information on firms, they can extract rents in the near future. 
Bank characteristics may be correlated with the spread of the loan. Investment and 
commercial banks may adopt a different pricing policy (Harjoto, Mullineaux, and Yi 2006). 
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Banks regulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) are required to file 
periodic Call Reports. We designate lenders that file a call report as a non-pure investment 
bank and lenders that do not file a call report as a pure investment bank. For example, 
Lehman Brothers is designated as a pure investment bank and Bank of America is 
designated as a non-pure investment bank. In unreported results, we find that firms 
borrowing from investment banks incur a higher cost of borrowing. However, loans 
originated by affiliated lenders are still more expensive than loans originated by 
unaffiliated lenders. Further, using a sub-sample of loans originated by non-pure 
investment banks, we include bank characteristics from the Call reports. It turn out that 
bank characteristics do not erode our results. Thus, neither bank type or bank characteristics 
explain the pricing of private information in loans originated by affiliated lenders. 
It is possible that the private information incorporated in the pricing of the loan may 
be correlated with firm risk. We include the total risk of the firm in our regressions. The 
results presented in Table 4 indicate that riskier firms, i.e., firms with greater volatility, are 
more likely to borrow from affiliated lenders. However, the coefficients on λAff_Lender are 
positive and statistically significant. In both economic and statistical terms our results 
remain unchanged.   
When lenders acquire rights to surplus (informational rents) in a firm, they may 
forego control rights to ensure that the equity investor (manager) has an incentive to exert 
effort (Rajan 1992). Thus, lenders affiliated to IPO underwriters may be willing to accept 
fewer covenants (control rights). In other words, our results could be explained by a trade-
off between spreads and covenants. We use the Covenant Intensity Index (Bradley and 
Roberts 2015) to proxy for covenants in the loan contract. We evaluate the difference in 
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Covenant Intensity Index for affiliated and unaffiliated lender loans in Table 5. There 
appears to be no statistical difference in the covenants incorporated in loan contracts 
originated by affiliated and unaffiliated lenders.  
Overall, in this section we show that affiliated lenders can create a relationship 
specific asset through IPO underwriting and use it to extract rents when lending to the IPO 
firm. These results are consistent with the hold-up hypothesis as we outlined in our model. 
1.6. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
In this section, we provide a series of tests that validate our empirical design and 
confirm the underlying assumptions.  
1.6.1. Measures of Underwriter Reputation 
In our main results, we use the CM rank of the lender as an identification variable. 
We validate our empirical design by using the market share of underwriter instead of the 
CM rank. The underwriting market share is estimated using two definitions. First, we 
compute the market share using the number of IPOs underwritten by the underwriter in the 
year prior to the IPO offer date. Second, we compute the market share using the dollar 
value of the proceeds of the IPOs underwritten in the year prior to the IPO offer date. 
The results are presented in Table 6. In Column (1), the identification variable 
(UW_Reputation) is the first measure – number of IPOs underwritten. The coefficient on 
λAff_Lender for the second-stage regression in Column (2) is positive and statistically 
significant. Loans originated by affiliated lenders are 5% more expensive than those 
originated by unaffiliated lenders. Similarly, the identification variable (UW_Reputation) 
in Column (3) is the second alternative measure of reputation is positive and statistically. 
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The results in Column (4) are similar to Column (2). Indeed, alternative measures of 
underwriter reputation validate our results. 
1.6.2. Falsification Test 
The amount of public information produced by the IPO firm and market 
participants (e.g., analysts) increases with time, and this will reduce the information wedge 
between the incumbent lender and other lenders. The decline in asymmetric information 
will ease the hold-up problem with the passage of time. Hence, the farther the origination 
date of the loan from the IPO offer date, the less likely the lender can hold-up the borrower.7 
In order to test this hypothesis, we construct a sample that includes loans originated 
between the sixth year and the tenth year after the IPO offer date.  
Table 7 provides the summary statistics for the falsification sample. In Panel A, the 
borrower characteristics suggest that firms that are large (assets), have higher leverage, and 
greater fraction of tangible assets are more likely to borrow from affiliated lenders. It 
appears that affiliated lenders are more likely to lend to firms with concentrated lending 
relationships. These patterns suggest that falsification sample is similar to the main sample. 
Furthermore, for loans after more than five years since IPO, fewer firms borrow from 
affiliated lenders. 8  Loan package characteristics and loan facility characteristics are 
presented in Panel B and Panel C. Loan packages originated by affiliated (informed) 
lenders are more likely to be larger (amount) and are secured. The facility level 
characteristics suggest that affiliated lenders seek a higher spread on the loan. However, 
                                                          
7 In Table E of the online appendix, we construct a sub-sample consisting of the first loan after the IPO and 
find the hold-up effect is economically and statistically much greater than the effect observed in the main 
sample. 
8 In our main sample 20% of the firms borrow from affiliated lenders while, in this sample 10% of the firms 
borrow from affiliated lenders. 
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the magnitude of this difference is lower in this sample compared to the main sample. In 
Panel C, loans from affiliated lenders have a longer maturity. Overall, the observable firm 
characteristics in this falsification sample are similar to the main sample. 
We perform multivariate test on the falsification sample that is similar to the tests 
described in the main results. The results for the pricing of the loan are presented in Table 
8. There is no statistical difference in the pricing of loans originated by affiliated and 
unaffiliated lenders. It appears that the ability of affiliated lenders to hold-up borrowers 
diminishes with the passage of time. Thus, the test on the falsification sample indicates that 
over time affiliated lenders lose the ability to extract informational rents from borrowers. 
1.7. THE SECONDARY LOAN MARKET AND RENT EXTRACTION  
The evidence presented in the previous sections supports the idea that informed 
lenders can earn abnormal profits when lending to firms after the IPO. Informed lenders 
utilize private information to charge borrowers higher interest rates than would be 
commensurate with the borrower’s risk when these borrowers are subjected to hold-up and 
do not have alternative sources of financing. Informed lenders can also use their private 
information to avoid lending at a rate below the fair rate for a loan. Our identification 
strategy accounts for the non-random pairing between firms and lenders, i.e., self-selection 
bias. The extent to which we can account for this self-section bias depends on the quality 
of our identification variable. In this section we devise a different test to augment the 
evidence presented in previous sections. 
Syndicated loans are often traded in the secondary market. The principle of market 
efficiency would imply that when a loan is traded in the market the change in the price 
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would reflect all public information. Participant lenders of a loan syndicate and other 
investors can potentially bring more information to the secondary market. If an informed 
lender is more likely to extract rents, then the yield at origination for a loan from an 
affiliated lender is more likely to be above the risk-adjusted rate of return. An uninformed 
lender is also more likely to offer a rate below the fair rate for a loan when it engages in a 
limited competition for good risk with informed lenders. When the yield in the secondary 
market converges to the appropriate rate after private information is disseminated and 
information asymmetry diminishes, the changes in loan prices from affiliated lenders are 
more likely to be greater than the price changes of loans from unaffiliated lenders. 
We assume that the loan is originated at par value i.e., Pt=0 =100. Ideally, we would 
prefer using the origination price. But, the origination price is only available for a few loans 
in the secondary market sample. The univariate statistics in Table 1 suggest that there is no 
statistical difference in the origination price (Primary Offer Price) of loan from affiliated 
and unaffiliated lenders. Thus, it would not be inappropriate to assume that the loans are 
originated at par (100) for the purpose of our test.  
The results for the multivariate test are presented in Table 9. The dependent variable 
is the change in price (ΔP). The price is quoted with reference to a par value of 100 (ΔP = 
Psec – 100). In Column (1), ΔP is measured using PRCFirstDay, which is the first market price 
of the loan observed at least 1 month after origination while, in Column (2), ΔP is measured 
using PRC30DayAvg, which is the 30-day average market price of the loan measured at least 
1 month after origination. We compute the average price over 30-days to reduce the impact 
of noise in the trading data. In Column (1), the price of a loan originated by an affiliated 
lender is 87 bps higher than that for a loan originated by an unaffiliated lender, everything 
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else being equal. The price on a given date may be noisy because the secondary loan market 
is not very liquid. Hence, we compute the average price over a month, and use it to calculate 
the price change for the dependent variable in Column (2). The price change of a loan 
originated by an affiliated lender again is statistically significantly more positive than that 
for a loan originated by an unaffiliated lender. Thus, the results indicate that the yield on 
the loans originated by affiliated lenders decreases to a greater degree than the yield on the 
loans originated by unaffiliated lenders. Indeed, this difference in price changes for loans 
from affiliated and unaffiliated lenders is a manifestation of rent extraction by informed 
lenders.  
1.8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The empirical evidence on informational rent extraction by informed lenders 
documented in the literature focuses on the relationship lending channel. We find that 
lenders can engage in informational rent extraction through the cross-selling channel. Our 
hypothesis is motivated by the seminal work of Sharpe 1990 on rent extraction by informed 
lenders. Using a theoretical model, we show that in a lending game between informed and 
uninformed lenders, the informed lenders can earn informational rents from good 
borrowers. Lenders that are affiliated to underwriters can reuse the private information 
collected during the IPO underwriting process to acquire property rights in the firm. Thus, 
we hypothesize that lenders affiliated to the IPO underwriters are more likely to charge 
higher spreads than commensurate with the borrower’s risk on post-IPO loans. 
We test our hypotheses using price and non-price features of syndicated loans from 
LPC’s Dealscan and IPO data from SDC Platinum. Using a sample of syndicated loans 
originated within 5 years after the IPO offer date, we find that loans originated by affiliated 
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lenders are more expensive than those originated by unaffiliated lenders. In particular, we 
estimate the impact of private information on the spread of the loan. On an average, 
affiliated lenders can earn an extra profit of 5% using relationship specific capital, i.e., 
private information. 
We augment the evidence on rent extraction by evaluating the secondary market 
data on syndicated loans. In an efficient market, the price of the loan will converge to its 
true value. We find that syndicated loans originated by affiliated lenders experience an 
otherwise greater decrease in yield than those originated by unaffiliated lenders. This result 
provides direct support for the hold-up hypothesis that affiliated lenders can use their 
private information to originate loans at higher interest rates than commensurate with the 
firm’s risk. Overall, the evidence presented in this paper is consistent with the theoretical 




















Figure 1.1: Lending Game 
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Figure 1.2: Interest Rate and Profit to Lenders 
Gi(r) and Go(r) is the cumulative density function for the mixed strategy of the inside and 
outside lender respectively. Figure 1.2(a) presents the interest rates and figure 1.2(b) 







Table 1.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
This table presents the summary statistics for syndicated loans originated up to 5 years after the IPO. The IPO sample includes all offerings between 
1995 and 2016. Panel A provides the borrower characteristics at the loan origination date, Panel B provides the package characteristics, Panel C 
provides the facility characteristics, and Panel D provides the facility level secondary market characteristics of the loan. COV_INTENSITY is the 
number of financial covenants attached to a loan. Sole Lender, Secured, Revolver, and Performance Pricing are dummy variables to indicate single 
lender loans, secured loans, credit lines, and loans with performance pricing features, respectively. ΔPFirstDay and ΔP30DayAvg are the differences 
between the secondary market prices and the issuance price (100). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
  (1) 
Unaffiliated Lender  
 (2) 
Affiliated Lender 
  (2) - (1) 
Differences 
 N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
 N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
 Diff. p-value 
 
PANEL A: BORROWER CHARACTERISTICS 
Assets   2011 2,090 346 7,862  401 5,878 1,208 14,367  3,788 0.00 
Leverage 2011 0.32 0.29 0.30  401 0.44 0.43 0.33  0.12 0.00 
Tangibility 2011 0.26 0.16 0.25  401 0.31 0.23 0.29  0.05 0.00 
Profit 2011 -0.14 0.09 4.67  401 -3.66 0.11 46.21  -3.52 0.13 
Rated 2011 0.06 0.00 0.23  401 0.04 0.00 0.21  -0.02 0.25 
Cash 2011 0.14 0.06 0.24  401 0.13 0.06 0.18  -0.01 0.34 
Market-to-Book 1902 2.34 1.66 2.51  346 2.31 1.52 6.46  -0.03 0.93 
Relationship 2011 0.29 0.00 0.41  401 0.35 0.00 0.45  0.06 0.01 
Volitility_12M 1321 0.16 0.14 0.09  203 0.14 0.11 0.09  -0.01 0.05 
             
PANEL B: PACKAGE CHARACTERISTICS 
Deal Amount(million) 2011 321 125 764  401 827 380 1375  506 0.00 
Secured 2011 0.66 1.00 0.47  401 0.72 1.00 0.45  0.06 0.02 
Performance Pricing 2011 0.51 1.00 0.50  401 0.44 0.00 0.50  -0.07 0.01 







             
 (1) 
Unaffiliated Lender  
(2) 
Affiliated Lender  
(2) - (1) 
Differences 
 N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
 N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
 Diff. p-value 
             
PANEL C: FACILITY CHARACTERISTICS 
Maturity (months) 3463 49.45 57.00 25.64  726 58 60 21.94  8.47 0.00 
Facility Amount (million) 3463 206 99 537  726 497 200 852  291 0.00 
All-in-drawn Spread (AISD) 3463 212 200 118  726 267 250 147  56 0.00 
Revolver (AISD) 2220 186 175 104  360 217 200 112  31 0.00 
Term Loan A (AISD) 645 239 225 117  116 303 263 175  65 0.00 
Term Loan (B to I) (AISD) 503 278 275 120  226 311 275 137  33 0.00 
Other Loan9 (AISD) 95 285 250 190  24 444 413 230  159 0.00 
Credit Line  3463 0.64 1.00 0.48  726 0.50 0.00 0.50  -0.14 0.00 
             
PANEL D: LOAN ORIGINATION AND SECONDARY MARKET PRICES 
Primary Offer Price (% of Par) 68 0.99 1.00 0.03  42 1.00 1.00 0.00  0.01 0.06 
ΔPFirstDay 405 -1.52 -0.50 2.94  183 -0.65 0.06 2.94  0.87 0.00 
ΔP30DayAvg 405 -1.52 -0.50 2.38  183 -0.59 0.125 2.34  0.92 0.00 
                                                          
9 The following loans are classified as “Other Loan” - Acquisition Facility, Bridge Loan, Demand Loan, FRN (Bond-Style, FRN (Loan-Style), 
Guarantee, Guidance Line (Uncommitted), Leagues/Other, Lease, Multi-Option Facility, NIF - Note Issuance Facility, Note, Other Loan, Standby 




Table 1.2: PRICING OF POST-IPO LOANS 
This table presents the regression results specified in Eq. (1). The sample includes all syndicated 
loans originated up to 5 years after the IPO. The dependent variable is the natural log of the All-in-
drawn spread (AISD). Aff_Lender is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the IPO underwriter 
and the lead bank of the syndicated loan are the same. The regression is run at the loan facility 
level. Relationship is the lending relationship intensity of the lender with the IPO firm. Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the package level. Robust 
t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Ln(AISD) Ln(AISD) Ln(AISD) 
    
Aff_Lender 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 
 (4.20) (3.26) (3.58) 
Leverage 0.37*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 
 (7.72) (7.18) (7.29) 
Tangibility 0.08 0.08* 0.08* 
 (1.50) (1.74) (1.76) 
Ln(Assets) -0.13*** -0.04*** -0.05*** 
 (-13.78) (-4.55) (-4.91) 
Profit -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.15*** 
 (-3.88) (-5.17) (-5.30) 
Rated -0.84*** -0.54*** -0.53*** 
 (-12.22) (-8.45) (-8.30) 
Log(Amt)  -0.08*** -0.08*** 
  (-8.58) (-9.13) 
Log(Maturity)  -0.02 -0.03 
  (-1.04) (-1.57) 
Secured  0.35*** 0.36*** 
  (14.52) (14.68) 
Perf_Pricing  -0.11*** -0.12*** 
  (-5.91) (-6.19) 
Relationship   -0.06** 
   (-2.57) 
Sole Lender   -0.09*** 
   (-3.28) 
Constant 5.64*** 6.64*** 6.84*** 
 (59.21) (44.56) (42.23) 
    
Loan Purpose FE No Yes Yes 
Loan Type FE No Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 4,189 4,189 4,189 






Table 1.3: PRIVATE INFORMATION & PRICING OF POST-IPO LOANS 
This table presents the two-stage regression results specified in Eqs. (2) and (3). The dependent 
variable in the first stage Probit (specification 1) is Aff_Lender, which is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if the IPO underwriter and the lead bank of the syndicated loan are the same. The 
dependent variable in the second stage OLS (specification 2) is the natural log of the All-in-drawn 
spread (AISD). The regressions are at the loan facility level. UW_Rank is a Carter-Manaster 
ranking (underwriting) of the underwriter. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
Standard errors are clustered at the package level. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * stand for significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Aff_Lender Ln(AISD) Aff_Lender Ln(AISD) 
     
λ Aff_Lender  0.05***  0.05*** 
  (3.08)  (3.04) 
UW_Rank 0.17***  0.17***  
 (11.10)  (11.12)  
Leverage 0.43*** 0.25*** 0.42*** 0.29*** 
 (3.12) (6.57) (3.08) (7.37) 
Tangibility -0.16 0.08 -0.15 0.08 
 (-0.70) (1.54) (-0.67) (1.58) 
Ln(Assets) 0.12*** -0.09*** 0.12*** -0.04*** 
 (3.10) (-10.59) (2.99) (-4.47) 
Profit -0.23** -0.15*** -0.24** -0.16*** 
 (-2.12) (-5.49) (-2.17) (-5.70) 
Rated -0.61*** -0.55*** -0.60*** -0.54*** 
 (-3.17) (-7.97) (-3.12) (-8.24) 
Relationship 0.34*** -0.07*** 0.34*** -0.06** 
 (3.24) (-2.93) (3.25) (-2.46) 
Secured 0.09 0.38*** 0.07 0.36*** 
 (0.90) (14.80) (0.75) (14.33) 
Perf_Pricing -0.11 -0.14*** -0.11 -0.11*** 
 (-1.35) (-7.14) (-1.37) (-5.73) 
Sole Lender 0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.09*** 
 (0.26) (-0.73) (0.34) (-3.29) 
Log(Amt)   -0.02 -0.09*** 
   (-0.51) (-9.17) 
Log(Maturity)   0.07 -0.02 
   (1.03) (-1.08) 
Constant -2.60*** 5.24*** -2.60*** 6.65*** 
 (-5.16) (67.15) (-3.37) (39.75) 
     
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 3,969 3,969 3,969 3,969 





Table 1.4: PRICING OF POST-IPO LOANS & FIRM RISK  
This table presents the two-stage regression results specified in Eqs. (2) and (3). The dependent 
variable in the first stage Probit (1 & 3) is Aff_Lender, which is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if the IPO underwriter and the lead bank of the syndicated loan are the same. The dependent 
variable in the second stage OLS (2 & 4) is the natural log of the All-in-drawn spread (AISD). The 
regressions are at the loan facility level. UW_Rank is a Carter-Manaster ranking (underwriting) of 
the underwriter. The regressions include loan purpose, loan type, year, and industry fixed effects. 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the package level. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Aff_Lender Ln(AISD) Aff_Lender Ln(AISD) 
     
λ Aff_Lender  0.05***  0.07*** 
  (3.03)  (3.41) 
UW_Rank 0.16***  0.14***  
 (8.27)  (6.17)  
Volitility_12M 3.21*** 0.76***   
 (4.79) (4.40)   
Volitility_24M   2.83*** 0.74*** 
   (2.85) (3.35) 
Leverage 0.14 0.37*** 0.27 0.41*** 
 (0.60) (6.11) (0.85) (5.40) 
Tangibility -0.37 0.10 0.50 0.11 
 (-1.12) (1.53) (1.20) (1.44) 
Ln(Assets) 0.22*** -0.04*** 0.29*** -0.04** 
 (4.06) (-2.94) (4.40) (-2.41) 
Profit -0.18 -0.18*** 0.05 -0.06 
 (-1.25) (-7.13) (0.16) (-0.87) 
Rated -0.62** -0.52*** -0.60* -0.55*** 
 (-2.43) (-6.10) (-1.87) (-6.48) 
Relationship 0.68*** -0.04 1.04*** -0.07** 
 (4.51) (-1.36) (5.87) (-1.96) 
Secured -0.02 0.33*** 0.21 0.31*** 
 (-0.18) (10.15) (1.24) (8.03) 
Perf_Pricing -0.11 -0.07*** -0.03 -0.07** 
 (-1.02) (-2.81) (-0.21) (-2.43) 
Sole Lender 0.04 -0.08** -0.15 -0.08* 
 (0.20) (-2.28) (-0.62) (-1.82) 
Log(Amt) -0.03 -0.08*** -0.07 -0.08*** 
 (-0.70) (-6.54) (-1.37) (-5.02) 
Log(Maturity) -0.01 -0.05** -0.07 -0.07*** 
 (-0.07) (-2.34) (-0.57) (-2.63) 
Constant -3.43*** 6.45*** -3.60*** 6.35*** 
 (-3.16) (30.77) (-2.64) (24.91) 
     
Observations 2,367 2,367 1,653 1,653 




Table 1.5: LOAN COVENANTS 
This table presents the TWO-STAGE regression for Covenant Intensity Index (CIX). The 
dependent variable in the first stage Probit is Aff_Lender, which takes the value 1 if the IPO 
underwriter, and the lead lender are the same. The dependent variable in the second stage OLS is 
the CIX. The regressions are at the loan package level. UW_Rank is a Carter-Manaster ranking 
(underwriting) of the underwriter. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard errors 
clustered at the package level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for 
significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Aff_Lender CIX 
   
λ Aff_Lender  0.06 
  (1.56) 
UW_Rank 0.17***  
 (6.23)  
Leverage 0.73*** 0.14 
 (3.27) (1.37) 
Tangibility 0.23 -0.34** 
 (0.66) (-2.22) 
Ln(Assets) 0.12* -0.10*** 
 (1.78) (-3.00) 
Profit -3.24** 1.57*** 
 (-2.24) (3.11) 
Rated -0.48* -0.05 
 (-1.70) (-0.34) 
Relationship 0.38*** 0.06 
 (2.93) (0.98) 
Secured -0.03 1.36*** 
 (-0.19) (17.34) 
Sole Lender -0.23 0.05 
 (-1.16) (0.55) 
Log(Deal_Amt) -0.17** 0.09** 
 (-2.41) (2.46) 
Constant -1.61** 2.87*** 
 (-1.99) (9.88) 
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
   
Observations 1,414 1,414 




Table 1.6: PRICING OF POST-IPO LOANS (ROBUSTNESS) 
This table presents the TWO-STAGE regression results specified in equation 2 & 3. 
UW_Reputation is IPO_number and IPO_amount in specification (1) and (3) respectively. The 
dependent variable in the first stage Probit (specification 1 and 3) is Aff_Lender, which is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the IPO underwriter, and the lead bank of the syndicated loan are 
the same. The dependent variable in the second stage OLS (specification 2 and 4) is the natural log 
of the All-in-drawn spread (AISD). The regressions are at the loan facility level. Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard errors clustered at the package level. Robust t-
statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Aff_Lender Ln(AISD) Aff_Lender Ln(AISD) 
λ Aff_Lender  0.05***  0.06*** 
  (3.57)  (3.75) 
UW_Reputation 0.06***  0.05***  
 (6.37)  (7.83)  
Leverage 0.51*** 0.29*** 0.49*** 0.29*** 
 (3.27) (7.43) (3.11) (7.43) 
Tangibility -0.07 0.08 -0.08 0.08 
 (-0.30) (1.58) (-0.36) (1.58) 
Ln(assets) 0.14*** -0.04*** 0.13*** -0.04*** 
 (3.56) (-4.48) (3.26) (-4.48) 
Profit -0.25* -0.16*** -0.24* -0.16*** 
 (-1.92) (-5.72) (-1.83) (-5.74) 
Rated -0.50*** -0.54*** -0.58*** -0.54*** 
 (-2.65) (-8.25) (-2.94) (-8.26) 
Relationship 0.30*** -0.06** 0.32*** -0.06** 
 (3.03) (-2.46) (3.18) (-2.46) 
Secured 0.07 0.36*** 0.06 0.36*** 
 (0.77) (14.35) (0.63) (14.35) 
Perf_Pricing -0.08 -0.11*** -0.07 -0.11*** 
 (-1.00) (-5.73) (-0.86) (-5.73) 
Sole Lender 0.05 -0.09*** 0.01 -0.09*** 
 (0.38) (-3.29) (0.11) (-3.29) 
Log(Amt) 0.01 -0.09*** 0.01 -0.09*** 
 (0.19) (-9.18) (0.20) (-9.19) 
Log(Maturity) 0.09 -0.02 0.09 -0.02 
 (1.42) (-1.08) (1.40) (-1.08) 
Constant -2.18*** 6.65*** -2.08*** 6.65*** 
 (-3.03) (39.78) (-2.91) (39.80) 
     
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 3,969 3,969 3,969 3,969 







Table 1.7: SUMMARY STATISTICS (FALSIFICATION SAMPLE) 
This table presents the summary statistics for syndicated loans originated between the sixth year, and tenth year after the IPO offer date. The IPO 
sample includes all offerings between 1995 and 2016. Panel A provides the borrower characteristics; Panel B provides the package characteristics; 
Panel C provides the facility characteristics. Secured and Performance Pricing are dummy variables to indicate secured loans and loans with 
performance pricing features respectively. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
  (1) 
Unaffiliated Lender  
 (2) 
Affiliated Lender 
  (2) - (1) 
Differences 
 N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
 N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
 Diff. p-value 
 
PANEL A: BORROWER CHARACTERISTICS 
Assets   1255 3399 913 9217  123 9204 2330 18143  5805 0.00 
Leverage 1255 0.32 0.28 0.29  123 0.42 0.38 0.30  0.10 0.00 
Tangibility 1255 0.26 0.17 0.24  123 0.32 0.21 0.29  0.06 0.02 
Profit 1255 0.11 0.09 0.19  123 0.12 0.08 0.17  0.01 0.48 
Rated 1255 0.06 0.00 0.24  123 0.13 0.00 0.34  0.07 0.03 
Cash 1255 0.11 0.06 0.14  123 0.12 0.07 0.12  0.01 0.70 
Market-to-Book 1230 1.72 1.37 1.07  120 1.71 1.49 0.91  -0.01 0.96 
Relationship 1255 0.48 0.47 0.46  123 0.70 1.00 0.42  0.22 0.00 
             
PANEL B: PACKAGE CHARACTERISTICS 
Deal Amount (million) 1255 477 225 1003  123 1104 500 1977  626 0.00 
Secured 1255 0.64 1.00 0.48  123 0.61 1.00 0.49  -0.03 0.57 
Performance Pricing 1255 0.48 0.00 0.50  123 0.37 0.00 0.48  -0.11 0.01 
Sole Lender 1255 0.14 0.00 0.34  123 0.03 0.00 0.18  -0.11 0.00 
             







             
             
             
 (1) 
Unaffiliated Lender  
(2) 
Affiliated Lender  
(2) - (1) 
Differences 
 N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
 N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
 Diff. p-value 
             
PANEL C: FACILITY CHARACTERISTICS 
Maturity (months) 2075 51 60 22  230 56 60 21  5 0.00 
Facility Amount (million) 2075 315 150 653  230 731 320 1224  416 0.00 
All-in-drawn Spread (AISD) 2075 247 225 155  230 284 250 170  37 0.00 




















Table 1.8:  PRICING OF POST-IPO LOANS (FALSIFICATION TEST) 
The sample includes all syndicated loans originated between the sixth year, and tenth year after the 
IPO offer date. This table presents the TWO-STAGE regression results specified in equation 2 & 
3. The dependent variable in the first stage Probit (specification 1 & 3) is Aff_Lender, which is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the IPO underwriter, and the lead bank of the syndicated 
loan are the same. The dependent variable in the second stage OLS (specification 2 & 4) is the 
natural log of the All-in-drawn spread (AISD). The regressions are at the loan facility level. 
UW_Rank is a Carter-Manaster ranking (underwriting) of the underwriter. Variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix A. Standard errors clustered at the package level. Robust t-statistics in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Aff_Lender Ln(AISD) Aff_Lender Ln(AISD) 
λ Aff_Lender  -0.000  -0.008 
  (-0.019)  (-0.382) 
UW_Rank 0.151***  0.154***  
 (5.791)  (5.953)  
Leverage 0.463* 0.370*** 0.447* 0.358*** 
 (1.817) (7.077) (1.753) (7.003) 
Tangibility -0.112 0.167** -0.075 0.183** 
 (-0.301) (2.103) (-0.201) (2.384) 
Ln(assets) 0.082 -0.087*** 0.140** -0.042*** 
 (1.450) (-6.698) (2.189) (-2.969) 
Profit -86.774*** -14.928 -80.149** -11.497 
 (-2.775) (-0.581) (-2.409) (-0.476) 
Rated 0.901*** -0.511*** 0.948*** -0.498*** 
 (3.364) (-7.470) (3.411) (-7.447) 
Relationship 0.196 -0.084** 0.220 -0.065** 
 (1.182) (-2.560) (1.305) (-2.030) 
Secured 0.037 0.334*** 0.012 0.321*** 
 (0.247) (10.213) (0.082) (10.039) 
Perf_Pricing -0.009 -0.189*** -0.010 -0.182*** 
 (-0.073) (-6.700) (-0.079) (-6.622) 
Sole Lender -0.567** -0.017 -0.582** -0.067 
 (-2.374) (-0.304) (-2.385) (-1.148) 
Log(Amt)   -0.115** -0.083*** 
   (-2.296) (-5.556) 
Log(Maturity)   0.032 0.000 
   (0.252) (0.014) 
Constant -1.533** 5.718*** 0.110 6.923*** 
 (-2.539) (52.502) (0.107) (26.685) 
     
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 2,305 2,305 2,305 2,305 




Table 1.9: SECONDARY MARKET PRICING OF POST-IPO LOANS 
This table presents the regression results specified in equation 4. The sample includes loans with a 
market price greater than $85. The dependent variable is the change in price (ΔP). The price is 
quoted with reference to a par value of 100 (ΔP = Psec – 100). Psec is the secondary market price. 
Psec is PRCFirstDay in column (1) and (2), and PRC30DayAvg in column (3) and (4) . Aff_Lender is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the IPO underwriter, and the lead bank of the syndicated 
loan are the same. The regression is run at the loan facility level. Δ Term Spread is the change in 
the Term Spread between the origination date of the loan and the quotation date of the loan. The 
Term Spread is the difference between the yield of a 10-year Treasury constant maturity bond and 
a 3-month Treasury constant maturity bill. Δ Default Spread is the change in the Default Spread 
between the origination date of the loan and the quotation date of the loan. The Default Spread is 
the difference between the yield of a seasoned Moody’s Aaa Corporate Bond and a seasoned 
Moody’s Baa Corporate Bond. Real GDP growth is the real GDP growth in the current quarter in 
2009 dollars. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard errors clustered at the 
package level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for significance level at the 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ΔP ΔP ΔP ΔP 
     
Aff_Lender 0.87*** 0.97*** 0.90*** 0.97*** 
 (2.71) (2.80) (2.94) (2.88) 
Leverage -0.46 -0.61 -0.43 -0.62 
 (-1.27) (-1.44) (-1.19) (-1.45) 
Tangibility 0.59 0.56 0.44 0.43 
 (0.84) (0.72) (0.64) (0.57) 
Ln(Assets) 0.10 0.18 0.16 0.25* 
 (0.80) (1.39) (1.35) (1.97) 
Return on Assets 3.80*** 3.76** 3.69*** 3.52** 
 (2.91) (2.17) (2.83) (2.07) 
Rated -0.28 -0.42 -0.53 -0.70 
 (-0.34) (-0.48) (-0.61) (-0.77) 
Market-to-Book  0.09  0.11 
  (1.06)  (1.21) 
Δ Term Spread -0.17 -0.16 -0.17 -0.16 
 (-0.66) (-0.60) (-0.67) (-0.63) 
Δ Default Spread -2.57*** -2.41*** -2.67*** -2.34*** 
 (-3.45) (-3.15) (-3.37) (-2.92) 
Real GDP growth -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 
 (-0.87) (-0.63) (-0.94) (-0.68) 
Constant -3.15*** -3.70*** -4.21*** -4.90*** 
 (-2.72) (-3.23) (-3.10) (-3.62) 
     
Loan Purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 587 533 587 533 





IPO DECISION, UNDERPRICING AND FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although the literature on Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) is quite rich, evidence of 
a causal relationship between a motive to go public and the issuance decision, and the 
associated pricing of equity for U.S. firms remains elusive. The main reason for this gap in 
the literature is the unavailability of information on private firms. Survey based studies 
(Brau and Fawcett 2006) of U.S. executives sheds some light on the factors that influence 
the IPO decision. The study by (Chemmanur, He, and Nandy 2010) examining the role of 
product market characteristics in the IPO decision for U.S. manufacturing firms is the 
closest we have got to understanding the decision to go public. 
Most studies find that firms pursue IPOs to alleviate capital constraints and finance 
growth opportunities. This perspective is either explicitly stated in theoretical models 
(Chemmanur, He, and Nandy 2010) or implicitly inferred from empirical results (Pagano, 
Panetta, and Zingales 1998; Aslan and Kumar 2011). During the pre-IPO book-building 
process, firms provide external investors with information on the quality of its projects to 
estimate the demand and price of equity. This cost of evaluating the firm’s projects will 




Evidence suggests that financial frictions such as agency costs (Schenone 2004; 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 2003) and asymmetric information (Benveniste and Spindt 1989; 
Rock 1986 and many others) have a first order effect on underpricing. I build on the theory 
of financial constraints (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988) and exploit the passage of 
the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (IBBEA) as an 
exogenous shock to the supply of capital to understand the link between access to 
financing, the IPO decision, and the pricing of equity. Using a sample of U.S. IPOs between 
1990 and 2002, I find that financially constrained (FC) firms are 25% more likely to go 
public than non-financially constrained (NFC) firms to alleviate financial constraints. 
Further, FC firms offer 6% more in underpricing than NFC firms to successfully raise 
equity. Finally, after going public FC firms invest more aggressively than NFC firms. 
The objective of this study is to examine the role of financial constraints in the 
decision to go public and the related equity underpricing by addressing three related 
questions. First, do financial constraints influence the decision to go public? Second, is 
there an incremental cost of issuing equity for financially constrained firms? Third, how 
does going public to alleviate financial constraints affect a firm’s investment decision? I 
answer the first question by examining the relationship between ex ante nature of the firm 
(before going public) with regards to ease of accessing capital markets and the likelihood 
of going public in response to an exogenous change in the access to capital. Subsequently, 
I address the second question by evaluating the impact of this change in the access to capital 
on the underpricing for FC and NFC firms. Finally, I perform a comparative analysis on 




Bank debt is a vital source of capital for private firms, especially young firms (Robb 
and Robinson 2014). Further, a firm’s capital structure exhibits a persistence that predates 
its IPO (Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender 2008). As a consequence, the financing decisions 
of private firms that are more reliant on external finance, are more sensitive to changes in 
bank lending conditions. An exogenous change in the supply of credit will result in an 
increase in the intensity of financial constraints for FC firms. The passage of the Riegle-
Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (IBBEA) resulted in a 
change in the supply of bank debt for FC firms. FC firms experienced a decline in the 
supply of bank credit after the IBBEA was implemented and thereby, an increase in the 
intensity of financial constraints (Zarutskie 2006). A change in the supply of credit to FC 
firms may induce such firms to substitute credit with equity to a limited degree (Fluck 
1998). I hypothesize that the propensity to go public (PTGP) increases with an increase in 
the magnitude of financial constraints. I test this hypothesis in a difference-in-difference 
(DD) framework by aggregating the number of firms going public at the state level. The 
results suggest that FC firms are more likely to use external equity as a substitute for bank 
credit. In economic terms, the FC firms are 25% more likely to go public than NFC firms. 
In additional tests, I aggregate the IPO proceeds raised at the state level and find that FC 
firms raise 28 cents more to the dollar than NFC firms. 
Next, I examine the role of financial constraints in the pricing of equity. The shift 
in the demand for equity by FC firms will affect the pricing of equity. This effect can 
operate through two channels. First, when the magnitude of financial constraints increases, 
issuers experience a decline in bargaining power with prospective investors. Although, 




discount (underpricing). A lower offer price (higher underpricing) will lower the marketing 
and placement effort on the part of the underwriter (Loughran and Ritter 2002). In addition, 
underwriters are usually affiliated to larger investment banking entities. These underwriters 
may engage in a quid pro quo arrangement with investors who are willing to make side-
payments in the form of inflated brokerage commissions in exchange for discounted shares 
(Loughran and Ritter 2004). The underwriter may also make preferential allotments to the 
personal brokerage accounts of issuing firm executives (spinning). For example, Credit 
Suisse First Boston Corporation (CSFB) collected inflated commissions from its clients in 
exchange for allocations of “hot” IPOs10. Thus, the misalignment of underwriter incentives 
may result in a higher under- pricing. FC firms have accesses to fewer sources of capital 
and hence, have lower bargaining power with their underwriters. 
Second, banking relationships reduce asymmetric information (between the bank 
and the firm), and this reduction in asymmetric information results in a lower IPO 
underpricing for bank dependent firms. Empirical evidence suggests that firms with 
banking relationships can issue equity at higher prices i.e., IPOs are less underpriced (C. 
James and Wier 1990; Slovin and Young 1990). The IBBEA was a shock to lending 
relationships of FC firms and thereby increased the cost of information production for 
external investors. This incremental cost will be borne by the firm in the form of higher 
underpricing (Chemmanur and Fulghieri 1999). Along similar lines, Beatty and Ritter 1986 
argue that the pre-IPO information production cost is analogous to investing in a call option 
on the IPO. The value of the option increases with uncertainty (volatility), which is greater 
                                                          




for FC firms. The empirical tests reveal that IPO underpricing of FC firms is greater than 
NFC firms by 6% . 
Finally, I examine the outcome of the IPO decision on the investment policy of the 
firm. FC firms by definition possess valuable investment opportunities, but financial 
frictions limit the extent to which they can invest in these opportunities. The IPO provides 
firms with equity capital and improves access to other sources of capital. Hence, post-
issuance FC firms can increase their investment intensity. I find that FC firms increase 
capital expenditures by 30% more than NFC firms. 
The validity of my empirical design depends on the correct identification of 
financially constrained firms. Firms that primarily utilize the IPO proceeds to repay debt 
(payment of borrowings, refinancing, etc.) are more likely to issue equity to re-balance 
their capital structure by exploiting market misvaluations or provide existing shareholders 
with lucrative sellout opportunities and are less likely to be financially constrained 
(Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales 1998). Further, firms that primarily utilize the proceeds of 
equity issuance (seasoned equity offering) for payment of debt, invest less (Walker and 
Yost 2008) and possess fewer growth options (Hertzel and Li 2010) than firms that utilize 
the proceeds for any other purpose. These debt-paying firms replace and increase 
borrowing after issuing equity. Hence, I designate these debt-paying firms as non-
financially constrained, and the non-debt-paying issuers as financially constrained. I also 
use firm characteristics such as payout policy and firm age to identify ex-ante financially 
constrained firms. An examination of firm characteristics reveals that the aforementioned 




I validate my results through robustness checks and also confirm the suitability of 
assumptions that underlie the empirical design. First, I evaluate the sensitivity of the results 
to the size of the treatment window. My results remain unaffected by the size of the 
treatment window. Next, I perform a placebo test to examine if the results are driven by 
spurious correlations. Finally, I provide suggestive evidence that the fundamental 
assumption of parallel trends in a DD framework is satisfied, and hence this design is 
appropriate to study the research question.  
The findings contribute to multiple strands of the literature. I provide causal 
evidence that financial constraints have a direct impact on the pricing of public equity. 
Previous studies document that underpricing is driven by asymmetric information between 
different types of investors and issuers, litigation risk and ex-post uncertainty. I present 
evidence that the forces of demand and supply of capital too have an influence on 
underpricing. In addition, the existing literature on financial constraints is focused more on 
listed firms and private firms in the Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF). I provide 
a bridge to the existing literature by providing evidence on the impact of access to capital 
on the decision to go public. Finally, I contribute to research on banking deregulation. 
Banking deregulation has resulted in positive and negative outcomes for firms. I find that 
credit rationing against FC firms results in these firms seeking public equity as a substitute. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I develop the hypotheses in Section 
1.2 and describe the identification strategy and data in Section 1.3. The main results are 
presented in Section 1.4, followed by robustness checks in Section 1.5. Finally, I conclude 





2.2 LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.2.1. The IPO decision and Financial Constraints 
Evidence suggests that the demand for capital is a critical determinant of the 
probability of going public, both statistically and economically (Lowry 2003). Besides 
providing firms with capital, IPOs lower the intensity of financial constraints through 
improved access to credit (Schenone 2010), increase in the bargaining power with banks 
(Rajan 1992), lower cost of credit (Saunders and Steffen 2011), and creation of publicly 
traded shares that can be used as a currency in acquisitions (Schultz and Zaman 2001; 
Hsieh, Lyandres, and Zhdanov 2011). 
In an ideal world, if a firm has insufficient internal funds to make investments, it 
can access external finance at no incremental cost (Modigliani and Miller 1958). However, 
financial frictions such as incomplete contracting, agency costs, and asymmetric 
information give rise to financial constraints, which restrict the amount, and impose 
incremental costs on raising external finance. Tirole 2006 elucidates the concept of 
financial constraints as follows, “Borrowers with little cash on hand, with large private 
benefits from misbehaving, and whose performance conveys little information about 
managerial choices are more likely to see their positive NPV projects turned down by the 
capital market”.  In other words, financially constrained firms are unable to fund good 
investments because of an inability to raise capital, greater dependence on bank loans, and 
illiquidity of assets (Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001)). 
Financially constrained (FC) firms often suffer from issues related to financing 
frictions, and creditors engage in capital rationing to a greater degree against such firms to 




others). In general, FC firms are more dependent on external finance (Erel et al. 2012) and 
are more likely to raise equity to meet capital deficits (Lemmon and Zender 2010) than 
NFC firms. Thus, managers at FC firms adversely affected by credit rationing are more 
likely to issue equity (Lowry 2003; Lin and Paravisini 2013). Further, market distortions 
such as market segmentation also affect a FC firm’s choice of external capital. FC firms 
that lack access to one form of debt (for example bank loans), may find it difficult to reduce 
capital deficits using other forms of debt (for example bonds), especially when capital 
markets experience shocks (Chernenko and Sunderam 2012)11. Hence, FC firms are more 
likely to go public to lower the intensity of financial constraints, while NFC firms may go 
public for other reasons such as re-balancing their capital structure after implementing 
substantial investment plans (Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales 1998; Poulsen and Stegemoller 
2008). 
In the US, on the supply side, two factors eased the process, and lowered the costs 
of going public in the nineties. First, firms may have found it easier to substitute debt with 
equity because equity markets were overpriced (or less underpriced), and this lowered their 
cost of external equity finance (Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter 2008). Second, most 
provisions of the Glass-Stegall Act were repealed with the passing of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act (GLBA) in 1999. This increased the participation of commercial banks and 
institutional investors in the IPO market12. These developments may have contributed to 
the ease of FC firms substituting monitored debt with external equity. 
                                                          
11 FC firms can also ease financial constraints by selling out to another  firm i.e., an acquisition  (Erel,  
Jang and Weisbach  (2015)).  However, the acquired  firm will compete  for funds with other  
divisions of the acquirer (Stein  (1997)). 
12 The Federal Reserve authorized Bankers Trust, Citibank and J.P. Morgan to engage in limited under- 
writing and dealing in certain securities in 1987 under Section 20 subsidiaries. The growth in investment 




Hypothesis A: FC firms are more likely than NFC firms to go public in response to an 
exogenous decrease in the supply of capital. 
2.2.2. Underpricing and Financial Constraints 
Given the far-reaching role of financial constraints in the IPO decision, I also 
examine the associated impact on IPO underpricing. When a firm decides to go public, it 
has to convince external investors on the quality of its projects. The cost of evaluating the 
firm’s projects in equilibrium is borne by the firm in the form of higher underpricing 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri 1999). Evidence suggests that financial frictions such as agency 
costs (Schenone 2004; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 2003), and asymmetric information 
(Benveniste and Spindt 1989; Rock 1986 and many others) have a first order effect on 
underpricing. Since, agency costs and asymmetric information are more severe for FC 
firms than NFC firms, FC firms may have to offer greater underpricing. 
Underwriters are involved in the price discovery process for an IPO and often have 
a say in the offer price. Although, underwriters are compensated based on the final offer 
price, they may prefer a higher discount (underpricing) for two reasons. First, a lower offer 
price (higher underpricing) will lower the marketing and placement effort on the part of 
the underwriter (Loughran and Ritter 2002). Second, usually underwriters are part of larger 
investment banking entities. These underwriters may engage in a quid pro quo arrangement 
with investors who are willing to make side-payments in the form of inflated brokerage 
commissions in exchange for discounted shares (Loughran and Ritter 2004). For example, 
Credit Suisse First Boston Corporation (CSFB) collected inflated commissions from its 




preferential allotments to the personal brokerage accounts of issuing firm executives 
(spinning). 
Additional anecdotal evidence on the motivation of the underwriter to offer shares 
at a discount can be found in Re eToys, Inc. Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation. 
eToys creditors sued Goldman Sachs (underwriter) when eToys went bankrupt after the 
internet bubble burst.  The creditors claimed that Goldman Sachs intentionally set an 
artificially low offer price for the IPO which generated lower proceeds and as a 
consequence eToys had insufficient cash to stay afloat. The plaintiffs provided two key 
pieces of evidence. The first was a document called the ”Trade-Up” report prepared by 
Goldman Sachs. This report demonstrated to institutional clients the money they made 
from Goldman’s IPO allocation over the years. The second was evidence that showed that 
Goldman’s clients made unnecessary trades to generate brokerage commissions. In fact, 
Goldman’s sales team were encouraged to use IPO allocations as currency to generate 
business. Thus, the misalignment of underwriter incentives may result in a higher 
underpricing. 
FC firms have accesses to fewer sources of capital and hence, have lower 
bargaining power with their underwriters. A reduction in the supply of credit would further 
erode the ability of the issuer to ensure the shares are issued at a fair price. Hence, FC firms 
are more likely to offer higher underpricing than NFC firms. 
Hypothesis B: FC firms are more likely than NFC firms to offer higher underpricing in 





2.2.3. Post-IPO Investment Decision 
IPOs relax financial constraints and hence, issuers can increase investment in 
growth options ((Aslan and Kumar 2011)). This view is also supported by survey-based 
papers (Bancel and Mittoo 2009; Brau and Fawcett 2006). In the U.S., IPOs are generally 
followed by a large growth in assets (Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah 1997) and capital 
expenditures (Kim and Weisbach 2008). If investing in growth options is the primary 
motive of FC firms going public then ex-post, FC firms should exhibit higher investment 
intensity than NFC firms. 
Hypothesis C : Post-issuance, FC firms are more likely to increase their investments than 
NFC firms. 
2.3 IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY AND DATA 
I obtain IPO data for U.S. issuers from Thomson Reuters’ SDC Platinum database 
with offer dates between 1990 and 2002. IPOs with an offer price below $5.00 per share, 
unit offers, REITs, closed-end funds, banks and S&Ls, ADRs, and IPOs not listed on CRSP 
within six months of issuing have been excluded. Data on firm age is from Jay Ritter’s 
website. I augment the sample by adding firm characteristics from COMPUSTAT and 
stock price from CRSP. The final sample consists of 3621 IPOs with offer dates in a five-
year window centered on the year of the exogenous shock (IBBEA). The underpricing 
(initial return or first-day return) is defined as the percentage change from the offer price 
to the closing price on the first day of trade. 
The summary statistics are presented in Table 1. It appears that FC firms are similar 




and higher R&D intensity. This is consistent with the premise that FC firms possess more 
growth options but are unable to fund all available opportunities. FC firms hold a higher 
proportion of cash which is indicative of the precautionary savings motive (Almeida, 
Campello, and Weisbach 2004; Denis and Sibilkov 2010). The column “Difference” 
provides an indication of the treatment effect on FC and NFC firms. The treatment effect 
on FC firms is evident with younger firms, with lower cash levels and higher R&D intensity 
pursuing an IPO. A similar effect is observed for NFC firms but the magnitudes are much 
smaller. The relatively muted impact of the treatment on NFC firms is also evident in the 
change in underpricing. Although, NFC firms offer a higher underpricing after treatment, 
it is 1/3 of the increase in underpricing for FC firms. The evidence in this table suggests 
that the IBBEA had a greater impact on FC firms than on NFC firms. 
The literature provides different approaches to identify financially constrained 
firms. I designate firms that primarily utilize the IPO proceeds for payment of debt 
(payment of borrowings, refinancing, etc.)  as financially constrained (FCP). FC firms 
incur a higher cost of external capital and hence, raise equity only when external finance is 
required to make investments. Such debt repaying firms are more likely to exploit market 
misvaluations by issuing equity to re-balance their capital structure or provide existing 
shareholders with lucrative sellout opportunities and are less likely to be financially 
constrained (Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales 1998). Further, firms that primarily utilize the 
proceeds of equity issuance (seasoned equity offering) for payment of debt, invest less 
(Walker and Yost 2008) and possess fewer growth options (Hertzel and Li 2010) than firms 
that utilize the proceeds for any other purpose. After the equity issuance, these debt-paying 




using alternative definitions. The first alternate definition is the payment of dividends 
(FCD). FC firms are less likely to pay dividends to shareholders (Fazzari, Hubbard, and 
Petersen 1988). I designate firms that do not pay dividends as FC firms. The second 
alternate definition is the age of the firm (FCYN). Young firms are more sensitive to 
financial frictions i.e., they suffer from information asymmetry problems (Hadlock and 
Pierce 2010). I designate firms below the median age in the sample as FC firms. 
In order to establish that the above measures correctly identify FC firms, I evaluate 
the correlation between these measures and firm characteristics. In Table 2 , the correlation 
between the three measures of financially constrained firms are positive and statistically 
significant. Further, the correlation between the measures of financially constrained firms 
and firm characteristics are in the expected directions and significant. It appears that 
financially constrained firms have lower leverage, higher cash (Almeida, Campello, and 
Weisbach 2004; Denis and Sibilkov 2010), lower cash flows, higher R&D intensity, are 
younger and smaller (Hadlock and Pierce 2010). 
My empirical design exploits the differential sensitivity of NFC and FC firms to an 
exogenous change in credit supply to determine the impact of financial constraints on the 
demand for equity and the associated underpricing. The sensitivity of the firm’s investment 
decision to the supply of capital is not directly observable. Studies on financial constraints 
use observable firm characteristics such as the presence of credit rating (Bernanke and 
Gertler 1989 and many others) or dividend payout ratios to identify FC firms. The approach 
has been extended by creating indices for financial constraints (Lamont, Polk, and Saá-
Requejo 2001; Whited and Wu 2006; Hadlock and Pierce 2010) for listed firms based on 




using the level (magnitude) of such measures to arrive at conclusions is inappropriate given 
the endogenous nature of these measures. This problem can be addressed if we compare 
the impact of the change in these endogenous measures in response to an exogenous shock 
(Roberts and Whited 2013). An exogenous change in regulation (and thereby the 
availability of credit) affecting the intensity of financial constraints is one such suitable 
shock. I use the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 
(IBBEA) as an exogenous shock to financial constraints. The IBBEA was implemented at 
different points of time in states across the U.S. The staggered nature of changes in state 
banking regulation provides a set of counterfactuals on how the equity issuance decision 
would have evolved in the absence of any exogenous variation in access to capital. 
Furthermore, this method accounts for aggregate trends in capital markets and the real 
economy. This permits me to disentangle the effect of financial constraints from other 
motivations influencing the IPO decision. 
The passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act 
of 1994 (IBBEA) created a national framework for banks to operate across state lines13. 
The IBBEA left the door open on certain regulatory issues to the discretion of the states. 
States could restrict new banks from entering the market by setting requirements on (1) a 
minimum age of in-state banks targeted for an acquisition, (2) restrictions on the ability of 
out-of-state banks to open a new branch, (3) restrictions on the ability of out-of-state banks 
to acquire a single in-state bank branch, and (4) a statewide cap on deposits below 30% of 
the total deposits in the state. This resulted in variation in the implementation and impact 
                                                          
13 A key assumption in a DD framework is that the shock is exogenous. In this instance, firms must have no 
role in determining the timing of the deregulation. Evidence suggests that the decision to deregulate banking 
in a state was influenced by political factors, and was not determined by firms seeking external finance 




of the IBBEA across states over time. The timing and degree of deregulation are provided 
in Table 3. 
The states had three years after Congress passed the IBBEA to respond to the 
discretionary restrictions i.e., until 07/01/1997. For example, Oklahoma chose to retain all 
4 restrictions on 5/31/1997 and thus, had an index value of 4. I follow the literature (Greene 
2017) in designating a state as a deregulating state by considering only the initial response 
to IBBEA. If the state changed interstate banking laws on multiple occasions, then IPOs 
after the first response are excluded from the sample. States that initially adopt all four 
restrictive provisions are designated as non-deregulating states while, those that initially 
remove at least one barrier to interstate banking are designated as deregulating states. The 
effective date for states that do not ease banking restrictions is 07/01/1997. 
Easing of branching restrictions in the U.S. resulted in out-of-state banks entering 
new markets, and as a consequence reduced the local market power of the current in-state 
banks (Jayaratne and Strahan 1998). An increase in the number of lenders in a market can 
result in informationally opaque firms facing credit supply shocks. This phenomenon can 
operate through two channels. First, in concentrated markets, lenders can internalize the 
benefits of private information and so, creditors may be more willing to finance FC firms. 
However, when credit markets experience increasing competition, lenders are unable to 
exploit this information monopoly, and may be less inclined to lend to these opaque 
borrowers (Rice and Strahan 2010).14 
                                                          
14 FC  firms suffer from greater  information asymmetry related  issues than  NFC  firms.  Lenders  
engage in capital  rationing  to  solve contracting problems  (Jaffee  and  Russell  (1976);  Stiglitz  
and  Weiss  (1981))  and specifically, tend  to ration  in favor of NFC firms (Bernanke, Gertler  and 




Second, the lenders organizational structure has an impact on lending policy. Large 
lenders depend more on hard information while small lenders depend more on soft 
information. Soft information acquired through lending relationships across time and 
products are important in alleviating financial constraints (Berger and Udell 1995; Petersen 
and Rajan 1995; Canales and Nanda 2012 and many others). Small banks have a more 
decentralized structure which gives branch managers more autonomy over lending 
decisions. In this setting, lenders have a greater incentive to collect and use soft information 
(Stein 2002). When banks lend to FC firms, they depend on soft information, which gives 
small banks an advantage over large banks in lending to FC firms. Small banks that have 
banking relationships with small firms provide liquidity insurance to these firms, especially 
during a financial crisis (Berger, Bouwman and Kim 2017) and tend to invest a greater 
proportion of their assets in small business loans than large institutions (Berger, Kashyap 
and Scalise 1995 and many others)15.  Thus, a proliferation of large lenders through new 
entrants or acquisitions in markets that have a significant presence of small lenders may 
adversely affect the availability of credit to FC firms (Berger, Saunders, Scalise and Udell 
1998; Carow, Kane and Narayanan 2006; Di Patti and Gobbi 2007 and many others). 
Empirical studies find that the passage of the IBBEA resulted in a reduction in the 
amount borrowed by younger firms (Zarutskie 2006), higher failure rates for new firms 
(Zarutskie 2006; Kerr and Nanda 2009) and reduction in the proportion of loans made to 
small firms by large banks (Berger et al. 1998). Further, young firms (financially 
constrained) substituted debt with external equity and increased retained earnings 
                                                          
15 When  bank  consolidation  results  in an increase  in local market  share,  the  efficiency effects 
are offset by an increase  in market  power.  These  large lenders  increase  interest rates  and  cut  




(Zarutskie 2006). Studies (Zarutskie 2006) that evaluate the impact of IBBEA using firm 
level data for private firms that are more suitable IPO candidates (average assets $6.5 
million) find that FC firms faced tighter borrowing conditions16.  Finally, bank mergers 
may result in opposite outcomes over the short and long term. In the short term, FC firms 
(small borrowers) benefit from lower spreads from greater competition but these benefits 
were reversed within 3 years (Erel 2011). Thus, it appears that the IBBEA had an adverse 
impact on FC firms over the longer term (>3 years). 
I test hypothesis ”A” by aggregating IPOs based on their ease of accessing external 
capital (FC/NFC), size category (number of employees) and state. The sample construction 
procedure is laid out in Appendix B. In a difference-in-difference (DD) framework 
(Tsoutsoura 2015; Morse 2011), I compare the propensity to go public (PTGP) for firms 
(aggregated at the state level) that are financially constrained (the treated group) to those 
that are non- financially constrained (the control group) before and after the shock. The 
propensity to go public is the ratio of the number of financially constrained (or non-
financially constrained) firms (of a given size category) going public to the total number 
of firms in the corresponding size category in a given state for each year. The data on total 
number of firms in a state is from the Longitudinal Business Database provided by the U.S. 
Census Bureau. The size category is based on number of employees and consists of three 
categories of firms - less than 100, 100 to 499 and greater than 500 employees. The 
propensity to go public is computed separately for FC and NFC firms in each state for each 
year. For example, in the state of California, 27 NFC and 67 FC firms with more than 500 
                                                          
16 Rice and  Strahan (2010) use the  small business  survey  data (average  assets  $0.5  million)  
that consist of firms that are unsuitable for an IPO.  Further, although an increase  in competition may 
lower spreads  for small  firms,  banks  continue  to  limit  credit  to  solve contracting problems,  




employees went public in 1996. There were 5008 firms with more than 500 employees in 
California in 1996. Hence, the PTGP for NFC and FC firms in California with more than 
500 employees is 0.54% and 1.34% respectively. The regression is specified as follows: 
 
 
where, TREATMENT is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the issuer’s state 
deregulates its bank branching laws in its initial response to IBBEA and if the offer issue 
date was after the issuer’s state initially responded to IBBEA.17 I use the FCP, FCD and 
FCYN definitions to identify financially constrained (FC) firms. CFC is a dummy equal to 
one for the aggregate FC firms and zero for the aggregate NFC firms.18 Controls is a vector 
that includes state level macroeconomic variables such as unemployment, GDP growth, 
and the CEA Index. An Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approach is inappropriate for this 
test because the dependent variable is bounded between 0 and 1. The regression is specified 
as a Generalized Linear Model (GLM) for fractional dependent variables (Papke and 
Wooldridge 1996). This quasi- likelihood method is robust and relatively efficient under 
the GLM assumptions. The sample includes Initial Public Offerings (IPO) with offer dates 
in a five-year window centered on the year a state initially responded to banking 
deregulation (IBBEA). 
                                                          
17 Zarutskie  (2006) uses a similar model specification 
18  I obtain similar results when I use the Interstate Branching Restrictions Index instead  of the  




The second test for hypothesis ”A” is based on IPO proceeds. I use the aggregate 
proceeds by firm type (FC/NFC), size category (number of employees) and state. The 
regression is specified as follows: 
 
where, TREATMENT is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the issuer’s state 
deregulates its bank branching laws in its initial response to IBBEA and if the offer issue 
date was after the issuer’s state initially responded to IBBEA. The regression is specified 
as an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model. 
In the second part of the analysis, I try to establish a relationship between the 
intensity of financial constraints and the offer pricing i.e., the underpricing. The credit 
supply shock will affect only those firms that have their headquarters located in states that 
respond to the IBBEA. This will have an impact on the difference in the underpricing 
between NFC and FC firms. 
This differential effect can operate through two channels. First, FC firms in non-
deregulated states have a greater access to bank loans than those in deregulated states. This 
implies that FC firms in deregulated states will experience a decline in bargaining power 
with underwriters. Thus, the treated FC firms may have to accept a higher underpricing to 
successfully place their issues. Underwriters can earn higher trading commissions and 
improve stock liquidity by offering higher underpricing (Nimalendran, Ritter, and Zhang 
2007; Goldstein, Irvine, and Puckett 2011; Ellul and Pagano 2006). Second, FC firms have 




through public equity and bond issuance. These FC firms may be willing to offer a higher 
underpricing in anticipation of future interactions with investment banks. Anecdotal 
evidence can be found in the eToys case where the CEO (Toby Lenk) testified that, “The 
investment banks have punitive power over us. We need them to raise capital. You don’t 
go complaining to investment banks because they will crush you”. The regression is 
specified as follows: 
 
where, UP is the underpricing (initial return). FC is a dummy equal to one for 
financially constrained firms and zero otherwise. TREATMENT is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the issuers state deregulates its bank branching laws in its initial response to 
IBBEA, and if the offer issue date was after the issuers state initially responded to IBBEA, 
and zero otherwise. The sample construction procedure for the hypothesis ”B” is presented 
in Appendix C. 
In the final part of the analysis, I evaluate the post-IPO investment decision. The 
IPO improves access to capital for FC firms and this should increase investment in growth 
opportunities. These firms should invest more than NFC firms. The regression is specified 
as follows: 
 




2.4 MAIN RESULTS 
2.4.1. The IPO decision and Financial Constraints 
The literature (Zarutskie 2006) finds that young private firms used significantly less 
external debt after a state responded positively to the IBBEA, which is indicative of an 
increase in the intensity of financial constraints. My analysis is based on the premise that 
FC firms are more dependent on bank loans than NFC firms. Bank debt is a vital source of 
capital for private firms, especially for young firms (Robb and Robinson 2014). In addition, 
a firm’s capital structure exhibits a persistence that predates the IPO (Lemmon, Roberts, 
and Zender 2008). Thus, the financing decisions of private firms that are more reliant on 
external finance will be more sensitive to changes in bank lending conditions. I provide 
suggestive evidence on this premise using the annual financial statements prior to the IPO. 
In Table 4, I evaluate the impact of the credit supply shock on pre-IPO long term leverage 
and secured debt. FC firms have lower long-term leverage prior to going public and this 
difference in leverage is statistically significant for three out of the four definitions of 
financially constrained firms. The pre-IPO long term leverage of FC firms declines by 
approximately 16%. In other words, when a state responds to IBBEA, FC firms are unable 
to borrow over longer maturities. NFC firms do not experience a significant change in their 
leverage for most definitions of financial constraints. 
Further, banks usually seek collateral when they extend credit to firms (Berger and 
Udell 1990). I use secured loans as a proxy for bank loans to examine the bank dependence 
of firms prior to the IPO. The average fraction of secured debt for FC firms declines after 
the shock, and this decline is statistically significant for all definitions of financial 




finding is consistent with the literature that after deregulation, banks reduced lending to 
financially constrained firms. 
An alternative approach to evaluate the impact of the capital supply shock is to 
compare the probability distribution of firms with and without the treatment. I plot the 
probability density function (pdf) of firm age, with and without the treatment effect (Figure 
2(a)). Treatment is equal to one for firms that go public after a state deregulates interstate 
banking, and zero otherwise. A non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test is performed 
(unreported) to test if the two distributions are from the same population. It fails to reject 
the null hypothesis (p-value=0.00) that the two distributions are from the same population. 
This implies that the credit supply shock had an impact on the type of firms going public. 
In order to address concerns on the technology boom in the nineties driving the results, I 
also plot the distribution for only manufacturing firms (SIC code 2000 to 3999). A plot of 
the pdf (Figure 2(b)) for manufacturing firms indicates a similar shift in the distribution 
and assuages concerns on the coincidental effect of the technology boom of the nineties. 
Here too, the Kruskal-Wallis fails to reject the null. The graphical evidence shows that the 
credit supply shock had an impact on the distribution. Indeed, it appears that when firms 
experience a change in lender policy, the distribution shifts to the left i.e., the probability 
of a young firm going public increases significantly. 
Next, I test hypothesis ”A” on the propensity to go public in a multivariate setting. 
The results using equation 1 are provided in Table 5 Panel A. The dependent variable is 
the propensity to go public (PTGP). The coefficient of interest is the interaction term - 
Treatment X CFC. It is positive and statistically significant for all specifications. This 




external equity than NFC firms. On an average, the propensity of FC firms going public is 
greater than that of NFC firms. GDP growth is the only control variable that is statistically 
significant. An increase in aggregate growth opportunities (GDP growth), increases the 
number of firms seeking external equity (Korajczyk and Levy 2003). The treatment dummy 
is constant for firms in a state for a year. Thus, the error term may be correlated among 
firms in a state in a year, and so I cluster standard errors at the state-year level (Rice and 
Strahan 2010). 
Specification (1), (2) and (3) are non-linear models. The OLS regression presented 
in column (4) provides an estimate of the marginal effect for the interaction term. The 
dependent variable is scaled up by 100000. The co-efficient of the interaction term suggests 
that likelihood that FC firms go public increases by 25%.19 
The impact of the shock on the demand for equity can also be evaluated by 
comparing the change in aggregate IPO proceeds before and after the shock. Table 5, Panel 
B presents the results of the aggregate state level data using equation 2. The dependent 
variable is the aggregate proceeds from the IPO. The coefficient of the interaction term is 
positive and statistically significant for FCP and FCYN. This suggests that FC firms 
demand more equity than NFC firms in the response to a capital supply shock. In economic 
terms, FC firms raise at least 28 cents more to the dollar than NFC firms. 
Figure 3 presents the time series of the change in PTGP in response to the credit 
supply shock. The interaction term TREATMENT X CFC is estimated for each year prior 
and subsequent to the shock. The difference in the PTGP for FC and NFC firms at the 
                                                          




aggregate level steadily increases from time zero i.e., when firms experience the exogenous 
shock to 5 years after the shock. The gradual change in bank lending policies that results 
in greater credit rationing towards FC firms, increases the likelihood that FC firms may 
seek alternative sources of capital- public equity being one of them. 
Additional evidence of the gradual impact of the change in the intensity of financial 
constraints is presented in Figure 4. A Poisson regression with the number of IPOs 
(categorized by FC and size) as a dependent variable yields similar results. The interaction 
term TREATMENT X CFC is positive and significant after the shock and insignificant 
before the shock. 
2.4.2. Underpricing and Financial Constraints 
Now, I extend the analysis to understand the role of financial constraints in the 
pricing of equity. Table 6 presents the underpricing for all IPOs with offer dates centered 
around between 5 years before and after a state first responds to the IBBEA. The number 
of IPOs peaks in 1996, while the highest mean underpricing is in 1999. The mean 
underpricing over the sample period is 25%. These patterns are consistent with the overall 
IPO trend in the literature (Loughran and Ritter 2004). Thus, my sample is similar to IPO 
samples in the literature and is not biased towards the inclusion of FC firms. 
Table 7 presents the results of the regression for hypothesis ”B” using equation 3. 
The coefficient of interest is the interaction term (β3), which is positive and statistically 
different from zero for all definitions of a FC firm. The increase in the demand for equity 
from FC firms may have induced these firms to increase the underpricing to successfully 




5.79%, 5.57%, and 8.94% for the FCP, FCD, and FCYN definitions respectively. The 
treatment effect explains a substantial variation in underpricing offered by FC firms, 
second only to the impact of the bubble period. The average underpricing in Table 6 is 
25%. Thus, for FC firms when underpricing increases by 5.79%, the change corresponds 
to an increase of 23%. 
I control for the partial adjustment phenomenon (Hanley 1993), VC backing 
(Megginson and Weiss 1991), primary issues (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 2003) and 
underwriter reputation (R. B. Carter, Dark, and Singh 1998). The sign of the coefficients 
are in the expected direction. Reputable underwriters (toptier) in the nineties offered higher 
underpricing. Firm size (Ln(Assets)), and firm age (Ln(age)) are negatively associated with 
the underpricing, while returns on the NASDAQ (Nasdaq15) and the partial adjustment 
(Revision) are positively associated with the underpricing. I include a dummy Bubble to 
control for the dot-com bubble in 1999-2000. In addition, the regression includes controls 
for time, state and industry fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the state-year 
level. 
The average proceeds (real) of the IPOs in the sample is $100 million. An 
incremental underpricing of 6% implies that FC issuers were willing to leave an additional 
$6 million on the table to successfully raise equity. It appears that changes in bank lending 
policies distorted the firms financing decisions and the resulting effect manifested itself 
through FC firms offering higher underpricing to successfully raise the required capital. 
This finding complements the evidence in asset pricing literature that investors demand a 




2.4.3. Post-IPO Investment Decision 
Table 8 presents the results of post-IPO investment decision of FC and NFC firms. 
The dependent variable in columns (1), (2) and (3) is the scaled increase in PP&E (Capex). 
The co-efficient of the interaction term (Treatment X FC) is positive, and statistically 
significant. FC firms increase their capital expenditures after going public. FC firms invests 
30% more than NFC firms. Further, the co-efficient of FC is positive, which implies that 
on an average FC firms have a higher investment intensity than NFC firms. 
The dependent variable in column (4), (5) and (6) is the total asset growth rate 
(gasset). The co-efficient of the interaction term (Treatment X FC) is positive, and 
statistically significant. The asset growth rate of FC firms is 10% greater than NFC firms. 
Overall, I find that FC firms invest more than NFC firms after the IPO. 
2.5 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
In this section, I validate my results through robustness checks, and also confirm 
the suitability of assumptions that underlie the empirical design. 
2.5.1 Size of Treatment Window 
In the main analysis, I use the DD methodology with a treatment window of ±5 
years, centered on the year a state first responds to the IBBEA. If the effect measured by 
the interaction term is noise, then the coefficient may be sensitive to the size of the 
treatment window. In Table 9 and 10, I provide suggestive evidence that the measured 
effect is not noise by varying the size of the treatment window. The treatment effect is 




respectively. The regression includes all control variables, and fixed effects from the 
original specification. In Table 9, Panel A, PTGP increases by at least 0.344, while in Panel 
B PTGP increases by at least 0.367. The increase in the magnitude of the coefficient is 
consistent with Figure 3. 
Similarly, in Table 10 I vary the size of the treatment window. In Panel A, IPO 
firms offer at least an additional 5.24% underpricing, while in Panel B IPO firms offer an 
additional 5.37% underpricing. The interaction effect is increasing in magnitude with time 
i.e., as banks consolidate the issuers experience a change in lending policies and may be 
more inclined to pursue an IPO. 
2.5.2 Falsification Test 
I perform a placebo test to provide additional evidence that the timing of the IBBEA 
is related to the change in the demand for equity and thereby the change in the difference 
in the underpricing for FC firms and NFC firms. A placebo shock is assumed at 5 years 
after and 5 years before the actual treatment dates for each state. Table 11 presents the 
placebo test for the hypothesis ”A”. The interaction term is not significant in Panel A. In 
Panel B, the interaction term is positive and significant at 1% only for the FCYN definition. 
The placebo tests for hypothesis ”B” are presented in Table 12 . The results in Panel 
A and Panel B indicate that the placebo shock has no significant impact on the underpricing 
for FC and NFC firms. The coefficient on the interaction term is not statistically different 
from zero except for FCYN in Panel A. Surprisingly, the sign on the co-efficient is 
negative. The results of the placebo tests suggest that the timing of the credit supply shock 




2.5.3 Parallel Path Assumption 
An assumption of the difference-in-difference (DD) methodology is that the change 
in the variable of interest (dependent variable) should remain unchanged in the absence of 
any treatment effect. In other words, the difference in underpricing for treatment and 
control group should exhibit a parallel trend. The assumption can be graphically verified 
in Figure 5. The plots suggest that the treatment and control groups exhibit a similar 
underpricing trend prior to the exogenous shock to credit supply.  Subsequently, after the 
shock, the underpricing increases for FC firms much more than that for NFC firms. Thus, 
it appears that the assumption of parallel trends holds true, and our empirical design is 
appropriate. 
2.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The objective of this paper is to relate two themes that are widely discussed in the 
IPO literature - the decision to go public and the underpricing of equity with access to 
capital i.e., financial constraints. I examine this relationship by addressing three related 
questions. First, do financial constraints influence the decision to go public? Second, is 
there an incremental cost of issuing equity for financially constrained firms? Third, how 
does going public to alleviate financial constraints affect a firm’s investment decision? 
Using the passage of IBBEA as an exogenous shock to the supply of capital, I 
evaluate the change in the propensity to go public for FC and NFC firms. A decline in the 
supply of capital to FC firms will push these firms towards pursuing an IPO. As expected, 
I find that FC firms are more likely to go public than NFC firms to alleviate financial 




private firms in the Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF). I provide a bridge to the 
existing literature by providing evidence on the impact of access to capital on the decision 
to go public. 
Underwriters have perverse incentives to issue shares at a discount (underpricing). 
FC firms that experience a decline in bank credit have lower bargaining power with the 
underwriter and offer a more underpricing than NFC firms. Previous studies document that 
underpricing is driven by asymmetric information between different types of investors and 
issuers, litigation risk and ex-post uncertainty. I present evidence that the forces of demand 
and supply of capital too have an influence on underpricing. 
Finally, FC firms by their very nature possess valuable growth opportunities but 
are unable to invest on account of limited access to capital. The IPO improves access to 














Figure 2.1: Time-line of a State’s Response to IBBEA 
The figure provides the time line of Oklahoma’s response to IBBEA. The state of 
Oklahoma first responds to the IBBEA on 05/17/1997. IPOs five years before and after this 
date are include in the sample. Since, the banking restriction index remains unchanged at 
4, Oklahoma is designated as a non-deregulated state. However, Oklahoma lowers 
















Figure 2.2: Probability Density Function (Epanechnikov) of Firm Age 
The figure plots the probability density function (PDF) of firm age. Treatment takes the 










Figure 2.3: Point Estimates of Propensity to go Public 
This figure presents the GLM regression for the propensity to go public (PTGP) for FC 
firms and NFC firms. The figure plots point estimates for the slope of the interaction terms 
(β) of the following specification: 
PTGPi,t = α1 + β−5TREATMENTi,−5 × CFCi,−5 + β−4 TREATMENTi,−4 × CFCi,−4 + 
β−3 TREATMENTi,−3×CFCi,−3+ β−2TREATMENTi,−2×CFCi,−2+ 
β−1TREATMENTi,−1×CFCi,−1 + β0TREATMENTi,0×CFCi,0 + β1 TREATMENTi,1 
×CFCi,1 + β2 TREATMENTi,2 ×CFCi,2 + β3TREATMENTi,3 ×CFCi,3 + β4 
TREATMENTi,4 ×CFCi,4 + β5 TREATMENTi,5 ×CFCi,5 + µ1TREATMENTi,t + η1 
CFCi,t + δ1 Controlsi,t + θ1 State + λ1 Year + ԑi,t 
Where λ1 and θ1 are year and state fixed effects respectively. Treatment is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the issuers state deregulates its bank branching laws in its initial 
response to IBBEA, and if the offer date is after the issuers state initially responded to 
IBBEA. CFC is a dummy equal to one for the aggregated FC firms, and zero for the 
aggregated NFC firms. The vertical bars correspond to 95% confidence intervals with 







Figure 2.4: Point Estimates of Number of IPOs 
This figure presents the Poisson regression of the number of IPOs (IPO Count) for FC firms 
and NFC firms. The figure plots point estimates for the slope of the interaction terms (β) 
of the following specification: 
IP O_Counti,t = α1 + β−5TREATMENTi,−5 × CFCi,−5 + β−4 TREATMENTi,−4 × 
CFCi,−4 + β−3 TREATMENTi,−3×CFCi,−3+ β−2TREATMENTi,−2×CFCi,−2+ 
β−1TREATMENTi,−1×CFCi,−1 + β0TREATMENTi,0×CFCi,0 + β1 TREATMENTi,1 
×CFCi,1 + β2 TREATMENTi,2 ×CFCi,2 + β3TREATMENTi,3 ×CFCi,3 + β4 
TREATMENTi,4 ×CFCi,4 + β5 TREATMENTi,5 ×CFCi,5 + µ1TREATMENTi,t + η1 
CFCi,t + δ1 Controlsi,t + θ1 State + λ1 Year + ԑi,t 
Where λ1 and θ1 are year and state fixed effects respectively. Treatment is a dummy 
variable that equals1 if the issuers state deregulates its bank branching laws in its initial 
response to IBBEA, and if the offer date is after the issuers state initially responded to 
IBBEA. CFC is a dummy equal to one for the aggregated FC firms, and zero for the 
aggregated NFC firms. The vertical bars correspond to 95% confidence intervals with 


















Figure 2.5: Parallel Path Assumption 
The figure plots the average underpricing for financially constrained(FC) and non-
financially constrained(NFC) firms on window centered on the year a state initially 




Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
The table presents the characteristics of the sample of 3621 Initial Public Offerings(IPO) 
with offer dates in a five-year window centered on the year a state initially responds to 
banking deregulation (IBBEA). IPO with an offer price below ✩5.00 per share, unit offers, 
REITs, closed-end funds, banks and S&Ls, ADRs, and IPOs not listed on CRSP within six 
months of issuing have been excluded. Firms that utilize their proceeds to service/pay off 
their debt obligations are considered as Non-Financially Constrained (NFC) firms, while 
the rest are considered as Financially Constrained (FC) firms. Treatment is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the issuers state deregulates its bank branching laws in its initial 
response to IBBEA, and if the offer date is after the issuers state initially responded to 
IBBEA. Difference is the difference in the mean between the two treatment regimes. The 
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0.00 Underpricing 1386 17.07 1159 46.17 29.10*** 0.00 
Assets 1386 2.12 1159 2.39 0.27*** 0.00 
Sales 1386 172.31 1159 168.85 -3.46 0.95 
Age 1386 13.73 1159 11.07 -2.66*** 0.01 
ROA 957 -0.10 892 -0.40 -0.30*** 0.00 
Cash 957 0.22 892 0.35 0.13*** 0.00 
Cash Flow 957 -0.12 892 -0.41 -0.30*** 0.00 
Investment 957 0.10 892 0.10 0.00 0.73 
R&D Intensity 
N 
957 0.18 892 0.26 0.08*** 0.00 
NFC (FCP)       
Underpricing 761 11.00 315 10.74 10.74*** 0.00 
Assets 761 2.73 315 2.84 0.11 0.42 
Sales 761 196.15 315 183.41 -12.74 0.75 
Age 761 19.80 315 16.91 -2.89** 0.05 
ROA 533 0.10 242 -0.10 -0.20*** 0.00 
Cash 533 0.06 242 0.10 0.04*** 0.00 
Cash Flow 533 0.08 242 -0.11 -0.18*** 0.00 
Investment 533 0.08 242 0.08 0.00 0.59 








Table 2.2: Measures of Financial Constraints 
The Spearman Rank Correlations between the six measures of financial constraints are presented in Panel A. The Spearman Rank 
Correlations between the six measures of financial constraints and firm characteristics are presented in Panel B. The significance 




Table 2.3: Distribution of IPOs 
The table provides the deregulation dates from Rice and Strahan (2010). The Bank 
Restriction Index can vary between 0 and 4. The deregulation dummy is 1 if the Bank 
Restriction Index is 4 and 0 for all other values of Bank Restriction Index. Abbr. is the 
abbreviation for the corresponding state. The effective date for states that do not ease 
interstate banking restrictions is set at 3 years after Congress passed the IBBEA 
(07/01/1997). If a state changes banking regulation more than once, then the IPO after the 












Table 2.4: Bank Dependence 
The table presents the impact of the IBBEA on the debt characteristics of the sample of 
3621 Initial Public Offerings (IPO) with offer dates in a five-year window centered on the 
year a state initially responds to banking deregulation (IBBEA). Treatment is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the issuers state deregulates its bank branching laws in its initial 
response to IBBEA, and if the offer date is after the issuers state initially responded to 
IBBEA. Difference is the difference in the mean between the two treatment regimes. 
Financially constrained firms are identified using the FCP, FCD and FCYN definitions. 
Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Secured debt is the ratio of secured 
debt to total assets. Leverage and secured debt are measured prior to the IPO offer date. 
The corresponding p-value is provided in the last column. Variable definitions are provided 













Table 2.5: IPO Decision and Financial Constraints 
The table presents the results for a sample of IPOs, aggregated at the state level, with offer 
dates in a five-year window centered on the year a state initially responds to banking 
deregulation (IBBEA). In Panel A, the dependent variable is the propensity to go public 
(PTGP). PTGP is the ratio of the number of firms in a size category in a state completing 
an IPO to the total number of firms in the same size category in a state. The FCP, FCD, 
and FCYN definitions are used to identify financially constrained (FC) firms in 
specification (1), (2), and (3) respectively. These regressions are specified as a Generalized 
Linear Model (Papke and Wooldridge (1996)). In column (4), the model is specified as an 
OLS, and the dependent variable is scaled by 100000. In Panel B,the dependent variable is 
the aggregate IPO proceeds at the state level.These regressions are specified as a OLS 
model. Treatment is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the issuers state deregulates its bank 
branching laws in its initial response to IBBEA, and if the offer issue date was after the 
issuers state initially responded to IBBEA. All control variables are lagged by one period. 
z-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
errors that are corrected for clustering within states and year.Variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix A. Significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% are marked with *, **, 










Table 2.6: IPO Underpricing 
The table presents the mean and median underpricing (initial return) for all IPOs with offer 
dates in a five-year window centered on the year a state initially responds to banking 
deregulation (IBBEA). IPOs with an offer price below $5.00 per share, unit offers, REITs, 
Ls, ADRs, and IPOs not listed on CRSP within six months of issuing have been excluded. 
The underpricing (initial return/first-day return) is defined as the percentage change from 
the offer price to the closing price on the first day of trade. 
 
Year N Mean Std. Dev. Median 
1990 54 8.19 12.86 2.93 
1991 157 12.30 15.35 7.95 
1992 331 10.56 17.47 4.17 
1993 428 13.32 19.50 6.49 
1994 346 10.02 15.33 4.78 
1995 390 22.13 26.50 14.29 
1996 588 17.88 24.18 10.71 
1997 386 13.81 18.01 8.23 
1998 227 24.08 54.73 10.53 
1999 381 76.98 95.09 46.92 
2000 296 59.52 81.34 28.71 
2001 20 10.58 13.86 9.17 
2002 17 14.42 19.47 9.82 




Table 2.7: Demand for Equity and Underpricing of IPO 
The sample includes 3621 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) with offer dates in a five-year 
win- dow centered on the year a state initially responds to banking deregulation (IBBEA). 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the underpricing/first-day return. In 
specifications 1, 2 and 3 financially constrained firms are identified using the FCP, FCD, 
and FCYN definitions respectively. Year fixed effects, state fixed effects, and industry 
fixed effects are included, where the coefficients are not reported for brevity. t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are computed using heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors that are 
corrected for clustering within states and year. Variable definitions are provided in 







Table 2.8: Post-IPO Investment Decision 
The sample includes all IPOs from Table 7. The dependent variable in specification (1), 
(2) and (3) is the capital expenditure before depreciation as a fraction of the PP&E variable 
is the asset growth rate (gasset) in specification (4), (5) and (6). Asset growth rate is defined 
as the change in total assets as a fraction of total assets in the previous year. I use the FCP 
definition in (1) and (4), FCD definition in (2) and (5) and FCYN definition in (3) and (6). 
Year fixed effects, state fixed effects and industry fixed effects are included, where the 
coefficients are not reported for brevity. t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors that are corrected for clustering within states 
and year. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Significance levels of 10%, 












Table 2.9: Size of Treatment Window (Propensity to go Public) 
The table presents the results for a sample of IPOs, aggregated at the state level, offer dates 
in a window centered on the year a state initially responds to banking deregulation 
(IBBEA). The dependent variable is the propensity to go public (PTGP). The FCP, FCD, 
and FCYN definitions are used to identify financially constrained (FC) firms in 
specification (1), (2), and (3) respectively. These regressions are specified as a Generalized 
Linear Model (Papke and Wooldridge (1996)). Treatment is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if the issuers state deregulates its bank branching laws in its initial response to IBBEA, 
and if the offer issue date was after the issuers state initially responded to IBBEA. All 
control variables are lagged by one period. z-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors that are corrected for clustering within states 
and year. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Significance levels of 10%, 





Table 2.10: Size of Treatment Window (IPO Underpricing) 
The sample includes 3621 Initial Public Offerings (IPO) with offer dates in a window 
centered on the year a state initially responds to banking deregulation (IBBEA). The 
dependent variable in all regressions is the underpricing/first-day return. In specifications 
1, 2 and 3 financially constrained firms are identified using the FCP, FCD, and FCYN 
definitions respectively. Year fixed effects, state fixed effects, and industry fixed effects 
are included, where the coefficients are not reported for brevity. t-statistics (in parentheses) 
are computed using heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors that are corrected for 
clustering within states and year. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 










Table 2.11: Placebo Test (Propensity to go Public) 
The table presents the results for a sample of IPOs, aggregated at the state level, with offer 
dates in a five-year window centered on a placebo date. In Panel A, the placebo date is 5 
years before the date a state initially responded to banking deregulation (IBBEA). In Panel 
B, the placebo date is 5 years after the date a state initially responded to banking 
deregulation (IBBEA). In specifications 1, 2 and 3 financially constrained firms are 
identified using the FCP, FCD and FCYN definitions respectively. TREATMENT is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the issuers state deregulates its bank branching laws in its 
initial response to IBBEA and if the offer issue date was after the issuers state initially 
responded to IBBEA. Year fixed effects based on the IPO year, state fixed effects and 
industry fixed effects based on the two-digit SIC code are included, where the coefficients 
are not reported for brevity. z-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors that are corrected for clustering within states 
and year. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Significance levels of 10%, 





Table 2.12: Placebo Test (IPO Underpricing) 
The sample includes 3621 Initial Public Offerings (IPO) with offer dates in a five-year 
window centered on a placebo date. In Panel A, the placebo date is 5 years before the date 
a state initially responded to banking deregulation (IBBEA). In Panel B, the placebo date 
is 5 years after the date a state initially responded to banking deregulation (IBBEA). The 
dependent variable in all regressions is the underpricing/first-day return.  In specifications 
1, 2 and 3 financially constrained firms are identified using the FCP, FCD, and FCYN 
definitions respectively. Year fixed effects, state fixed effects, and industry fixed effects 
are included, where the coefficients are not reported for brevity. t-statistics (in parentheses) 
are computed using heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors that are corrected for 
clustering within states and year. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 









M&A ADVISER CONTRACTING 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Empirical studies find that on an average mergers and acquisitions (M&As) do not 
increase acquirer shareholders’ wealth (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 2004). Financial 
advisers can lower transaction costs, ameliorate information asymmetry problems, and 
decrease contracting costs for firms (Servaes and Zenner 1996). In addition, financial 
advisers provide managers with insurance against lawsuits if the deal fails to meet 
stakeholder expectations. Hence, acquirers may seek the assistance of financial advisers to 
improve outcomes especially for complex deals (Servaes and Zenner 1996). Although, the 
literature on M&As is well developed, our understanding of the nature of contracting 
between acquirers and their financial advisers is quite limited. 
Usually, the payoff to the adviser is contingent on the completion of the deal but is 
independent of its impact on shareholder wealth. This payoff structure may result in an 
agency problem because the adviser may not exert enough effort in evaluating the 
suitability and cost of the acquisition (McLaughlin 1990, 1992). In this paper, I examine 





 Acquirers are more dependent on financial advisers for complex transactions, 
which require more effort in screening and monitoring the target. Creditors fulfill this role 
and thus, advisers can demonstrate greater effort by financing complex deals. In a sample 
of bank-financed acquisitions, I find that the buy-side adviser is more likely to finance 
complex acquisitions. A bundled contract with lower advisory fees (immediate payoff) in 
lieu of higher loan interest (future payoff) will ensure the adviser has an incentive to ensure 
the success of the acquisition. On the expected lines, I find that advisers that finance 
acquisitions charge higher spreads (interest) on acquisition loans but accept lower advisory 
fees. The bundling of advisory service and lending yields superior outcomes as measured 
by changes to shareholder wealth and completion time. 
In the recent past, there has been a growing trend of firms pursuing deals without 
the involvement of an adviser. The Wall Street journal reported that in 2015, approximately 
26% of large deals did not include an adviser on the buy-side. This decline in the role of 
advisers could be attributed to ineffective contracting between the acquirer and adviser. 
Financial advisers earn an advisory fee on the completion of the deal. However, the 
advisory fee is not contingent on the impact of the acquisition on shareholder wealth. This 
payoff structure creates perverse incentives for the adviser. 
Anecdotal evidence on the agency problem between an adviser and acquirer can be 
found in Daisy Systems v. Bear Stearns. Daisy Systems appointed Bear Stearns as its 
adviser for the acquisition of Cadnetix, a high-technology firm whose primary asset was 
intellectual property. Although Daisy successfully acquired the target, problems with 
Cednetix eventually drove Daisy to bankruptcy. In the lawsuit that followed, the Ninth 




expert” manner. Thus, legal provisions may not be effective in lowering agency costs for 
the acquirer. 
Acquisition gains for the acquirer are negatively correlated with the reputation of 
the adviser (Hunter and Jagtiani 2003; Ismail 2010). As a consequence, reputation capital 
may not serve as an appropriate mechanism to manage the agency problem. However, a 
contract that ensures the adviser has skin in the game can lower agency costs. The bundling 
of advisory service and financing will increase the involvement of the adviser and may 
result in better outcomes for firms. Target advisers can increase bidding competition and 
thereby the price of the target by providing financing to the acquirer i.e., stapled finance 
(Povel and Singh 2010). Stapled finance provides acquirers with access to cheap debt over 
longer maturities. The target (sell side) adviser does not break-even on these acquisition 
loans but earns a higher compensatory advisory fee (Aslan and Kumar 2017). Thus, 
acquisition financing can play a role in mitigating agency problems associated with 
financial advisers. 
Agency theory (Harris and Raviv 1979; Shavell 2006) posits that a risk averse agent 
(adviser) should be compensated by a risk neutral principal based on the level of effort and 
not on the outcome of the activity. Creditors exert effort to monitor (Diamond 1984) and 
screen (Boyd and Prescott 1986; Diamond 1991) the firm’s investments. An adviser that 
acts as creditor will exert more effort in evaluating and executing an M&A deal than an 
adviser that does not finance the deal. The severity of the agency problem is increasing in 
the complexity of the acquisition. Hence, on the demand side, it is more likely that acquirers 
will prefer financial advisers that are willing to finance complex deals. On the supply side, 




buy-side adviser is willing to forgo immediate payoffs (advisory fees) for differed 
payments in the future (interest), the incentives of the adviser are better aligned with those 
of the acquirer. This contractual arrangement should result in better outcomes for acquirers 
as measured by wealth effects and completion times. 
I use a sample of 724 M&A M&A transactions announced between 1995 and 2014 
to evaluate the role of acquisition financing in M&A advisory. An examination of the price 
and non-price features of the acquisition loan provides an insight on the contractual 
arrangement between the adviser and acquirer. Since, the agency problem is more acute 
for complex deals, advisers are more likely to finance complex deals. Complexity is 
measured in terms of the relative size of the deal and involvement of competing acquirers. 
Next, I compare the spread on acquisition loans originated by lenders affiliated to 
the adviser and independent lenders. Affiliated lenders seek an additional 80 basis points 
(bps) on acquisition loans than unaffiliated lenders. Further, anticipating managerial moral 
hazard problems affiliated lenders impose tighter covenants and demand collateral. This is 
consistent with the premise that banks use price and non-price terms as complementary 
tools to deal with borrower risk. Finally, I also find evidence of a substitution effect 
wherein affiliated lenders charge lower advisory fees (20 bps), possibly in lieu of higher 
interest payments. 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the bundled contract, I compare the 
outcome of acquisitions financed by advisers with those financed by unrelated lenders. 
First, I examine the impact on completion time, which is measured from the announcement 
date to the effective date. After the deal is announced, the advisers will direct effort towards 




for affiliated advisers is 10 days shorter than independent advisers. Second, I investigate 
the impact of the acquisition on investor wealth. Investor wealth will be eroded if affiliated 
lenders collude with acquirer managers by facilitating empire building, and in exchange 
extract rents in the form of higher interest payments. However, the results indicate that 
acquisitions financed by advisers elicit a positive response from the market. Thus, 
acquisition financing may be effective in certifying deal quality. 
I address two potential sources of endogeneity. First, the dummy variable 
Aff_Lend, which identifies deals financed by the adviser may proxy for unobservable 
acquirer characteristics. I consider a sample of non-acquisition loans from the affiliated 
lender originated in the same time window as the main sample. Non- acquisition loans 
priced of similar terms by affiliated and unaffiliated lenders. Second, the pairing between 
the acquirer and the lender in not random because complex deals are financed by affiliated 
lenders. I use a two-stage Heckman procedure to address the self-selection bias. The results 
of the two-stage regression are consistent with my main results. 
This paper contributes to several areas of the literature. First, I add to the literature 
on conflict of interests between shareholders, and financial intermediaries (Michaely and 
Womack 1999; Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan 2003; Mehran and Stulz 2007). I find 
that the agency problem between the adviser and acquirer can be mitigated by bundling 
advisory service and financing. Second, the findings augment the literature on the cross-
selling channel employed by universal banks. Investment banks cross-subsidize advisory 
fees by the related equity financing fees (Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos 2012) and 
interest on staple finance loans (Aslan and Kumar 2017). I find a similar substitution effect 




The paper is organized as follows. I develop the hypotheses in the next section. The 
identification strategy and the data are described in section 3.3. I present the main results 
in section 3.4 and validate the results through robustness tests in section 3.5. Finally, I 
conclude in section 3.6. 
3.2 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.2.1 Bundling of Financial Advice and Lending 
Financial advisers can lower transaction costs, ameliorate information asymmetry 
problems and decrease contracting costs for firms (Servaes and Zenner 1996). Advisers 
lower transaction costs by specializing in transaction execution and possessing economies 
of scale and scope in information production. Further, advisers interact with buy side and 
sell side firms in the market for corporate control, and thus can ameliorate information 
asymmetry problems. Finally, investment banks monitor the firm and thereby lower agency 
costs for the shareholder. These advisers also provide managers with insurance against 
lawsuits if the deal does not meet stakeholder expectations. 
The majority of takeovers in the U.S. are financed by loans (Bharadwaj and 
Shivdasani 2003). Banks affiliated to financial advisers may be willing to provide external 
finance to facilitate the transaction. The firm’s decision to borrow from an affiliated lender 
can be attributed to two hypotheses - Information Friction Hypothesis and Bonding 
Hypothesis. These two hypotheses may not be mutually exclusive. 
Banks can lower the cost of information production by engaging in repeated 
interactions with firms (Petersen and Rajan 1995) , and expanding the scope of banking 




scope in the form of lower cost of borrowing(S. Bharath et al. 2007), and improved access 
to credit (Petersen and Rajan 1995). Further, these intermediaries enjoy diversification 
benefits (White 1986), increase in revenues, and improvement in their competitiveness 
(Drucker and Puri 2005; Calomiris and Pornrojnangkool 2009) by combining commercial 
and investment banking activities. Financial advisers with an affiliated lending business 
can extend the benefit of providing concurrent lending services to the client in the form of 
lower advisory fees and/or cheaper loans. Thus, information- ally opaque firms can reduce 
adverse selection costs by borrowing from a better-informed lender i.e., an affiliated lender. 
In other words, borrowers that suffer from severe information asymmetry problems are 
more likely to prefer an affiliated lender (“Information Friction Hypothesis”). 
H1A: Affiliated lenders are more likely to finance M&A deals involving informationally 
opaque acquirers 
The fee paid to the adviser includes a variable component and/or a fixed 
component. This fee may be unconditional, contingent on completion, or both. However, 
the payoff to the acquirer’s adviser is independent of the impact of the transaction on 
shareholder wealth. This payoff structure may result in an agency problem because the 
adviser may not exert enough effort in evaluating the suitability and cost of the transaction 
(McLaughlin 1990, 1992). For example, advisory fees are higher for successful takeovers 
which may induce advisers to push for higher premiums to ensure the deal is successful 
(McLaughlin 1990). An examination of the legal and economic facets of the contract 




The ruling of the Delaware Supreme Court provides a template for defining the 
legal nature of the adviser-client relationship. In re Rural/Metro Corp. stockholders20, the 
Delaware Supreme court ruled that financial advisers are responsible for the quality of their 
advice and they must keep the firm informed about potential conflict of interests. However, 
the court observed that the relationship between an adviser and the firm is contractual and 
not fiduciary in nature. This implies that legal provisions may not be effective in lowering 
agency costs of the acquirer. 
From an economic perspective, the relationship between the adviser and the 
acquirer can be studied using two frameworks based on Contract Theory - agency theory 
(Harris and Raviv 1979; Shavell 2006) and information asymmetry theory/signaling 
mechanisms (Spence 1973). 
Agency theory stipulates that a Pareto optimal contract must account for the risk 
preferences of the contracting parties. When the principal is risk averse and the agent is 
risk neutral, a Pareto optimal contract will allocate the risk to the agent. In such 
circumstances, the payoff to the agent is equal to total gain of the investment minus the 
principal’s share of the gain. A risk neutral adviser will bear the acquisition’s risk and will 
attempt to maximize the value of the acquisition. Thus, the payoff to the agent will be 
contingent on the outcome of the acquisition. In other words, the acquirer should 
compensate the adviser only if the acquisition is successful i.e., the expected synergies are 
realized. The acquirer can offer the adviser out-of-the-money call options with a strike 
price based on the synergies from the acquisition. 
                                                          





When the principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk averse, the payoff to the 
agent cannot be based on the overall gain. In this situation, the principal will bear the risk 
and will compensate the agent based on the agent’s effort. A risk averse adviser must 
demonstrate effort towards ensuring the acquisition is successful and the acquirer will 
compensate the adviser based on the level of effort. Evidence suggests that investment 
bankers are risk-averse (Hunter and Walker 2006). They represent buy and sell side clients 
across different industries to diversify their risk. In addition, they are usually affiliated to 
large financial institutions who actively manage their risk. 
The position of a creditor is tantamount to writing a put option on the firm. 
Creditors have a vested interest in ensuring that the option is never in the money i.e., the 
firm does not go bankrupt. Hence, creditors try to influence managerial decisions. The 
literature documents multiple channels through which creditors protect their interests. First, 
creditors monitor the firm, and may renegotiate the loan contract when the firm defaults 
(Diamond 1984). This deters the firm from making poor investment choices. Second, 
creditors screen the firm’s investments and finance only positive NPV projects (Boyd and 
Prescott 1986; Diamond 1991). In fact, the market recognizes the ability of creditors in 
screening and monitoring acquisitions. Bank financed acquisition elicit a more positive 
response than non-bank financed acquisitions (Bharadwaj and Shivdasani 2003). Hence, 
an adviser that finances the acquisition will exert more effort than an adviser that only 
provides advisory service. 
Target firms benefit from the bundling of advisory service and financing. Target 
advisers can increase bidding competition and thereby the price of the target by providing 




vides acquirers with access to cheap debt over longer maturities. The target (sell side) 
adviser does not break-even on these acquisition loans but earns a higher compensatory 
advisory fee (Aslan and Kumar 2017). Thus, acquisition financing can play a role in 
mitigating agency problems associated with financial advisers. 
Signaling theory proposes that transacting parties can lower transaction costs by 
signaling their quality (Spence 1973). The outcome of an acquisition depends on the quality 
of the financial adviser (Bao and Edmans 2011). Good advisers have an incentive to corner 
a greater share of the more lucrative M&A advisory business (as compared to lending). 
M&A advisory fees are as important as, if not more, than equity underwriting fees 
(Kolasinski and Kothari 2008). The advisory market can move from a pooling equilibrium 
to a separating equilibrium if good advisers can differentiate themselves from bad advisers. 
Good advisers can achieve this by providing a credible signal of their quality. If the adviser 
is willing to have skin in the game by investing in the debt of the firm, he can differentiate 
himself from other competing advisers. 
In summary, the financial adviser (intermediary) can mitigate the agency problem 
by financing the acquisition (Leland and Pyle 1977; Campbel and Kracaw 1980). The 
agency problem is more severe when the acquirer is more dependent on the adviser i.e., 
when deals are more complex. This implies that the adviser is more likely to provide 
financing for complex acquisitions (“Bonding Hypothesis”). 






3.2.2 Affiliated Lenders and Loan Features 
Financial advisers with a lending business can extend the benefit of concurrent 
lending and advisory service to firms in the form of lower fees and/or lower interest 
payments (Drucker and Puri 2005; S. Bharath et al. 2007). The information friction 
hypothesis would imply that loans from affiliated lenders are cheaper and have fewer 
covenants. 
H2A: Acquisition loans from affiliated lenders are more likely to have lower interest rates 
and fewer covenants. 
Under the bonding hypothesis, a contract is Pareto optimal if the payoff to the 
adviser (agent) is contingent on his effort. When a risk averse adviser lends to a firm, the 
adviser will increase effort towards screening the target and monitoring the acquirer. 
However, the incentive to exert effort may diminish if the affiliated lender earns a higher 
up- front advisory fee in lieu of a cheap loan. In M&A deals that involve equity issuance, 
advisers cross-subsidize advisory fees by the related equity financing fees (Golubov, 
Petmezas, and Travlos 2012). Thus, a bundled contract with a lower upfront advisory fee, 
and a compensatory higher interest rate on the loan will generate the highest level of effort.  
Creditors can use financial covenants to impose restrictions on the actions of the 
manager (Smith and Warner 1979). The strictness of covenants is increasing in the degree 
of the risk of the firm (Demiroglu and James 2010). Thus, financial covenants act as a 
screening mechanism that limit moral hazard problems by the borrower (Dichev and 




complex acquisitions, which are riskier. Thus, affiliated lenders would impose restrictions 
to mitigate moral hazard problems associated with managerial decisions. 
H2B: Acquisition loans from affiliated lenders are more likely to have higher interest rates 
and tighter covenants 
When investment banks bundle advisory service and equity underwriting, they 
cross- subsidize advisory fees with equity underwriting fees (Golubov, Petmezas, and 
Travlos 2012)A similar arrangement exists between targets and their advisers. Sell side 
advisers trade-off advisory fees with interest on acquisition loans for deals with stapled 
finance (Aslan and Kumar 2017). The bonding hypothesis implies that a contract that 
compensates the adviser on the level of effort is Pareto optimal. Acquirer advisers may be 
willing to differ some of the upfront payoff to the future and thereby demonstrate a higher 
intensity of effort in executing the deal. 
H3: Advisers affiliated to lenders are more likely to charge a lower advisory fee than 
unaffiliated advisers. 
3.3 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
3.3.1 Bundling of Advisory Service and Lending 
The objective of the analysis is to understand the role of bundling advisory service 
and financing in mitigating adviser agency costs. A lender that offers advisory service and 
acquisition financing is an affiliated lender. I designate a lender as an affiliated lender if 
the lead lender and M&A adviser share a common owner (holding company). For example, 
Salomon Smith Barney (M&A adviser) was affiliated to Citibank (lender) because they 




quisitions (M&As) between banks. For example, Wells Fargo (lender) acquired Wachovia 
(lender). Finally, I account for universal banks acquiring pure investment banks. For ex- 
ample, Swiss Bank Corporation Bank (universal bank) acquired Dillon, Read & Co (M&A 
adviser). 
The decision to borrow from an affiliated or unaffiliated lender is modeled using a 
Logit regression. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the adviser and lender are related 
and zero otherwise. The regression model is specified as 
 
where Deal_Char and Acq_Char are deal characteristics and acquirer 
characteristics respectively. I also include industry (θ1) and time (κ1) fixed effects. 
Aff_Lend is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the adviser and lender are related. 
Informational friction costs are higher for smaller firms with growth options and limited 
access to credit markets. If the information friction hypothesis holds true, then these firm 
characteristics should be positively correlated with the decision to borrow from an 
affiliated lender. 
The acquirer may need assistance with the estimation of synergies for complex 
acquisitions. For example, top-tier financial advisers can identify more synergistic 
combinations and expropriate a greater fraction of synergies to accrue to acquirers 
(Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos 2012). In addition, structuring a complex transaction 
requires expertise on economic, legal and taxation issues. For example, some deals may 




decrease completion time. Hence, the acquirer is more dependent on the prudent advice of 
the adviser for complex transactions and is more likely to seek financing from an affiliated 
lender (bonding hypothesis). If the bonding hypothesis holds true, deal characteristics 
should be correlated with lender choice. 
3.3.2 Affiliated Lenders and Loan Features 
I test the second hypothesis on the pricing of the acquisition loan using an Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) model. The dependent variable is the log of all-in-drawn spread 
(AISD). The AISD is defined as the spread in excess of a benchmark (usually LIBOR). It 
corresponds to the total cost (interest rate and fees) paid over LIBOR for each dollar drawn 
down under the loan commitment. I use the logarithm of loan spreads to address the 
problem of skew- ness in the distribution of the AISD. This modification of the functional 
form is prescribed in the literature (Qian and Strahan 2007; Graham, Li, and Qiu 2008; 
Valta 2012). I follow the literature (Ivashina and Kovner 2011) on loan pricing to identify 
deal, loan and firm characteristics that influence the pricing of the loan. The regression is 
specified as follows  
 
where Loan_Char is the loan characteristic vector. An acquisition may have more 
than one related acquisition loans (package), which in turn may have multiple loan 
facilities. I retain all related acquisition loans. An advantage of this specification is that for 




affiliated lender for the same M&A transaction. This approach addresses endogeneity 
concerns on account of omitted variables. I run the above regression at the facility level. 
A firm’s decision to choose a lender may be endogenous, i.e., acquirers and lenders 
may match based on preferences and characteristics. The empirical design accounts for this 
non-random matching between lenders and acquirers by implementing a self-selection 
model (Li and Prabhala 2007). I implement a Heckman (Heckman 1979) two-step 
correction procedure to alleviate concerns on self-selection bias. 
The first-stage equation models the choice between an affiliated and unaffiliated 
lender, and the second-stage regression includes a control variable for the selection bias. A 
strong identification strategy necessitates that I include an identification variable in the first 
stage but not in the second stage (Li and Prabhala 2007). This identification variable must 
be correlated with lender selection but not be directly correlated with the outcome - spread 
of the loan. Firms may hire multiple advisers for complex acquisitions. I use the number 
of advisers on the buy side as an identification variable. The number of buy side advisers 
will not be directly correlated with the cost of the loan. The first stage of the regression is 
specified as follows 
 





where, λ is the inverse Mills ratio using the estimation from the first stage 
regression. 
In order to test the third hypothesis on advisory fees, I compare the advisory fees 
for deals financed by affiliated lenders with those financed by unaffiliated/independent 
lenders. The dependent variable is the advisory fee scaled by the deal value. The regres- 
sion specification accounts for the non-random pairing of acquirers and lenders. I use the 
M&A experience of the acquirer as an identification variable. Acquirers with prior M&A 
experience will be less dependent on the adviser. Thus, the prior experience of the ac- 
quirer is correlated with the dependence on the adviser (thereby the choice of lender) but 
not directly correlated with the advisory fee. The first stage is specified as follows 
 
I run the above regression at the acquisition level i.e., only one observation per 











3.3.3 Wealth Effects 
The source of financing has an impact on the bidding strategy of the acquirer and 
thereby on the acquisition premium (Vladimirov 2015). Acquisitions that are financed by 
bank loans elicit a positive response from the market (Bharadwaj and Shivdasani 2003). 
This suggests that banks can certify the quality of the acquisition. Creditors monitor the 
acquirer and possess control rights to mitigate shareholder-creditor conflicts (Diamond 
1984). These creditors also screen the firm’s investments (Boyd and Prescott 1986; 
Diamond 1991) and ensure only good deals are consummated. 
A bundled contract (advisory service and loan) provides the adviser with a greater 
incentive to screen and monitor the firm’s investment. Hence, deals financed by affiliated 
lenders may be assessed in a more positive light than deals financed by unaffiliated lenders. 
I estimate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) using the market model to 
evaluate the impact of lender choice on shareholder wealth. The parameters are estimated 
over a window of 100 days with a gap of 10 days between the estimation window and event 
window. The regression is specified as follows: 
 
3.4 DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
The M&A sample includes deals announced between 01 January 1994 and 31 
December 2014 from the Thomson Reuters’ Securities Data Company Platinum - Mergers 
and Acquisitions database (SDC Platinum) involving acquirers and targets located in the 




of the acquirer are retained. Deals (acquirer and/or target) in the highly regulated financial 
services (SIC code 6000 to 6999) or utilities (SIC code 4900 to 4999) sector are dropped. 
The M&A sample includes only deals where control is transferred from the existing target 
shareholders to the acquirer shareholders. In other words, the acquirer controls less than 
50% of the target on the announcement date and holds more than 50% of the target after 
completion. Acquirer financial information is from COMPUSTAT and stock price data is 
from CRSP. I do not include leveraged buyout deals in the sample because the motivations 
and outcomes of strategic M&As and LBOs are quite different. In addition, LBOs usually 
involve a financial sponsor. These sponsors have existing relationships with the adviser 
and lender, which can influence the pricing of the acquisition loan. Finally, I only retain 
those deals that involve at least one financial adviser that is related to a prospective lender. 
Thus, all my tests are conditional on the participation of an adviser who has the ability to 
finance an acquisition. 
The data on acquisition loans is from Thomson Reuters’ Loan Pricing Corporation 
(LPC) DealScan database that provides origination data on syndicated loans. The LPC loan 
data is more reliable and representative of the syndicated loan market after the mid- 
nineties. Hence, I retain loans originated between 01 January 1994 and 31 December 2014. 
I designate loans with primary purpose as “Acquisition line”, “Takeover”, ”Capital 
expend.”, ”Corp. purposes”, ”Project finance”, and ”Working capital” as acquisition 
related loans21. The M&A sample is merged with the syndicated loan sample using the link 
file provided by (Chava and Roberts 2008) for deals announced between 1994 and 2012. I 
                                                          
21 4Loans with primary purpose as ”Debt Repayment”, ”Dividend Recap”, ”Spinoff”, ”Stock buyback”, 
”LBO” etc. are non-acquisition loans. I obtain similar results when I exclude loans with primary purpose as 




employ a fuzzy matching technique to map M&A deals with the related syndicated loans 
between 2013 and 2014. 
The mapping of deals with loans results in multiple deal loan matches. I exclude 
acquisition loans (package) originated more than 1 year from the M&A deal effective date 
because acquirers are more likely to arrange for loans closer to the closure of the deal22. 
The cost of borrowing includes an undrawn spread and a facility fee that are payable on 
the unused amount, and the total amount respectively. Banks charge borrowers these 
spreads/fees to recoup opportunity costs on loan commitments. Hence, the firm can 
minimize its borrowing cost by arranging for funds only when necessary. I validate the 
matching procedure of the acquisition loans with the M&A transactions using additional 
information from SDC Platinum and DealScan. SDC Platinum provides the name of the 
lender for few M&A deals and DealScan provides the name of the target for some 
acquisition loans. 
An acquisition loan can have multiple loan facilities. For example, TTM 
Technologies acquired Tyco Printed Circuit Group on 27 October 2006. The acquirer 
arranged for a loan from UBS with deal active date 27 October 2006. The package included 
two facilities - a revolver and a term loan. The final sample consists of 1486 loan facilities 
and 724 M&A deals. 
Usually, multiple lenders participate in a syndicated loan. However, the terms of 
the loan are negotiated by the lead lender. I follow the literature (S. T. Bharath et al. 2011; 
Berg, Saunders, and Steffen 2016), and designate a lender as a lead lender if at least one of 
                                                          




the following conditions are met: (a) Lead Arranger Credit = “Yes” in Dealscan, (b) 
LenderRole = “Agent,” “Admin agent”, “Arranger”, or “Lead bank” in Dealscan, or (c) the 
lender is the sole lender. 
If the lead lender and M&A adviser share a common owner (holding company), 
then the lender is designated as an affiliated lender. I identify deals financed by affiliated 
lenders by employing a fuzzy matching technique. The regulatory and competitive 
environment of the banking sector in the U.S. has undergone significant changes since the 
nineties. I account for the consolidation in the US banking sector while constructing the 
sample. For example, Wells Fargo acquired Wachovia Corporation in 2008. If the 
announcement date of an M&A transaction is after 2008 with Wachovia as the adviser, and 
Wells Fargo as the lender, then such a deal is considered to be funded by an affiliated 
lender. A summary of the major affiliated and unaffiliated lenders is provided in Table I. 
Table II presents the summary statistics for the sample. I winsorize all the 
continuous variables are at the 1% and 99% levels. Acquirers may be more dependent on 
advisers for deals that require regulatory approval (Regulated), have a high cash payout 
(CASH), extend across state lines (Inter-State), and are relatively large (Relative Value).  
An acquirer offering more cash instead of stock bears the risk of failure in realizing 
synergies. Acquirers use their overvalued shares as currency for acquisitions (Rhodes-
Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan 2005; Savor and Lu 2009). Thus, in cash deals the 
estimation of synergies is critical for the acquirer. Advisers possess comparative advantage 
over acquirers in estimating synergies for transactions. Further, M&A deals may be subject 




Executing deals that require regulatory approval may require the expertise of financial 
advisers. 
Relative size is defined as the transaction value divided by the sum of market value 
of the acquirer and the transaction value (Offenberg and Pirinsky 2015). The relative size 
is a proxy for the magnitude of the synergy from merger (Loughran and Vijh 1997). 
Financial advisers interact with multiple firms in the market for corporate control and can 
utilize this expertise to decrease information asymmetry between acquirers and targets, 
thereby providing a fairer estimate of synergies. These advisers can also leverage 
economies of scope and scale to estimate synergies. Thus, the acquirer will be more 
dependent on the adviser in relatively large deals. The difference in relative size for deals 
financed by affiliated lenders and unaffiliated lenders is statistically significant at 1% . 
Surprisingly, affiliated lenders are less likely to finance diversifying deals and tender 
offers. Thus, deal characteristics suggest that affiliated lenders are more likely to finance 
complex transactions. 
Affiliated lenders are more likely to participate in deals involving large (log(Assets 
Acq)) acquirers with a higher fewer growth options (TobinQ Acq), higher leverage, and 
access to diverse sources of capital (Rating_Acq). It is quite unlikely that such firms face 
a higher informational friction cost. Further affiliated lenders are more likely to participate 
in deals involving targets that operate in the hi-tech sector and have multiple business 
segments. Though, information on such targets may be easily available, valuation of the 
target may require some expertise. Thus, firm characteristics provide little evidence to 




The loan characteristics in Panel D provide some additional interesting insights on 
lender choice. Affiliated lenders are more likely to originate more expensive (higher 
spreads) loans, demand collateral and seek tighter covenants. These features are sugges- 
tive of the higher risk involved in M&A deals financed by affiliated lenders. Further, these 
loans are less likely to include a revolving credit facility (i.e., no embedded option). In 
Panel A, the advisory fees are lower for deals financed by affiliated lenders. Overall, the 
evidence presented in table II supports the bonding hypothesis. 
3.5 MAIN RESULTS 
3.5.1 Bundling of Advisory Service and Lending 
I test the informational friction and bonding hypothesis in a multivariate setting. 
The decision to seek financing from an affiliated lender is modeled as a binary choice 
model as shown in equation 1. Table III presents the marginal effects of the Logit 
regression. The dependent variable Aff_Lend is equal to 1 if the acquisition loan is 
originated by an affiliated lender, and zero otherwise. The control variables in column (1) 
include deal characteristics, while additional controls for acquirer characteristics are 
introduced in column (2) and (3). I also include industry and year fixed effects. 
Advisers are more likely to finance deals when the payout structure has a greater 
fraction of cash (Cash Pct). An acquirer offering more cash instead of stock bears the risk 
of failure in realizing synergies. Thus, the greater the fraction of cash paid, the more critical 
is the estimation of synergies for the acquirer. The estimation of synergies is also very crit- 
ical for relatively large acquisitions (Relative Value). An increase in target size decreases 




to engage in empire building because larger targets provide high private benefits (Harford 
and Li 2007; Grinstein and Hribar 2004). Further, larger targets may incur higher post-
acquisition integration costs. The greater complexity and costs of integrating large targets 
decreases the likelihood of realizing potential synergies (Ahern 2010). Thus, acquirers are 
more dependent on advisers for relatively large acquisitions. On an average, acquisitions 
decrease acquirer shareholder wealth. An inaccurate valuation of the target could increase 
the bankruptcy risk for the acquirer. Surprisingly, affiliated lenders are less likely to finance 
diversifying deal i.e., acquirer and target operate in different industries.  
The market for corporate control involves multiple players on the buy side and sell 
side. Acquirers may face competition from other potential suitors for acquiring a target. In 
such circumstances, the acquirer is dependent on the negotiation and execution skills of the 
adviser. Hence, deals with multiple bidders are more likely to be financed by acquirers 
(Multiple Bidders).  
Acquirers with high leverage (Leverage Acq), fewer growth options (TobinQ Acq), 
and access to capital markets (Rating Acq) are more likely to borrow from an affiliated 
lender. These acquirers usually do not face higher information friction costs. On the 
contrary, the higher leverage and fewer growth options are indicative of a more mature 
borrower. Hence, the evidence in table III supports the bonding hypothesis. 
3.5.2 Pricing of Acquisition Loans 
The decision to borrow from an affiliated lender will have an impact on the pricing 
of the loan. Syndicated loans are priced in terms of the all-in-drawn spread (AISD). The 
AISD is defined as the spread in excess of a benchmark (usually LIBOR). Table IV presents 




of AISD. The main independent variable Aff Lend is equal to 1 if the loan is originated by 
an affiliated lender, and zero otherwise. In column (1), the independent variable vector 
includes deal and acquirer characteristics, while in column (2) additional controls for loan 
characteristics are included. The loan spread, and loan characteristics are determined 
simultaneously, and hence are likely to be endogenous. By performing separate 
estimations, I try to establish that the results are not biased by the endogenous nature of the 
loan contract. 
A syndicated loan (package) consists of multiple facilities. An observation is a 
unique facility. Hence, to account for the correlation in the error term, I cluster the standard 
errors at the package level. I also include industry, loan type and year fixed effects. The 
loan type refers to the nature of the loan - credit line, term loan A, term loan B to G and 
other loan types (LC,bridge loan, etc.). In all the specifications, the coefficient on Aff_Lend 
is positive and statistically significant. It appears that affiliated lenders charge a higher 
spread than unaffiliated lenders for acquisition loans. 
A firm’s decision to choose a lender may be endogenous, i.e., acquirers and lenders 
may match based on preferences and characteristics. The empirical design accounts for this 
non-random matching between lenders and acquirers by implementing a self-selection 
model. The first stage regression is presented in Column (3) and (5). Firms are more likely 
to hire multiple advisers for complex acquisitions. The number of advisers will not be 
directly correlated with the cost of the loan. I use the number of advisers (Number of 
Advisers) on the buy side as an identification variable. In second-stage of the regression, I 
include the inverse Mills ratio as an independent variable. The results in column (4) and 




average AISD is 200 bps and the co-efficient of Aff_Lend is 0.4. Hence, the cost of 
borrowing increases by about 80 basis points (bps) when acquirers borrow from affiliated 
lenders. The median loan amount is approximately $200 million. In economic terms, the 
incremental cost of borrowing from an affiliated lender is $1.6 million per year. 
The coefficients for most control variables are along the expected lines. The cost of 
borrowing is negatively associated with diversifying deals (Diversify) and public targets 
(Public Tgt), and positively associated with the relative size of the deal (Relative Value) 
and fraction of cash paid (Cash Pct). When acquirers pursue diversifying acquisitions, the 
diversification effect lowers the overall risk of the firm (Aivazian, Qiu, and Rahaman 
2015), which explains the negative coefficient on Diversify. Public targets are easier to 
screen and hence, have lower information production costs. Relative Size (Relative Value) 
is also positive and statistically significant. This is consistent with the expectation that 
relatively large deals are riskier, and lenders price this incremental risk. 
Loan spreads are negatively correlated with acquirer firm size (log(Assets)_Acq), 
and positively associated with acquirer leverage (Leverage_Acq). The coefficients on loan 
characteristics are also consistent with the literature. The spread of the loans is positively 
correlated with collateral (Gottesman and Roberts 2007) and maturity (Gottesman and 
Roberts 2004), and negatively correlated with amount. 
Overall, I find that acquisition loans originated by affiliated lenders are more 
expensive than those originated by unaffiliated lenders. This phenomenon can be the 
outcome of three possibilities. First, the acquirer is financially constrained, and the 
affiliated lender is extracting rents. I include measures of financial constraints (Size-Age 




in the estimation of equation 1. I find that the Size-Age Index and the KZ Index have no 
explanatory power in the choice of lender and the consequent cost of borrowing 
(unreported results). Further, financially constrained acquirers prefer issuing equity over 
debt for cash payments to the target (Vladimirov 2015).  
The second possibility is that the M&A adviser possesses private information on 
the deal and can leverage this information to earn rents (Sharpe 1990). Bank dependent 
acquirers with an intense/concentrated relationship would be more prone to a hold-up 
problem (Rajan 1992; J. F. Houston and James 2001). Firms without a public debt rating 
are considered to be bank dependent (Chava and Purnanandam 2011). The coefficient on 
acquirer rating is positive and significant. This suggests that non-bank dependent 
borrowers are more likely to borrow from an affiliated lender i.e., adviser informational 
rent extraction is not a plausible explanation. I provide additional evidence to refute the 
possibility of rent extraction in robustness test section.  
The third possible explanation for higher spreads is that the acquisition loan is an 
integral part of the contract between the adviser and acquirer. Pareto optimality would 
dictate that the adviser’s compensation should be based on the level of effort in evaluating 
and executing the deal. Thus, an optimal contract will increase the adviser’s effort towards 
evaluating and executing the deal and differ part of the immediate payoff (advisory fee) to 
the future (interest payments). 
3.5.3 Advisory Fee 
I provide evidence supporting the above argument by comparing the advisory fee 
charged by independent advisers and affiliated advisers (adviser related to the lead lender). 




advisory fee data is available for 120 transactions in the sample. Table V presents the OLS 
regression of the advisory fee on deal and firm characteristics. The dependent variable is 
the advisory fee as a percentage of deal value. The coefficient on Aff_Lend is negative and 
statistically significant in all specifications. Affiliated advisers offer discount of 20 basis 
points on advisory fees.  
The acquirer-lender pairing may not be random, and hence I use the two-stage 
regression to correct for self-selection. Acquirers with prior M&A experience will be less 
dependent on the adviser. The identification variable in column (3) is the M&A experience 
of the acquirer. The coefficient of M&A Experience is negative and significant. After 
correcting for the self-selection, the coefficient of Aff_Lend in column (4) suggests that 
affiliated advisers accept lower advisory fees. The median deal size is $365 million. Thus, 
affiliated advisors accept $0.73 million less in advisory fees than independent advisors.  
Some M&A deals may be subject to antitrust approvals from the Federal Trade 
Com- mission and the Justice Department. Hence, executing such deals may require the 
expertise of financial advisers, which explains the positive coefficient on Regulated. 
Similarly, inter-state deals and relatively large deals may involve greater effort, and thereby 
necessitate a higher advisory fee. The advisory fee is also correlated with the size 
(Log(assets)_Acq), acquirer complexity (Segment_Acq) and acquirer growth opportunities 
(TobinQ Acq). Overall, I find that acquirers that borrow from affiliated lenders pay lower 







3.5.4 Non-Price Features of Acquisition Loans 
Lenders use interest rate, collateral, maturity and amount as complementary tools 
to manage borrower risk. Ex post, collateral protects against moral hazard problems 
(Gonas, Highfield, and Mullineaux 2004; Berger, Scott Frame, and Ioannidou 2011). The 
lender can appropriate secured assets when the borrower defaults. Therefore, collateral is 
an important element of the contract between borrowers and lenders. Affiliated lenders are 
more likely to finance riskier deals and thus, acquisition loans originated by affiliated 
lenders are more likely to be secured.  
Shareholder-credit conflicts arise on account of adverse payout policies, asset 
substitution, under-investment problem and over-investment problem. The lender can use 
control rights i.e., covenants to manage shareholder-credit conflicts (Chava and Roberts 
2008; Demiroglu and James 2010). Covenant intensity is higher for firms with growth 
opportunities, and higher leverage (Billett, King, and Mauer 2007). Further, along the lines 
of (Myers 1977), lenders use covenants and debt maturity as substitutes to ameliorate the 
under-investment problem (Bradley and Roberts 2015). Since, affiliated lenders are more 
likely to finance riskier deals, acquisition loans originated by affiliated lenders are more 
likely to be include more covenants. The results of the regression with non-price terms as 
dependent variables are presented in Table VI. 
The intensity of covenants is measured using the Covenant Intensity Index (Bradley 
and Roberts 2015). The CIX focuses on six covenants. These include financial covenants, 
dividend restrictions, secured, equity sweep , debt sweep and asset sweep. Thus, CIX takes 




The result in column (1) suggests that acquisition loans originated by affiliated 
lenders include more restrictive covenants than loans from unaffiliated lenders. I run the 
two- stage regression to correct for self-selection bias in columns (2) and (3). The 
coefficient on Aff_Lend is positive and statistically significant in column (3). The result is 
consistent with the premise that affiliated lenders finance complex deals, which tend to 
have a higher risk of failure. These lenders manage shareholder-creditor conflict by seeking 
greater control rights. 
The dependent variable in column (4) is Secured, which is equal to 1 if the loan is 
secured, and zero otherwise. The coefficient on Aff_Lend is positive and significant at 
10%. This implies that affiliated lenders are more likely to seek collateral to manage the 
greater risk associated with complex deals.  
3.5.5 Optionality Feature of the Loan 
Credit lines are a combination of a term loan and an option. When firms borrow 
using credit lines, it is a negative NPV loan for banks and hence, banks will seek 
compensation ex-ante for this loss. Banks charge upfront fees and all-in-undrawn spreads 
(AISU) as compensation for providing this option to borrow (Berg, Saunders, and Steffen 
2016). The value of this option is directly proportional to the volatility of the underlying 
asset (Black and Scholes 1973) i.e., the risk of the acquisition. This implies that loan related 
to riskier acquisitions should have higher upfront fees and all-in-undrawn spreads (AISU). 
I test the relationship between the value of the option and the presence of an affiliated 





The results are presented in Table VII. The positive and statistically significant 
coefficient on Aff_Lend suggests that affiliated lenders charge higher AISU as 
compensation for the higher risk of the acquisition. In other words, affiliated lenders 
finance complex deals, and lenders price this risk. 
3.5.6 Completion Time 
The life-cycle of the acquisition can be split into two phases. In the first phase, the 
acquirer and target are engaged in private interactions while, the second phase commences 
when the acquirer makes a public announcement (Boone and Mulherin 2007). Once the 
deal is announced, it is in the interest of the acquirer to close the deal at the earliest to stave 
off competing acquirers. Thus, advisers may have to exert higher level of effort to minimize 
completion time. The completion time is measured from the announcement date to the 
effective date. I regress completion time on deal and acquirer characteristics. The results 
of are presented in table IX. 
Affiliated advisers execute deals in fewer days than independent lenders. On an 
average, completion time for affiliated advisers is 10 days shorter than independent 
advisers. The coefficient of the control variables is also consistent with findings in the 
literature. Deals with a greater fraction of cash payments take fewer days. Tender offers 
have shorter completion times than mergers, and acquisitions that require regulatory 





3.5.7 Wealth Effects 
The wealth gains for the majority of M&A deals accrue to the target, and acquirers 
experience negative wealth effects on the announcement of a merger (Andrade, Mitchell, 
and Stafford 2001). In order to preserve shareholder wealth, acquirers must exercise 
diligence in making acquisitions. A bundled contract (advisory service and loan) provides 
the adviser with a greater incentive to screen and monitor the firm’s investment. Hence, 
deals financed by affiliated lenders may be accessed in a more positive light than deals 
financed by unaffiliated lenders. An examination of announcement effects will shed more 
light on this argument. 
The announcement effect is the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) measured 
over 3 days i.e., event window of [-1, +1] and [0, +2]. The proxy for the market is the CRSP 
Value Weighted Market Portfolio. I regress CAR on deal and acquirer characteristics. The 
results are presented in table VIII. 
Acquisitions financed by affiliated lenders elicit a positive response from the 
market. The CAR for deals financed by affiliated lenders is 0.01 (1 percent) greater than 
deals financed by unaffiliated lenders. The economic magnitude of this effect is $36 
million 23 . The co-coefficients on the control variables are also consistent with the 
literature. Diversifying deals (Diversify) decrease shareholder wealth. This is consistent 
with the diversification discount effect. Larger acquirers (log(Assets)_Acq) pursue 
acquisitions with negative synergies and thus, experience lower abnormal returns (Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz 2004).  
                                                          




3.6 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
In this section, I perform a robustness test to support the interpretation of the main 
results. The objective of this test is to validate the finding that the higher spread (AISD) on 
the acquisition loan is related to the contract with the M&A adviser and is unrelated to 
acquirer characteristics. If acquirers were financially constrained and/or suffering from 
hold-up problems, then all (acquisition and non-acquisition) loans from the affiliated lender 
in the same time window should have a higher spread.  
I create a sample non-acquisition loans originated in the same time window using 
the procedure laid out in Section IV. Along the lines of the empirical design for the main 
result, I identify loans originated by affiliated and unaffiliated lenders. Using this sample, 
I run the regression specified in equation 2. The results are presented in Table X. 
The dependent variable is the log of the AISD. The coefficient of Aff_Lend is not 
statistically significant at 5%. It appears that there is no difference in the pricing of non- 
acquisition loans originated by affiliated lenders and unaffiliated lenders. Thus, I conclude 
that the higher spread on the acquisition loan is related to the bundling of financial advisory 
and lending. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
Financial advisers possess comparative advantage in identifying, structuring and 
executing deals in the market for corporate control. However, the incentive structure for an 
adviser may result in an agency problem for the acquirer. I find that bundling of advisory 
service and financing mitigates the agency problem between the acquirer and its adviser. 




principal. The adviser is compensated based on the level of effort, which would be higher 
when the adviser finances the acquisition. In other words, a bundled contract with lower 
advisory fees (immediate payoff) in lieu of higher loan interest (future payoff) will improve 
the alignment of interests between the adviser and acquirer. 
The agency problem is more severe when the acquirer is more dependent on the 
adviser i.e., for complex deals. I find that advisers are more likely to finance complex M&A 
transactions. Along the expected lines, I find that advisers that finance acquisitions charge 
higher spreads (interest) on acquisition loans but accept lower advisory fees. Further, 
affiliated lenders impose tighter covenants and seek more collateral to protect themselves 
from the risk associated with complex deals.  
The effectiveness of a contract can be ascertained based on the outcome. Acquirers 
exhibit superior abnormal returns when the deal is financed by the adviser. In addition, 
advisers that finance the deal demonstrate an urgency in closing the deal to stave off com- 
petition from potential acquirers. Thus, the bundling of financial advisory and lending 











Table 3.1: Lead Lenders for Acquisition Loans 
The table presents the major independent(unaffiliated) lenders, and affiliated lenders. An 
independent lender does not act as an adviser to the M&A deal. An affiliated lender acts as 























Table 3.2: Summary Statistics 
The table presents the summary statistics for M&A deals and the related acquisition loan 
originated between 1994 and 2014. Relative size is the ratio of the transaction value to the 
sum of market value of the acquirer and transaction value. Advisory fee is the M&A 
advisory fee as a fraction of deal value. The covenant intensity index (CIX) and secured 
(dummy) variables are at the package level. All the continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% levels. Differences is the difference in the mean between the two groups. 
The corresponding p-value is provided in the last column. Variable definitions are provided 







Table 3.3: Bundling of Financial Advice and Lending 
The table presents the marginal effects of the logistic regression of the likelihood that an 
M&A deal is financed by an affiliated lender. The dependent variable is equal to 1 when 
an affiliated lender finances the deal, and zero otherwise. Relative size is the ratio of 
transaction value to the sum of market value of the firm and transaction value. All 
specifications include industry and year fixed effects. Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***, **, and 







Table 3.4: Pricing of Acquisition Loan 
The table presents the results of the OLS regression of the pricing of the loan. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the all-in-drawn spread(AISD). Aff_Lend is 
equal to 1 if the M&A transaction is financed by an affiliated lender and zero otherwise. 
Number of Advisers is the number of M&A advisers advising the acquirer. Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard errors clustered at the loan package level 







Table 3.5: Advisory Fee and Lender Affiliation 
This table presents the regression results specified in equation 5. The dependent variable 
Adv Fee is the M&A advisory fee as a fraction of the transaction value. Aff_Lend is equal 
to 1 if the M&A transaction is financed by an affiliated lender and zero otherwise. M&A 
Experience is the number of acquisitions completed by the acquirer in the 10 years prior to 
the current deal. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard errors clustered 
at the firm level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for significance level at the 1%, 






Table 3.6: Non-Price Features of the Loan 
The table presents the results of the regression of the non-price features of the acquisition 
loan at the package level. The dependent variable is the specified on the header of the 
column. Aff_Lend is equal to 1 if the M&A deal is financed by an affiliated lender and 
zero otherwise. CIX is the covenant intensity index. Secured is equal to 1 for loans that 
require collateral and zero otherwise. The regression is specified as an OLS and Logit in 
column (1) and (2) respectively. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard 
errors clustered at the loan package level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for 






Table 3.7: Optionality Feature of the Loan 
The table presents the results of the OLS regression of the optionality feature of the loan. 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the all-in-undrawn spread (Ln(AISU)). 
Number of Advisers is the number of M&A advisers advising the acquirer. Aff_Lend is 
equal to 1 if the M&A deal is financed by an affiliated lender and zero otherwise. Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard errors clustered at the loan package level 







Table 3.8: Wealth Effects-Acquirer CAR 
The table presents the OLS regression of the announcement effect for the acquirer. The 
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR). The abnormal return is 
estimated using the CRSP Value Weighted Index. The event window is specified at the top 
of each column. Aff_Lend is equal to 1 if the M&A deal is financed by an affiliated lender 
and zero otherwise. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard errors 
clustered at the industry level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for significance level 










Table 3.9: M&A Completion Time 
The table presents results of the OLS regression analysis of completion time. The 
completion time is the number of days between the M&A announcement date and the 
effective date. The sample includes only deals with completion time greater than 10 days. 
Aff_Lend is equal to 1 if the M&A deal is financed by an affiliated lender and zero 
otherwise. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Standard errors clustered at 
the adviser level. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for significance level 







Table 3.10: Non-Acquisition Loans 
The dependent variable is the log of the All-in-drawn spread (LSPREAD). Aff_Lend is 
equal to 1 if the M&A deal is financed by an affiliated lender and zero otherwise. Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A. All regressions include industry, year and loan 
type fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the package level. t-statistics are in 
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VARIABLE DEFINITIONS FOR CHAPTER 1 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Aff_Lender 
An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the lead lender is the 
underwriter to the IPO, and zero otherwise. 
Leverage 
The leverage ratio at the end of fiscal year prior to the current loan, 
calculated as book value of total debt to book value of total assets. 
Tangibility 
The borrower's asset tangibility at the end of fiscal year prior to the 
current loan, calculated as Net Property, Plant, and Equipment (PP&E) 
scaled by Total Assets. 
Ln(assets) 
Natural log of the total assets of the borrower at the end of fiscal year 
prior to the current loan. 
Profit 
Ratio of the Earnings before Income and Taxes (EBIT) scaled by Total 
Sales. 
Rated 
An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the borrower's S&P 
long-term issuer credit rating is available, and zero otherwise. 
Term Spread 
The Term Spread is the difference between the yield of a 10-year 






The Default Spread is the difference between the yield of a seasoned 




The real GDP growth in the current quarter in 2009 dollars. 
Credit Line It is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the loan is a credit 
line/revolver and zero otherwise. 
Return on Assets The borrower's return on assets determined as the earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT) scaled by total assets. 
Covenant 
Intensity Index  
CIX from (Bradley and Roberts 2015) with values ranging from 0 to 
6.  
Invest_bank It takes the value 0 if the lender is a FDIC-insured institution and 1 
otherwise. 
Bank_Capital Bank_Capital is defined as equity capital divided by GTA. Capital 
adequacy refers to the amount of a bank’s capital relative to its assets. 
Bank_Size The natural log of gross total assets (GTA) of the bank. 
UW_Rank The Carter-Manaster ranking(underwriting) of the underwriter 
Cash 
The borrower's cash and cash equivalents at the end of fiscal year 
prior to the current loan scaled by total assets. 
Ln(AISD) Natural log of the All-in-drawn spread of the syndicated loan 
Perf_Pric 
An indicator variable that takes a value of one if loan agreement 






An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the loan is funded 
by a sole-lender, and zero otherwise. 
Log(Amt) Natural log of the facility amount. 
Log(Maturity) Natural log of the maturity of the facility in months. 
Log(Deal_Amt) Natural log of the package amount. 
Volatility_12M The standard deviation of the daily stock return measured over a 12-
month period prior to the deal active date. 
Relationship 
∑ 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑗
𝑡=0 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠
𝑡=−5 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠





An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the loan is secured 
by collateral, and zero otherwise. 
Market-to-Book 
The borrower's Market-to-book ratio determined as the market value 
of assets (Total Assets + Market Value of Equity – Book Value of 
Equity) scaled by the book value of assets.  
All-in-drawn 
spread 
Basis point spread over LIBOR plus the annual fee and the up-front 
fee spread, if there is any. 
Underpricing  The change from Primary Offer Price to Secondary Break Price in 
percent (%) 
Primary Offer 
Price (% of Par) 
The price that closes a loan deal in the primary market. 
Secondary Break 
Price (% of Par) 
The price of a loan when it breaks into the secondary market. 




PRCFirstDay The first market price of the loan observed at least 1 month after 
origination. 
PRC30DayAvg The 30-day average market price of the loan measured at least 1 
month after origination. 
ΔPFirstDay ΔP = PRCFirstDay – 100 
ΔP30DayAvg ΔP = PRC30DayAvg – 100 
IPO_number ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑠 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑏𝑦 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑗 
𝑡=0 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠
𝑡=−1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑠 
𝑡=0 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠
𝑡=−1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
 𝑋 100 
IPO_amount ∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑠 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑏𝑦 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑗 
𝑡=0 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠
𝑡=−1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑠 
𝑡=0 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠
𝑡=−1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟






VARIABLE DEFINITIONS FOR CHAPTER 2 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
PTGP 
Propensity to go Public(PTGP) is the ratio of the number of firms 
in a size category in a state completing an IPO to the total number 
of firms in the same size category in a state 
UP 
Underpricing/ first-day return/initial return is defined as the 
percentage change from the offer price to the closing price on 
the first trade date 
Age The number of years since founding date as of the IPO offer date 
Tech /Hitech 
The Tech dummy takes a value of one (zero otherwise) if the firm 
was in the technology or internet business 
Primary 
Primary dummy equals one (zero otherwise) if the offering is a 
100% pure primary (i.e., no secondary shares sold). 
Toptier 
The prestigious underwriter dummy variable equals one (zero 
otherwise) if the IPOs lead underwriter has a rank of 8 or above on 
the 0-9 Carter and Manaster (1990) scale. 
Nasdaq15 
The lagged 15-day Nasdaq return is the compounded percentage 
return on the Nasdaq Composite index (excluding dividends) 
during the 15 trading days prior to the offer date. 
Revision 
It is the offer price minus the midpoint scaled by the mid-point. 





The Bubble dummy takes on a value of one (zero otherwise) if the 
IPO occurred during 1999-2000 
VC 
VC dummy equals to 1 if the IPO is backed by a venture capital (VC) 
fund 
Ln(Assets) 
It is the natural log of the firm’s assets in real terms (inflation-
adjusted to a base of year 2004) 
NASDAQ It is a dummy for IPOs that list on the NASDAQ exchange. 
Capex 







FCP          
It is a dummy equal to 0 if the primary purpose of the proceeds is 
repayment of debt or debt related obligations and 1 otherwise 
FCD          
It is a dummy equal to 0 if the firm has paid dividends in the year 
prior to the IPO and 1 otherwise 
FCYN         
It is a dummy equal to 0 if the Age of the firm is greater than 5 
years and 1 otherwise 
Assets It is the assets of the firm in USD millions  




Sales It is the sales of the firm in USD millions  
EBIT 
It is the ratio of earnings before income and taxes scaled by total 
assets 
Investment It is the ratio of capital expenditure scaled by total assets  
LT Debt  It is the ratio of the long-term debt to total assets  
Secured Debt It is the ratio of the secured debt to total assets    
R&D 
intensity                              
R&D expenses to Total Assets.   
Q-prox         
It is the ratio of the average Market to Book ratio of equity in an 
industry in a given year. The industry classification is based on 
Fama-French 10 industry classification scheme. 
Casheq It is the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to Total Assets.   
Size  It is the natural log of real assets of the firm              
Cflo           It is the ratio of Cash Flow to Total Assets.               
FC / CFC      
It is dummy that equals 1 for financially constrained firms and 0 
otherwise 
Treatment    
It is dummy that equals 1 after states deregulate banking and 0 
otherwise 
Unemployment 
Unemployed percentage of the labor force  
GDP growth 




CEA Index     
The Coincident Economic Activity Index combines four state-
level indicators to summarize current economic conditions in a 
single statistic. The four state-level variables in each coincident 
index are non-farm payroll employment, average hours worked in 
manufacturing by production workers, the unemployment rate, and 
wage and salary disbursements deflated by the consumer price 









































It is equal to 1 if the lead lender and M&A adviser are related, and 
zero otherwise.  
Cash 
It is equal to 1 for where the method of payment is 100% cash, and 
zero otherwise 
Tender 
It is equal to 1 if the mode of acquisition is a tender offer, and zero 
otherwise 
Diversify 
It is equal to 1 if the acquirer and target have the same first SIC 
digit and 0 otherwise 
Regulated 
It is equal to 1 if the deal is subject to regulatory approval, and 0 
otherwise 
Inter-State 
It is equal to 1 if the acquirer and target are from different states and 
0 otherwise 
Hostile It is equal to 1 if the deal is hostile and 0 otherwise 
Public_Tgt It is equal to 1 if the target is listed and 0 otherwise 
Relative Value 
It is the ratio of transaction value to the sum of market value of the 
acquirer and transaction value. 
Multiple 
Bidders 
It is equal to 1 if multiple bidders are pursuing a target, and 0 
otherwise 





Cumulative abnormal return (%) of the bidding firms’ stock in the 
event window. The returns are calculated using the market model 
with the market model parameters estimated over the period starting 
100 days and ending 10 days prior to the announcement. The CRSP 
value-weighted index return is the market return. 
Completion 
Time 
Number of calendar days between the announcement date and to the 
effective date 
AISD 
The all-in-drawn spread is defined as the spread in excess of a 
benchmark (usually LIBOR). It corresponds to the total cost (interest 
rate and fees) paid over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down under 
the loan commitment. It is the annual cost to a borrower for drawn 
funds and it compensates the bank for the credit risk it bears when 
the borrower draws down on its credit line. 
CIX 
The covenant intensity index by Bradley & Roberts (2015) that takes 
the value between 0 and 6 
Maturity The maturity of the loan facility in months 
Amount The dollar value of the loan facility 
Deal Amount The dollar value of the loan package 
Secured It is equal to 1 if the loan is secured, and 0 otherwise 
Revolver 
It is equal to 1 if the loan is a revolving credit facility and 0 
otherwise 
Revolver_Pkg 
It is equal to 1 if the loan package includes a revolving credit 





Perf_Pric It is equal to 1 if the loan includes a performance pricing provision 
and 0 otherwise AISU All-in Spread Undrawn is defined as total (fees and interest) annual 
spread over  LIBOR for each dollar available under a commitment 
TobinQ _Acq Market value of assets to book value of assets of the acquirer 
Leverage 
_Acq 
Total liability to market value of assets of the acquirer 
Assets_Acq Book value of total assets (AT) of the acquirer 
ROA_Acq 
It is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation 
(EBITDA) to the total assets (AT) 
Rating_Acq 




It is the market value of common stock. The market value is the 























I follow Bharath et al. (2007) to construct a continuous measure of 





Number of acquirer financial advisers participating in a deal 
Top-Tier It takes the value 1 if the M&A adviser is in the top quartile in 
terms of market  share and zero otherwise 
M&A 
Experience 
The number of M&A deals completed by the acquirer in the 10 
years prior to the current acquisition 
Segment_Tgt Number of 4-digit SIC segments of the target 





Market-adjusted buy-and-hold return of the bidding firms’ stock 






PROOFS FOR PROPOSITIONS IN CHAPTER 1 
PROOF FOR PROPOSITION 1: 
Note that the inside lender will always offer 𝑟𝐹  to firms with an F signal at 
equilibrium because a lender will lose money for these firms. An outside lender will always 
offer one rate to all firms since it does not observe the signal at t=t1. Furthermore, an 
outside lender will not offer a lower or higher rate than the rate the inside lender offers to 
firms with an S signal. An outside lender does not offer a lower rate because it will lose 
money if this rate is below 𝑟𝑝. If the rate is greater than 𝑟𝑝, there is no reason for the inside 
bank to offer a higher rate than the outside lender because the inside bank can increase its 
profit by at least matching the outside lender’s rate. Similarly, an outside lender does not 
offer a higher rate at equilibrium because doing so does not attract any firms with an S 
signal and will attract all firms with an F signal. The outside lender will thus always lose 
money for doing so. Note that the outside lender can always offer 𝑟𝐹 and only lend to 
firms with an F signal. Doing so will break-even for the outside lender. 
So, for any possible equilibria, below we first consider the cases where both the 
insider lender and an outside lender offer the same rate to firms with an S signal. Denote 
the rate offered to firms with an S signal by the inside bank as 𝑟. At the end we consider 
the case where an outsider lender offers 𝑟𝐹 to all firms and show that this case cannot be 




First, any 𝑟 ≤ 𝑟𝑝 cannot be an equilibrium. The reason is simple. If an outside 
lender offers 𝑟 ≤ 𝑟𝐹, all firms with an F signal will go to an outside lender. Because 𝑟𝑝 is 
the break-even rate for all firms, and because an outside lender attracts all firms with an F 
signal by offering 𝑟 ≤ 𝑟𝐹 , an outside lender will be better off by offering 𝑟𝐹 . If 𝑟 is 
dominated by 𝑟𝐹 for an outside lender, such a rate cannot be an equilibrium. 
Second, consider 𝑟𝑝 < 𝑟 < 𝑟








. Note that 𝑟′  is the 
break-even rate for an outside bank to offer the same rate as that the inside bank offers to 
a firm with an S signal. For the population, the proportion for firms with an S signal is 𝑝𝑝. 
Since a firm will choose the insider and outside lenders randomly, the proportion of firms 
with an S signal that will choose the outside lender is simply 1
2
𝑝𝑝. Note that the proportion 
of firms with an F signal is 1 − 𝑝𝑝, and all these firms will go to the outsider lender. For 














(𝑟′ − 𝑟𝐹) = 0   (A1) 








 from Eq. (A1). Given that an outside lender needs at 
least 𝑟′ to break-even, an outside lender will be better off by offering 𝑟𝐹. So 𝑟𝑝 < 𝑟 < 𝑟
′ 
cannot be an equilibrium. 
Third, consider 𝑟′ ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑟𝐹. In this case, an outsider lender earns positive profits 
by offering 𝑟 to all firms. Note that 𝑟 > 𝑟𝑆, so the inside bank can apparently better off 
by offering firms with an S signal a rate of 𝑟 − , where  is an arbitrarily small positive 




Finally, consider the case where an outside bank offers 𝑟𝐹 and the insider bank 
offers a rate of 𝑟′′. In this case, if 𝑟′′<𝑟′, no outside will deviate from offering 𝑟𝐹, but the 
inside bank can be better off by offering 𝑟′′ + . If 𝑟′′ ≥ 𝑟′, the outside bank can earn a 
positive profit by matching the rate 𝑟′′. Again, no equilibrium exists when an outside bank 
offers both 𝑟𝐹. 
To summarize, the above cases show that there exist not rate offerings for the inside 
and outside banks that at least one of them will have incentives to deviate. Thus, there will 
be no equilibria in pure strategies.       QED.  
PROOF FOR PROPOSITION 2: 
The outside lender can compete for good firms by randomizing its bids and thereby 
outbidding the informed lender for the good firms. The outcome of this strategy is that 
outside lenders will occasionally earn positive expected profits, but also incur losses when 
they lend to bad firms at lower rates such that their expected profits are zero on average. 
More specifically, an outside lender will offer 𝑟𝐹 with a probability of 𝑝(𝐹), where 𝑝(𝐹) 
is the probability for a signal of failure in Period 1. With a probability of 𝑝(𝑆), the outside 
lender randomizes the rate offered to a firm over a distribution of 𝑔𝑂(r). The outside lender 
will occasionally offer favorable terms to some bad firms and in the process make a loss 
on lending to bad firms. But, the outside lender will compete with the inside lender for the 
good firms by randomly offering a rate lower than 𝑟𝑆, the rate offered by the insider bank 
to firms with a signal of success. Because 𝑟𝑆 > 𝑟𝑆 (𝑟𝑆 is the expected rate for firms with 
a signal of success), for the outside lender on an average, the loss on lending to bad firms 




The inside lenders anticipate the behavior of the outside lender and respond by 
randomizing the rate over a distribution of 𝑔𝑖
𝑆(r) for firms that signal “S” and thus earn a 
minimum abnormal profit of (𝑟𝑝 − 𝑟𝑆). It is not optimal for inside lenders to offer less than 
𝑟𝑝 because an outside lender offers at least 𝑟𝑝 as shown in the proof for Proposition 1. 
Further, the inside lender will always offer 𝑟𝐹 to firms that signal “F” because offering 
any rates below 𝑟𝐹 results in a loss and thus cannot be optimal for the inside bank. 
Be we follow the strategy of von Thadden (2004) to characterize the equilibrium 
strategies for both the insider and outside lenders. 
Bidding Strategy of the Inside Bank 
The inside bank earns zero profit from lending to firms with an F signal, so the 
profit of the inside bank can be written as: 
𝑃𝑖
𝑆(𝑟) = p(outside lender bids greater than 𝑟𝑆)[𝑝(𝑆)(1 + 𝑟𝑆) − (1 + ?̅?)] 
  = (1 − 𝐺𝑂(𝑟
𝑆))[𝑝(𝑆)(1 + 𝑟𝑆) − (1 + ?̅?)]      
where 𝐺𝑂(𝑟
𝑆) is the c.d.f for the outside bank’s bidding, i.e., the probability that 
the outside lender bids less than or equal to 𝑟𝑆. 
Note that the probability of success for the pool of borrowers available to the 
outside bank is 𝑝𝑝. If the outside bank bids less than 𝑟𝑝, it will draw more “F” firms from 
the inside lender. This will lower the pooled probability of success. Hence, the lower limit 
for the bids of the outside firm is 𝑟𝑝. The inside lender will anticipate the outside lender’s 
bidding constraint and will never bid less than 𝑟𝑝 when the signal is “S”. Thus, the lower 




The upper limit for the inside lender is 𝑟𝐹 when bidding for “S” firms. If the inside 
lender bids 𝑟𝑋 (𝑟𝑋 > 𝑟𝐹) for “S” firms, then the outside lender can earn a profit on good 
and bad firms on offers r(ϒ) ϵ (𝑟𝐹, 𝑟𝑋 − ). However, the outside lender makes a zero profit 
and so the upper limit for the inside lender is 𝑟𝐹. We can rewrite the payoff for the inside 
lender as follows: 
𝑃𝑖
𝑆(𝑟𝑆) = (1 − 𝐺𝑂(𝑟
𝑆))[𝑝(𝑆)(1 + 𝑟𝑆) − (1 + ?̅?)] = 𝑐 > 0, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑆 ∈ [𝑟𝑝, 𝑟𝐹)
 (A3) 
Bidding Strategy of the Outside Bank 
Profit of the outside bank, 
 𝑃𝑂(r) = Prob(inside lender bids greater than “r”).[p(ϒ).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)]  
 = Prob(inside lender bids greater than “r” ∩ ϒ=S).[p(S).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)] + 
  Prob(inside lender bids greater than “r” ∩ ϒ=F).[p(F).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)] 
= Prob(inside lender bids greater than “r” | ϒ=S) . Prob(ϒ=S).[p(S).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)]+ 
 Prob(inside lender bids greater than “r” | ϒ=F) . Prob(ϒ=F).[p(F).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)] 
= Prob(inside lender bids greater than “r” | ϒ=S) . pP.[p(S).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)] + 
 Prob(inside lender bids greater than “r” | ϒ=F) . (1- pP).[p(F).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)] 
= (1 - 𝐺𝑖
𝑆(r)). 𝑝𝑃.[p(S).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)] + (1 - 𝐺𝑖
𝐹(r)). (1- 𝑝𝑃).[p(F).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)] 
Where 𝐺𝑖





The inside bank will always bid rF when the signal is “F”. Hence, 𝐺𝑖
𝐹(r) = 0. 
𝑃𝑂(r) = (1 - 𝐺𝑖
𝑆(r)). 𝑝𝑃.[p(S).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)] + (1- 𝑝𝑃).[p(F).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)] 
      = (1 - 𝐺𝑖
𝑆(r)). 𝑝𝑃.[p(S).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)] + (1- 𝑝𝑃).[p(F).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)] 
The outside bank makes a zero abnormal profit. Hence, 𝑃𝑂(r) = 0. 
(1 - 𝐺𝑖
𝑆(r)). 𝑝𝑃.[p(S).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)] + (1- 𝑝𝑃).[p(F).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)] = 0 where r ϵ [rP, rF] 
…………(4) 
Rearranging the terms in equation (2), 
𝐺𝑖
𝑆(r) =
[p𝑃. 𝑝(𝑆) + (1 − p𝑃). 𝑝(𝐹)](1 + 𝑟) − (1 + ?̅?)













[θ. p𝐻 + (1 − θ). p𝐿](1 + 𝑟) − (1 + ?̅?)
p𝑃. [𝑝(𝑆). (1 + 𝑟) − (1 + ?̅?)]
 
Substituting 𝑝𝑃 = θ.pH + (1-θ).pL 
𝐺𝑖
𝑆(r) =
(1 + 𝑟) − (1 + r𝑃)





[𝑝(𝑆). (1 + 𝑟) − (1 + ?̅?)]
 
The final step in characterizing the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is extracting the p.d.f 
by differentiating the above equation. Hence,  
𝑔𝑖
𝑆(r) =
𝑝(𝑠)(1 + r𝑃) − (1 + ?̅?)






We obtain the c.d.f for the outside lender as follows 
When r = r𝑃  , then 𝐺𝑂(r𝑃) = 0 
𝑃𝑖
𝑆(r𝑃)  = (1 - 0).[p(S).(1+ r𝑃) - (1+?̅?)] = c 
Substituting c = p(S).(1+ r𝑃) - (1+?̅?) in (1) we obtain, 
𝑃𝑖
𝑆(r)  = (1 - 𝐺𝑂(r)).[p(S).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)] = p(S).(1+ r𝑃) - (1+?̅?) 
𝐺𝑂(r) =
𝑝(𝑆). (𝑟 − r𝑃)
[𝑝(𝑆). (1 + 𝑟) − (1 + ?̅?)]
 
𝐺𝑂(r) = p(S). 𝐺𝑖
𝑆(r) ……………………..……(5) 
𝑔𝑂(r) = p(S). 𝑔𝑖
𝑆(r) ……………………...……(6) 
 
PROOF FOR PROPOSITION 3: 
Profit of the outside bank when firm signals “S”, 𝑃𝑂
𝑆(r)  
= Prob(inside lender bids greater than “r” ∩ ϒ=S).[p(S).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)] 
= Prob(inside lender bids greater than “r” | ϒ=S) . Prob(ϒ=S).[p(S).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)] 
= Prob(inside lender bids greater than “r” | ϒ=S) . pP.[p(S).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)] 
= (1 - 𝐺𝑖
𝑆(r)). 𝑝𝑃.[p(S).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)] …………………………………...……(7) 
Profit of the inside bank when firm signals “S”, 𝑃𝑖




= Prob(outside lender bids greater than “r”).[p(S).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)]  
= (1 - 𝐺𝑂(r)).[p(S).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)] 
= (1- p(S).𝐺𝑖
𝑆(r) ).[p(S).(1+r) - (1+?̅?)] …………………………………...……(8) 
A comparison of equation (7) and (8) suggests that 𝑃𝑖
𝑆 (r) > 𝑃𝑂
𝑆(r) . 
PROOF FOR PROPOSITION 4: 
Probability that a firm signaling “S” borrows from the inside bank =  
∫ Prob(outside lender bids greater than “r” ).
𝑟𝐹
𝑟𝑃
Prob(inside lender bids "r"|ϒ = S) 𝑑𝑟 




𝑆(r) 𝑑𝑟 … … … … … … . . . … … (9) 
Probability that a firm signaling “S” borrows from outside bank  
= ∫ Prob(inside lender bids greater than “r” | ϒ
𝑟𝐹
𝑟𝑃
= S) . Prob(outiside lender bids "r") 𝑑𝑟 




𝑆(r)). 𝑔𝑂(r) 𝑑𝑟 












𝑆(r) 𝑑𝑟 … … … … … … … … … … … … . … (10) 
 
A comparison of equation (9) and (10) indicates that firms that signal “S” are more 
likely to borrow from the inside lender (where p(S)  𝐺𝑂(r)). The probability that a firm 
signaling “F” is offered a rate below 𝑟𝐹 from outside bank is as follows: 
= ∫ Prob(inside lender bids greater than “r” | ϒ
𝑟𝐹
𝑟𝑃
= F) . Prob(outiside lender bids "r") 𝑑𝑟 




𝐹(r)). 𝑔𝑂(r) 𝑑𝑟 



















The probability that a firm signaling “F” is offered 𝑟𝐹 from both the inside and 
outside bank is 1 – p(S). Put differently, for 1 − 𝑝(𝑆) of the firms with an F signal, they 
will borrow randomly from either the inside or the outside bank. 
So the overall probability for a firm with an S signal to borrow from an outside 
bank is 1
2
(1−𝑝(𝑆))+𝑝(𝑆), and the probability for borrowing from the inside bank is 1
2
(1−𝑝(𝑆)). 
A comparison of the two probabilities indicates that firms that signal “F” are more likely 








EMPIRICAL DESIGN IN CHAPTER 1 
The choice of the lender may not be a random choice. We model this decision using a 
modified two-stage Heckman regression ((Li and Prabhala 2007)) 
Aff_Lender = {
0,    𝑍𝑖𝛼 +  𝜂𝑖 ≤ 0
1,    𝑍𝑖𝛼 +   𝜂𝑖 > 0
 
 Pr(Aff_Lenderij)  =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1UW_Rank𝑖𝑗  + 𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜂𝑖  
(5) 
UW_Rank is the Carter-Manaster ranking (underwriter) of the underwriter. In the second 
step (Eq (8)), we model the spread on the loan (AISD) as a function of private information. 
 𝐸(𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖|𝐴𝑓𝑓𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 = 1) =  𝐸[(𝛽0 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑖) | 𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟
= 1] 
 
 𝐸(𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖|𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 = 1) =  𝐸[(𝛽0 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑖) |  𝑍𝑖𝛼 +   𝜂𝑖
> 0] 
 
 𝐸(𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖|𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 = 1) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐸[ 𝑖| 𝑍𝑖𝛼 +   𝜂𝑖 > 0]  
Let ԑi = πηi + νi 
 𝐸(𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖|𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 = 1)
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐸[𝜋𝜂𝑖  +  𝜈𝑖| 𝑍𝑖𝛼 +   𝜂𝑖 > 0] 
 




𝐸(𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖|𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 = 1) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜋𝐸[𝜂𝑖  | 𝑍𝑖𝛼 +   𝜂𝑖 > 0] 
 𝐸(𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖|𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 = 1) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜋𝐸[𝜂𝑖  | 𝜂𝑖 > −𝑍𝑖𝛼] 








 𝐸(𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑|𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 = 1) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝜆 1  + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 (6) 
Similarly,  𝐸(𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑|𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 = 0) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝜆 0  + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 (7) 







We can combine equations (6) and (7). 
 𝐸(𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑|𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝜆 𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟  + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 (8) 
  𝜆 𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 =  𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝜆 1  + (1 − 𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟) 𝜆 0   
The inverse Mills ratio term ( λ 𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟) that accounts for self-selection is equal 
to E(ηi | Lender Type), which is an updated estimate of the private information. Hence, by 
including the corrected key independent variable ( λ 𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟), we are actually testing for 
relevance of private information. A positive coefficient on  λ 𝐴𝑓𝑓_𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 would suggest 
that private information has a greater explanatory power for firms that borrow from inside 
lenders than firms that borrow from outside lenders. In other words, it is plausible that 






SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURE FOR CHAPTER 2 
SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURE FOR HYPOTHESIS “A" 
Step 1: Select ALL IPOs from SDC that fulfill the following criteria 
Dates: 01/01/1990 to 12/31/2012 
Exclude  
Closed-end Fund/Trust: Exclude All Closed-end Fund/Trusts 
Depositary Issues Best Efforts 
REIT Traded only on OTC Private Placements Foreign Firms 
Penny Stocks (Offer Price <5) 
Financial firms (SIC code between 6000 and 6999) and utilities (SIC code 
between 4900 and 4949) 
Step 2: Aggregate number of IPOs by financial constraints (FC/NFC) and size in each state 
for a year. 
Step 3: Merge the IPO data with state-level firm data from U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA). 




SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURE FOR HYPOTHESIS “B" 
Step 1: Select ALL IPOs from SDC that fulfill the following criteria 
Dates: 01/01/1990 to 12/31/2012 
Exclude 
Closed-end Fund/Trust: Exclude All Closed- end Fund/Trusts and REIT 
Depositary Issues 
Best Efforts 
Traded only on OTC Private Placements Foreign Firms 
Penny Stocks (Offer Price <5) 
Financial firms (SIC code between 6000 and 6999) and utilities (SIC code 
between 4900 and 4949) 
Step 2: Collect initial returns data from CRSP and match with the IPO data from SDC by 
using the 6-digit CUSIP. In some cases, where first day closing prices are unavailable, I 
use the bid/ask price (denoted by a negative price in CRSP). 
Step 3: I obtain firm characteristics from COMPUSTAT and merge it with the sample 
from step 2. 
Step 4: I use the date of adoption of the IBBEA from Rice and Strahan (2010) and merge 
it with the sample from Step 3. 
Step 5: The age of the frim from Jay Ritter’s website is incorporated in the sample 
